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With the increase in the number and diversity of attacks, a main concern for
organizations is to keep their network and systems secure. Existing frameworks to
manage Information Technology (IT) security include empirical evaluations, secu-
rity risk assessments, cost-benefit analyses, and adversary-based evaluations. These
techniques are often not easy to apply and their results are usually difficult to convey.
This dissertation presents a model to help reasoning about security and to support
communication between IT security experts and managers. The model identifies
major components of security: threat, user, organization, asset, and emphasizes the
human element. Characteristics for each component are determined and cover the
attacker’s motivations, the user’s risk perception, the IT security team expertise,
and the depth of protection of the asset. These characteristics are linked through
causal influences that can represent positive or negative relationships and be lever-
aged to rank alternatives through a set of weights. The described formalism allows
IT security officers to brainstorm about IT security issues, to evaluate the impacts
of alternative solutions on characteristics of security, and ultimately on the level of
security, and to communicate their findings to managers.
The contributions of this dissertation are three-fold. First, we introduce an
approach to develop and validate a model for IT security decision making, given
known issues related to this task: difficulties in sharing security data, lack of ac-
cepted security metrics, limitation in available information and use of experts. We
propose a development and validation process that relies on two sources of informa-
tion: experts and data. Second, we provide the results of the model development for
academic environments. The resulting model is based on extended discussions with
the Director of Security at the University of Maryland (UMD), two interviewed
experts, fifteen surveyed experts, and empirical data collected at UMD. Finally,
we demonstrate the use of the model to justify IT security decisions and present
methodological steps towards measuring various characteristics of the model.
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1.1 Context: The Importance of Managing Security
For the last years, Information Technology (IT) security has been a major
concern for organizations, as successful cyber attacks can lead to costly consequences
for organizations, such as the theft of sensitive information for the company or for
users. In this section, three stories illustrate some reasons that explain the success
of cyber attacks: a successful denial of service that targeted Yahoo and shut it down
for several hours, the theft of sensitive information of users on their medical records,
and the case of a user falling for a phishing attack that resulted in the compromise
of Chinese activists’ accounts.
On February 7, 2000, an attacker launched a denial-of-service attack against
Yahoo: routers that connected the Yahoo website to the rest of the Internet were
overloaded with fake traffic. This resulted in the non-availability of the Yahoo
website to users for three hours [8]. The following day, the same attack success-
fully targeted Buy.com, which had its initial public offering on NASDAQ market
that morning, Ebay.com, CNN.com, and Amazon.com [7]. The day after, ZDNet,
E*Trade and Excite were then attacked. The direct consequence of these denial-of-
service attacks is a complete shutdown of the websites for several hours, resulting
in a loss of money for companies.
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In April 2009, a restricted database on a computer of the health services
center at the University of California (UC), Berkeley, was attacked [9]. According
to the 2009 report of the Educational Security Incidents [42], this database contained
highly sensitive information on more than 160,000 former and current students at
UC Berkeley and Mills College. It included social security numbers, health insurance
information, and immunization records. The affected database was taken offline to
prevent any further attacks. Mails and emails were sent to people whose information
could have been stolen. Although there was no proof that the attack intended
to steal this specific information, there was still an attempt to access information
that should not have be accessed by a third party. Numerous examples of attacks
intending to steal credit card numbers, social security numbers, or credentials exist.
In this story, there could have been major consequences related to the confidentiality
of individuals’ personal information.
In January 2010, Google disclosed that intruders had stolen information from
their computers [10]. More precisely, in December 2009, the intruders sent instant
messages through Microsoft Messenger Program to an employee of Google in China.
The employee clicked on a link that was included in the messages and inadvertently
allowed the intruders to access his/her own computer and then, computers at Google
in Mountain View, USA. The objective was to access Gaia, which is the famous
Google software that enables users to access a range of services with one unique
password. The intruders successfully retrieved passwords to access email accounts
of two human rights activists in China. Later, Google discovered that dozens of
Gmail accounts of other advocates of human rights in China were routinely accessed,
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through phishing scams or malware placed on the users’ computers [11]. This event
had broad repercussions: Google decided to shut down Google China. This story
emphasizes two aspects of cyber security: malicious attackers steal information on
purpose, and a user fell for social engineering.
Several conclusions can be derived from these three stories. First, successful
attacks can lead to severe consequences for companies (Yahoo, Amazon), specific
individuals (such as human rights activists in China), or users in general. They
include loss of credit card or social security numbers, and shut down of companies.
Therefore, organizations need tools to manage IT security to prevent such attacks.
Second, these attacks were successful because of two causes: either attackers who
intend to harm organizations or users, or a careless user, falling for social engineering
attacks. Consequently, humans play an important role in these attacks. In this
context, how can organizations ensure security of their systems? In addition, could
these attacks have been prevented? There is no easy answer to these questions
because IT security is a field where many variables interact. The next section
presents challenges related to the IT security field.
1.2 The Issues in IT Security
1.2.1 The Lack of Available Sound Security Data and Metrics
The context of managing IT security is different from managing risk in fields
such as the nuclear or aeronautic fields. Two main reasons support this observation.
The first reason is the lack of available, meaningful data. Meaningful data are data
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that have a meaning for IT security management. Most organizations gather logs of
their network activity, which include incidents data or raw data collected by security
devices such as intrusion prevention systems. However, organizations are reluctant
to share them. The first reason to explain this is that these data contain personal
information on users. Through the IP address, the user could be tracked and his/her
habits could be determined. Second, organizations are hesitant to disclose the types
of successful attacks targeting their organizations and their numbers. This gives the
image that the organizations network is unsecure and organizations are not willing
to give this image.
Although organizations collect a vast amount of data, data are often raw data
and would need interpretation. The issue is that there is no accepted definition of
security terms and no agreement on what metrics should be considered for security.
For instance, vulnerability, threat, and risk have different meanings from one person
to another [53]. Besides, there is no common tool for organizations to exchange data.
PREDICT, the Protected Repository for the Defense of Infrastructure against Cyber
Threats [4], is a centralized repository of network operations data for research in IT
security and is a first step towards a solution for sharing security data. However data
made available by PREDICT do not include specifics on the organization (security
culture in the organization, size of the IT security team), details on the users (types
of users), or on the data collection (for instance the configuration of the intrusion
detection system that collected data). As a result of these two facts, it is difficult
for organizations to exchange data, leading to a lack of available data.
Another reason that makes managing IT security challenging is the non-
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controlled environment. In the case of a failure in a nuclear power plant, conditions
of the environment at the instant of the failure can be investigated and a precise
scenario can be built, such as in the Three Mile Island accident [23]. In security, it
is often impossible to trace back the scenario that led to a successful attack as it is
often impossible to find the exact cause that led to a successful cyber attack. For
example, if the number of corrupted computers has increased in an organization, it
may be due to several reasons: there were more attackers, users did not perceive
risks, or a breach in a software was recently discovered. There is not enough infor-
mation about the context to rule out one of the possible causes of the corrupted
computers.
Due to the context of lack of available, meaningful data and metrics, and
incomplete information about the context, it seems difficult to efficiently manage
security. However, although incomplete, available information allows drawing con-
clusions on the level of security of an organization and deciding how to make deci-
sions and invest in security.
1.2.2 Managing Security
Frameworks to assess security and manage security already exist. Organiza-
tions have the possibility to use IT risk assessment frameworks ([12], [13], [45], [90],
[118]), which are inspired from traditional risk assessment methodologies. In these
frameworks, threats are identified and the likelihood that the threat is successful
and the threat impact are evaluated. These two quantities can be evaluated qual-
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itatively or quantitatively. On the one hand, qualitative risk assessments can be
accomplished quickly but the conclusions are not as accurate as the conclusions
that can be drawn with a quantitative risk assessment. On the other hand, the
feasibility of quantitative risk assessments is questionable: experts need to identify
all threats and assess the likelihood that the threat is successful as well as the threat
impact. Aside from being a time-consuming task, organizations often do not have
the data to support such metrics.
Economic frameworks have also been applied [116]. Approaches to analyze
security investments and how to invest in security can be based on cost-benefit or
return on security investments methodologies ([30], [37]). A cost-benefit analysis
can be conducted to determine if it is worth implementing a security solution. One
could also investigate another strategy that would mitigate the risk but would cost
less. A famous economic model is Gordon and Loeb’s model that determines the
optimal amount to invest in security [57]. This model allows identifying how to invest
in security but applying the model is still challenging for security teams. Indeed,
customizing the model for specific companies and collecting data to populate the
model are difficult tasks.
Although frameworks to assess IT security are numerous, organizations are
reluctant to use them because of their applicability. As a result, IT security officers
often end up using best practices to manage security.
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1.2.3 Communication
Results of security assessments can be misleading. Let us consider the case
where security incidents in organizations are recorded: they are based on IT security
officers noticing abnormal behavior on the network. In other words, the number of
incidents is potentially limited by the number of people allocated to work on the task
of incidents identification. More precisely, if the number of incidents is increasing, it
may mean that the organization is more vulnerable to attacks or that more resources
(time and staff) were allocated to identify incidents. Miscommunication is therefore
an issue in IT security. Moreover, people who make decisions are often not people
who actually deal with security (i.e. IT security officers) [44]. There may be a lack
of communication or miscommunication between decision makers and IT security
officers. As a result, there is a need for a framework that would be a solid basis for
communication purposes between decision makers and IT security officers.
1.2.4 The Human Element
Including the human element in security has been an increasing trend ([56],
[102]). Schneier stipulated that the user is the weakest link and that security is “as
good as its weakest link” [102]. Social engineering is becoming a famous mean of
attack to steal users’ credentials [83]. Phishing is one of the numerous techniques
of social engineering, in which an attacker (called phisher) sends an email that
appears to be from a legitimate sender (bank for example) asking a user to enter
his/her identification number and password. Usually, the email contains a link
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towards a fraudulent web page that appears to be the user’s bank home page.
When information is entered by the user, the phisher collects these data for future
fraudulent purposes. In this context, an organization can install many devices but
it may not totally prevent phishing attacks from being successful.
Another example of potential security breach related to users is the use of
passwords. Some users tend to use easy passwords (such as their username, “pass-
word”, or “1234”) because they are easier to remember. These easy passwords are
also the first passwords attackers will try to hack a user account. To cope with
this issue, organizations are advised to impose a strong password policy, as recom-
mended in [93]. Organizations (IT security team and managers) definitely play a
key role in defending their network by making users sensitive to phishing attacks
or by imposing a password policy (minimum number of characters, letters versus
numbers, lower case versus upper case letters).
The organizations’ objective is to protect their network and systems from ma-
licious activity. Behind every malicious activity, a human attacker is hidden: social
engineering, virus, denial of service. Attackers’ objective is to harm an organization
or users. Their motivations can be diverse: some attackers want to steal users’
credentials, others launch attacks for fun.
The examples cited in this section show that the human elements play a major
role in security. While making decisions for security, the human elements (user,




In the first section, we presented examples of successful attacks to motivate
the need of managing IT security to prevent severe consequences for users and
organizations. In the previous subsections, we identified several issues in IT security.
First, there is a lack of available, meaningful data and metrics. Second, managing
IT security is challenging because current frameworks require many resources (time
and people) and are not easily applicable. Third, we emphasized the difficulty of
communication between IT security officers and managers. Finally, we showed that
the human element plays a major role in IT security, through users, attackers, or
security officers.
Therefore, we aim at providing security officers with a model of IT security
that focuses on the human element, provides recommendations on metrics, and
facilitates communication. Our model includes human elements that are involved in
security, that is to say, the attacker, the user, and the organization. We consider four
major components of security: attacker, user, organization, and asset. We identify
key characteristics for each of the four components, and the interactions between
them. The characteristics and their interactions were mainly determined through
expert opinions, which rely on three sources: 1) we had months of discussion with
the Director of Security at the University Maryland (UMD), who has over fifteen
years of experience in dealing with IT security issues at a large public university
and who is, through frequent interactions with his colleagues at other universities
nationwide, also very familiar with security issues at other US universities, 2) we
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interviewed two experts at other universities for a duration of two hours, and 3)
we conducted a survey and had fifteen responses. Interviews allowed modifying the
four original components to the following decomposition: threat, user, organization,
and asset. The model depicted in this dissertation is validated in two ways. It has
been first validated qualitatively by experts. Besides, it has been partially validated
with available data collected at UMD. The partially validated model can be used in
a qualitative manner for communication purposes: the visual and easy-to-interpret
representation of the model facilitates communication between IT administrators
and managers.
In this dissertation, we also provide suggestions on how to quantify charac-
teristics in the model. We raise the issue that characteristics may not be directly
quantified with collected data. To cope with this major issue, we propose the use of
indicators to help the quantification process. In both the direct and indirect quan-
tification, we suggest the use of data collected in organizations. More precisely, we
provide detailed recommendations on selected characteristics.
1.4 Contributions
This research introduces an approach for developing and validating a model
for IT security decision making that improves reasoning and communication among
stakeholders (managers and IT security officers). Examples of questions that the
model can answer include:
• Should the organization communicate more on security-related risks to users
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or pay for seminars to increase the IT team knowledge?
• What will have more impact on security: educating users, buying new security
devices or hiring people to deal with security?
Specifically, the contributions of this research are:
• Development of an approach for a model for IT security decision making that
includes major characteristics of security and influences among them: This
approach relies on involving experts through interviews and surveys,
• Identification of the relevant components of security: Besides the assets (tech-
nical system), the model identifies the stakeholders who play a role in security,
including the attacker, the user, and the organization,
• Identification of the components’ characteristics: The model identifies key
characteristics of the previously identified components that particularly impact
security, such as the expertise of the security team or the awareness of the user,
• Identification of the impact of characteristics on one another: The model iden-
tifies the interactions between characteristics. A characteristic can positively
or negatively impact another characteristic. The model also identifies the
strength of these influences,
• Suggestion of an approach for model validation in IT security, based on actual
security data: Data collected at UMD are used to partially validate the model.
They include security logs, such as incidents, and a list of implemented security
measures. The objective is to compare the rate of incidents before and after the
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implementation of a measure and compare these conclusions to the outcomes
of the model,
• Qualitative assessment of security: By identifying the influences among char-
acteristics, it is possible to modify one characteristic and see how the change
propagates through the model. This approach aims at facilitating communi-
cation between IT administrators and decision makers,
• Step toward quantitative measurements for security: We provide directions on
identifying measurements of characteristics.
1.5 Outline
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the background
related to three topics. First, we discuss existing frameworks for managing IT secu-
rity and show the limitations of such frameworks. Second, we present what has been
done to identify characteristics related to human elements that could be relevant to
one of the three stakeholders involved in security: attacker, user, and organization.
Third, we discuss the issue of model validation and present the literature supporting
model validation.
In Chapter 3, we detail the approach taken to develop and validate a model
for managing IT security. In the model, we identify characteristics related to the
components of security and the causal influences among them. Identification of these
characteristics and relationships is based on expert opinions. The processes of face-
to-face interviews and web-based surveys are detailed in this chapter. The difficulty
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implied in model validation is raised and suggestions for model validation are made:
model validation is based on experts’ elicitation and case studies developed at UMD.
The results of the model development are provided in Chapter 4. Results of
the interviews and surveys are presented. A model is derived from these insights.
Chapter 5 presents the validation of the model. It relies on validation by
experts and validation of parts of the model through case studies developed at UMD.
Security data collected at UMD before and after the implementation of measures
allow validating impacts of characteristics on security in the model.
In Chapter 6, we present the partially validated model. We provide description
of components and characteristics. We also show how the model can be used in a
qualitatively manner to facilitate communication between IT security officers and
managers.
Chapter 7 presents a step towards the quantitative measurement of character-
istics in the model. We select several characteristics and suggest measurements for
them. We introduce the concept of facets to show that the model can be used to
manage the overall security but also to focus on a specific asset category or attack
type.
Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation. We show how the presented model






In this chapter, we present the background related to three topics. First, we
provide a literature review on methods for IT security management. IT security
teams often use ad-hoc assessments to manage security: they base their assessments
on empirical evaluations of their networks and systems. Such approaches are fuzzy
and methods are suggested to cope with this issue. They include risk assessment
techniques, inspired from traditional risk assessment approaches, and cost-benefit
analyses. We present these methods in the first section of this chapter and highlight
their major problems: applicability and ease of communication.
In the second section of this chapter, we highlight the recent trend in IT
security which is to consider the human element as a major stakeholder of IT security.
Human elements include attackers, users, IT security officers, and managers. We
present a literature review that supports the characterization of these elements and
the quantification of their behavior.
In the third section, we introduce the related work associated to validating a
model. Validating a model may rely on two resources: experts and data. Several
techniques involving these two resources exist and techniques that could be useful
in our study are documented.
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Finally, we expose the approach taken to develop a model for managing IT
security. Our model aims at providing IT security teams with a tool to discuss with
managers on what security measure to implement, that is easy to use. This model
focuses on the human element, which is often considered to be the weakest link in




Most organizations base their assessments on empirical assessments done by
their IT security staff. In other words, the IT team is able to say that security has
increased because fewer attacks are observed, or that security has decreased because
more computers in the organization are corrupted. Deciding what security solution
to implement often relies on a trade-off between the cost organizations are willing
to invest in security and the best decision security wise.
This is not a rigorous method. This method of assessing security may work
in small organizations. However, in large organizations, such an assessment cannot
be used between security administrators and managers to make security decisions.
Communication between the two parties is difficult because there is no framework
on which to base the justification of implementing a solution versus another one.
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2.2.2 Self Assessments
Swanson suggests a self-assessment questionnaire to assess organizational se-
curity [112]. Several controls are inspected (management, operational, and technical
controls): for each of them, a set of questions needs to be answered according to a
five-level scale. The five levels are the following:
• Level 1: Control objective is documented in a security policy,
• Level 2: Security controls are documented as procedures,
• Level 3: Procedures have been implemented,
• Level 4: Procedures and security controls are tested and reviewed,
• Level 5: Procedures and security controls are fully integrated into a compre-
hensive program.
Once the questionnaire is completed, the organization can determine what
needs to be done to achieve an objective of level 3 for example. This method is easy
to implement but it does not seem able to justify the implementation of a security
solution over another one.
2.2.3 Standards and Regulations
Best practices are implemented in response to the “problem of standardization
where subjective judgments may cause variations in design and implementation”
[65]. Best practice frameworks help organizations assess security risks, implement
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security controls, and comply with governance requirements. ISO 27002 (formerly
ISO 17799 [79], [97]) is an information security standard published by the Inter-
national Standard Organization which provides best practices for organizations on
information security management. This standard originated from the British stan-
dard BS 7799. Organizations can be audited and become ISO 17799 compliant. The
standard contains the following domains:
1. Security policy,
2. Organization of information security,
3. Asset management,
4. Human resources security,
5. Physical and environmental security,
6. Communications and operations management,
7. Access control,
8. Information systems acquisition, development, and maintenance,
9. Information security incident management,
10. Business continuity management,
11. Compliance.
Each domain contains one or several control objectives and one or more con-
trols that can be applied to achieve the control objectives. These domains cover
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organizational, technical, and physical aspects. Saint-Germain provides a schematic
top-down structure that includes these domains and that shows that their impact is
felt from the management or organizational level to the operational level [97]. This
structure is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Pyramidal Structure of the Domains of the ISO 27002 Standard
Standards are not useful to all organizations. On the one hand, it is useful
for e-commerces to be certified so that customers are ensured that the organization
complies with governance requirements. On the other hand, standards are not
flexible enough for organizations such as universities, where policies cannot be as
much enforced as in governmental agencies for example. In addition, standards do
not allow deciding among alternatives, what security solution to implement.
18
2.2.4 Security Risk Assessments
In order to cope with the fuzziness of empirical approaches, frameworks to
assess security and decide how to invest in security have been developed. IT risk
assessments are based on traditional risk assessments. Examples of proposed risk
assessment methodologies are [12], [13], [25], [45], [90], [109], [118]. For instance,
Aagedal et al. propose guidelines for each step of the risk assessment process [12].
Especially, the authors suggest how to implement traditional risk assessment tech-
niques (e.g. Hazop method, fault tree analysis) to risk assessment for information
systems. However the scope of this work is mainly the security-critical systems such
as an e-commerce website.
A typical IT risk assessment consists in 1) defining the system, 2) identifying
the threats on the system and the vulnerabilities the system is exposed to, 3) cal-
culating the risk by multiplying the likelihood that a threat is successful and the
threat impact (or criticality or severity), and 4) recommending controls.
These terms are defined in different ways, the following being examples [109]:
Threat: “The potential for a threat-source to exercise (accidentally trigger or
intentionally exploit) a specific vulnerability.”
Threat-source: “Either (1) intent and method targeted at the intentional
exploitation of a vulnerability or (2) a situation and method that may accidentally
trigger a vulnerability.”
Vulnerability: “A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design,
implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised (accidentally triggered
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or intentionally exploited) and result in a security breach or a violation of the sys-
tem’s security policy.”
The steps of an IT risk assessment are shown in Figure 2.2 (inspired from [109]).
Step 1 identifies the scope of the risk assessment. For example, boundaries of the IT
system, its resources (hardware, software, and human), and information to protect
are identified. The output of step 2 is a list of threat-sources that could exploit a
specific vulnerability in the organization and a list of vulnerabilities that could be
exploited by threat-sources. Step 3 can be done qualitatively or quantitatively. For
instance, qualitative assessment consists in assigning a low, medium or high value
to the likelihood that a specific vulnerability is successfully exploited by a threat-
source and to the threat impact ([13] and [45]). A risk determination matrix allows
determining the risk given an assessment of the likelihood and the impact (Step 4).
Table 2.1 (from [45]) shows a sample risk matrix suggested by the SysAdmin, Audit,
Network, Security (SANS) institute. A semi-qualitative assessment would consist in
assigning a number to the likelihood and to the impact rather than a low, medium
or high value [109]. A sample risk level matrix for semi-qualitative assessment is
shown in Table 2.2 (from [109]). Quantitative risk assessments use the Annualized
Loss Expectancy (ALE): this approach is discussed in the next subsection.
After computing the risk (using a qualitative, semi-qualitative or quantitative
risk assessment), decision makers can decide what strategies to adopt to mitigate
risks (Step 5).
The best strategy for organizations is a trade-off between 1) the cost organi-
zations are willing to pay for security and 2) the best decision security wise.
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Figure 2.2: Example of an IT Risk Assessment Methodology Flowchart
Limitations are encountered in IT risk assessments:
• Applicability: Developing a risk assessment in an organization is resource
demanding. Not only do system administrators need to identify threats and
vulnerabilities, they also need to identify a frequency of occurrence and a
gravity factor (to be linked with the value of losing an asset). Especially for
large organizations, risk assessments require that many experts are involved in
the process, and that many threats are covered, resulting in a non-manageable
number of threat scenarios,
• Communication: Results of risk assessments need to be communicated to a
variety of people, including security team, decision makers, managers, and
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Table 2.1: Sample Qualitative Risk Determination Matrix
Impact
Low Moderate High
Low Low Low Moderate
Likelihood Moderate Low Moderate High
High Moderate High High
users, and it is sometimes difficult to convey results of risk assessments to
people.
2.2.5 Economic Approaches
Economic approaches have been recently used to assess security. A cost-benefit
analysis can be conducted to determine whether it is worth implementing a solution.
On the one hand, the cost of implementing a specific strategy is evaluated. On the
other hand, the benefit of implementing such a solution is calculated. If the cost is
higher than the benefit, the strategy is not implemented. On the contrary, if the
benefit is higher than the cost, the strategy may be considered for implementation.
One could also investigate another strategy that would mitigate the risk but would
cost less. If the cost is equal to the benefit, the organization gains no advantage in
implementing it.
One of the most famous economic approaches is the Annualized Loss Ex-
pectancy (ALE) approach. The ALE represents the risk of loosing an asset because
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Table 2.2: Sample Semi-Qualitative Risk Determination Matrix - Risk Scale: High
(from 50 to 100), Moderate (from 10 to 50), Low (from 1 to 10)
Impact
Low (10) Moderate (50) High (100)
High (1.0) Low Moderate High
10 ∗ 1.0 = 10 50 ∗ 1.0 = 50 100 ∗ 1.0 = 100
Likelihood Moderate (0.5) Low Moderate Moderate
10 ∗ 0.5 = 5 50 ∗ 0.5 = 25 100 ∗ 0.5 = 50
Low (0.1) Low Low Low
10 ∗ 0.1 = 1 50 ∗ 0.1 = 5 100 ∗ 0.1 = 10
of a successful threat. For that matter, it is often used for quantitative risk assess-
ments. The ALE is defined as the product of the the Annual Rate of Occurrence
(ARO), which is the frequency for losing an asset, by the Single Loss Expectancy
(SLE), which is the value in dollars of the loss of the asset:
ALE = ARO ∗ SLE (2.1)
Gordon and Loeb propose an extension of the ALE approach by defining the
expected loss as [57]:
E = λ ∗ t ∗ ν (2.2)
Where λ is defined as the loss given a successful breach, t as the probability
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that a threat occurs, and ν the vulnerability, which is the probability that once
a threat occurs, the attack is successful. Gordon and Loeb’s approach aims at
determining the optimal monetary amount to invest in security. The authors model
the security breach function as being dependent on the amount spent in protecting
assets. They show that there is an optimal amount decision makers should invest in
security. This theoretical approach does not provide hints on how to decide among
security solutions.
Soo Hoo presents a decision-analysis-based, ALE framework that allows to
make a decision between several security alternatives [65]. His approach is based on
the identification of additional benefit and cost inherent to the implementation of a
given policy with respect to a baseline situation. Soo Hoo raises the issue of dearth
of data but does not explicitly explain how data can be used in his framework.
Schechter suggests a measure of security strength based on economics [100],
where a market price to discover a new vulnerability is introduced as a measure of
the security strength for software without known vulnerabilities. This work has the
potential to help decision makers in ranking software based on a common security
metric. However, the scope of this work is limited to software security. In addition,
gathering data to estimate the market price to discover new vulnerabilities requires
developers to be involved and so this approach has limited applicability.
Other economic approaches include the Return on Investment (ROI), the Re-
turn On Attack (ROA) [37], the Internal Rate on Return (IRR), and the Return
On Security Investment (ROSI) [107]. The intuitive ROI is defined as the difference
between the ALE before and after the implementation of a security measure divided
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by the cost of the measure. Cremonini and Martini believe that this definition lacks
to consider the attacker’s interests [37]. They suggest the coupled use of the ROA
with the ROI. The ROA captures how the attacker’s behavior changes with the
adoption of a security measure by the organization. It is defined by the ratio of the
gain he/she expects from a successful attack and the losses he/she encounters due
to the implementation of the security measure.
The Return on Security Investment (ROSI) metric is based on three quantities:
the risk exposure RE, which is the dollar amount of loosing an asset, the solution
cost SC, which is the cost of implementing the solution, and the percentage of
mitigated risk PRM, which is the expected mitigation after the implementation of
the measure. It is defined as:
ROSI =
(RE ∗ PRM) − SC
SC
(2.3)
Gordon and Loeb strongly argue with the use of the ROI and ROSI metrics
because of two inherent assumptions that are rarely met in reality: the investment
must produce a constant return each year, and accounting profits must coincide
with cash profits [58]. They introduce the Internal Rate on Return (IRR), based on








If the IRR is greater than the discount rate or cost of capital k, which is
the minimum rate a project needs to earn so that the organization’s value is not
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reduced, the solution should be implemented whereas it should not be implemented
if the IRR is less than k.
These economic approaches are, without doubt, the methods that decision
makers are the most familiar with. Their quantitative nature allows a quantifiable
comparison among security solutions. Besides, accounting for the cost of a security
solution when making decisions is a major concern for managers. However, despite
the unquestionable advantages of these measures, the inherent criticism is how to
gather data to calculate these measures, and what data to use. As discussed before,
calculating the ALE requires that one assesses the monetary value of loosing an
asset, which is made challenging for intangible assets. The probability of a threat
occurring or the losses an attacker sustains are other examples of quantities difficult
to evaluate.
2.2.6 Frameworks for Decision Making
Bodin et al. suggest using the Analytical Hierarchy Process to rank security
solutions and decide the optimal allocation of budget [22]. First, the organization
identifies criteria and sub-criteria they want to take into account when making
a decision, and assign weights to each criterion and sub-criterion. These include
confidentiality, data integrity, and availability. Then the organization investigates
several alternatives. Each alternative is evaluated against each criterion by using
an intensity measure that captures how well an alternative accomplishes a criterion.
At the end of the process, each alternative is assigned a score between 0 and 1, 1
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being the perfect score and therefore the optimal alternative. This approach has
the advantage of comparing criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives and can facilitate
decision making. However, a decision maker is needed along the entire process to
choose criteria and sub-criteria, assign weight, make evaluations to derive a ranking
of the alternatives. Providing a composite score hides the fact that this approach
heavily relies on the subjectivity of an expert.
Houmb presents a framework for making security decisions. Her work describes
a tool that supports decision makers in choosing one or a set of security solutions
among alternatives [66]. The approach is called the Aspect-Oriented Risk Driven De-
velopment (AORDD) Framework and combines Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM)
with Risk Driven Development (RDD) techniques. The AORDD Framework is com-
posed of seven components, including the AORDD security solution trade-off anal-
ysis and the trust-based information aggregation schema. This work also presents
two types of information: observable, empirical, or objective information and sub-
jective or interpreted information through experts. This framework originates from
the traditional risk assessment approach and incorporates the ability of qualitative
and quantitative assessments. Parameters are derived and scores can be calculated.
The issue when using aggregate scores is that information may be hidden behind the
unique score. This work focuses on decisions at the low level: for example, a solu-
tion considered against Denial-of-Service attacks is to develop a filtering mechanism.
This work does not incorporate decisions at a higher level, such as the installation
of a new security device on the organization’s network. In addition, it is unclear
how the framework helps in a real environment for making decisions: Houmb uses
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the example of honeypots as empirical data but does not mention how organizations
can use her framework and use their own empirical data.
2.2.7 Decision Theory and Game Theory Approaches
Cavusoglu et al. criticize the regular approach of making information security
decisions [32]. According to the authors, the fact that decisions made by the organi-
zation affect the attitude of an attacker (for instance presence of intrusion detection
systems has an effect on preventing the attackers from harming an organization [31])
questions the use of traditional decision making approaches. In this context where
the two parties make decisions and each decision may impact the other party’s de-
cision, the authors study two approaches: decision theory and game theory. More
specifically, they compare three situations: 1) the firm assumes that its decision has
no impact on the attacker (decision theory), 2) the firm makes its decision by antici-
pating the attacker’s behavior through a simultaneous game where the firm and the
attacker make respectively the investment and the effort simultaneously, and 3) the
firm makes its decision by anticipating the attacker’s behavior through a sequential
game where the firm first makes an investment, then the attacker makes the effort
after learning the the firm’s decision. Simulations show that the maximum payoff
for the firm is obtained in a sequential game. This study remains theoretic as no
directions are provided to show how decision theory or game theory can be used to
make decisions in practice.
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2.2.8 Adversary-Based Evaluations
Qualitative evaluations based on the threat include MITRE-developed cyber
preparedness (Cyber Prep) framework [21] and Sandia Threat Analysis Framework
[43]. Cyber Prep provides an approach organizations can use to identify their level of
preparedness to threats on a scale of five levels. Although the methodology provides
sample safeguards, it does not provide guidelines on what measures to implement nor
provide a method to compare security solutions. Sandia Threat Analysis Framework
presents a threat matrix which identifies eight levels based on measurable quantities,
such as intensity, stealth, time, technical personnel, cyber and kinetic knowledge,
and access [124]. Both MITRE and Sandia frameworks are qualitative and do not
provide guidelines on how to choose the safeguards to implement to protect the
organization.
The Mission-Oriented Risk and Design Analysis (MORDA) methodology, by
the US National Security Agency and described in [46] and [47], assesses the system’s
security risk by calculating attack scores based on attack characteristics, adversary
preferences, and mission impact. Comparison of security alternatives is possible
through the relative change in security, cost, and performance.
The Network Risk Assessment Tool (NRAT) is another adversary-based eval-
uation [122]: it is a high-level tool to identify attacks against information systems
that is based on the likelihood of an adverse event occurring and of the severity
of the impact. The likelihood is evaluated based on a series of questions of major
attributes of the attacks and the threat actors while the severity is assessed based
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on the identification of the impacts of the attacks on security and on services.
LeMay et al. present an ADversary VIew Security Evaluation (ADVISE) method
to quantitatively evaluate a system’s security [75]. It is based on the characterization
of the system through an attack execution graph, characterization of the adversary,
and definition of relevant metrics that will be useful for the analyst to make secu-
rity decisions. A stochastic model that describes how likely an attack happens is
generated from these elements, and the execution of the model leads to answers for
the analyst on the likelihood that an adversary adopts an attack path.
The aforementioned adversary-based evaluations is labor intensive as it re-
quires the collaboration of several experts to identify attack paths and quantify
them. As a result, they are not often used for decision making [123].
Red teaming is another adversary-based approach that is, to some extent,
more used than the previous approaches. Red teaming is defined as “a process
designed to detect network and system vulnerabilities and test security by taking
an attacker-like approach to system/network/data access” [89]. More precisely, red
teams are composed of third-party individuals, who have the knowledge, expertise,
and resources of hackers, and who are granted authorization by an organization to
discover vulnerabilities in their systems and network. Red teams use tools to probe
for vulnerabilities and launch attacks against these vulnerabilities. This approach is
more in-depth than attacks launched by hackers: most of the time, attackers need
to find only one vulnerability in a system to launch an exploit against it whereas red
teams identify an exhaustive list of vulnerabilities and try to exploit them. The scope
of red teaming depends on the needs of the organization: although red teaming can
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be used to identify all vulnerabilities, it can also focus on specific portions of the
network. Once vulnerabilities are identified, the organization can make decisions
to handle these vulnerabilities. Although an organization may benefit from red
teaming, it is challenging to conduct one: the security team in the organization
should be aware of the test in order not to stop the red team. While realistic, the
test may not be representative of the actual attacks targeting the organization.
2.2.9 Model-based Approaches
Kotulic and Clark try to build a conceptual model for security risk manage-
ment (SRM) [72]. The authors emphasize the importance of incorporating the hu-
man element as they can cause security breaches or make risky decisions that impact
an organization’s response to threats [64]. The framework identifies several charac-
teristics, including organization characteristics (SRM program posture, IT resource
posture, organization posture, contextual factors), management characteristics, ex-
ecutive management support, SRM program effectiveness. Their model focuses on
the organization and does not include other components, such as the attacker. The
authors do not explain how the model can be practically used to manage security.
The authors attempted validating some relationships in their model with surveys
sent to 1540 respondents in 23 firms. They reached a response rate of 1.6%. The
authors discuss reasons that explain such a low response rate: information security
is one of the most intrusive field and there is a mistrust of anyone who tries to
understand the actions of security practitioners.
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System dynamics has also been used to model organizational security. Rosen-
feld et al. suggest a systemic approach to model enterprise security based on archetypes
[95]. This intended approach includes not only machines but also human character-
istics (security administrators and users). This work is the right approach towards
a simple model to reason about security. However, it simplifies influences to two
possible impacts: increase or decrease. For example, if factors A and B increase
factor C, system dynamics does not allow to decide between factors A and B, the
one that is going to have the most influence on factor C.
2.2.10 Perspectives
In the previous subsections, we presented several different approaches for de-
cision making. We acknowledge that managing security is resource demanding, in
terms of personnel and time involved. However, we want to compare the ease of use
of these techniques with respect to one another. In addition, when managing secu-
rity, IT security officers provide one or several solutions to managers. Both parties
discuss the alternatives and a decision to implement (or not) one (or several) solu-
tion(s) is made. Therefore, IT security officers need to communicate appropriately
the results of an assessment to highlight a need for a security solution or they need
to justify why one solution is better than another one. In this section, we analyze
the aforementioned solutions with respect to two questions:
1. How easy is it to manage security with this technique? Elements to consider
to answer this question include: applicability and feasibility, necessary human
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resources, time, involvement of third parties, or required data.
2. How can decision makers justify implementing a solution? Assessments can
lead to recommendations on improvements. Are the outputs adequate to con-
vince decision makers to invest in the recommended solution?
Among the solutions cited, ad-hoc assessments are the easiest ones to imple-
ment when managing security. They do not require as many resources as the other
approaches but they do not provide support into deciding among security solutions:
it is difficult for IT security officers to use the outputs of these analyses to con-
vince managers to invest in one solution versus other solutions. Self-assessments
and standards and regulations are easy to implement as they provide specific ques-
tions or guidelines to manage security in organizations. When organizations are
looking for certification, they need to have a third party involved in the process.
Recommendations on what to do to improve security are derived from these assess-
ments but there is no guideline on how to decide between several solutions and how
to convince decision makers. Security risk assessment is probably the most used
technique. It is however criticized for being resource demanding. In addition, se-
curity risk assessments do not allow justifying the implementation of one solution
versus another one. On the contrary, economic approaches allow comparing quan-
titatively security solutions and managers are familiar with discussions involving
dollar values. However, the feasibility of these approaches is questionable as it is
unclear where data used in the analysis come from. The same issue with the ori-
gins of data stands for the AORDD framework [66]: it is not clear how empirical
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data are used for the quantitative analysis. The AHP [22] approach is not easy to
implement as it requires the involvement of several experts to identify criteria and
assign scores to them. Both the AORDD [66] and AHP approaches [22] have the ad-
vantage of comparing solutions and facilitating communication. Game-theory-based
and adversary-based techniques, on the contrary, do not facilitate communication as
the outputs are low-level and decision makers do not necessarily have an IT security
background: for example, both techniques may require the understanding of attack
paths. Because of the formalism involved, they are not easy to implement, unless a
tool is already provided [75]. Finally, model-based approaches presented above have
the significant advantage of showing the interactions between components, hence
showing how implementing a solution may affect other factors in the model: this
facilitates communication between IT security officers and managers. Their use is
however limited as it is unclear how these models can be used in a real organization.
In conclusion, there is a need for a framework for decision making that is easy
to use for IT security officers and that facilitates discussion with managers and the
justification of implementing one security solution versus other ones.
2.3 Including the Human Element
Including the human element in security has been an increasing trend ([56] and
[102]) as humans can cause security breaches or make risky decisions that impact
an organization’s security ([64] and [72]). Human elements involved in security




The attacker has been a major concern for the security community. More pre-
cisely, work has been conducted to identify attributes of the attacker. For example,
Arief and Besnard provide insights about the attacker from a human perspective by
defining a taxonomy for hackers and discussing hackers’ motives [15]. Yuill et al.
suggest profile attributes for the attacker [126]. Attackers’ attributes include their
abilities (such as computer skills or attack skills), their knowledge (their knowledge
of the network), and their motives. Also the authors explain that the attacker’s
decision to attack or not depends on 1) his/her valuation of the network asset, 2)
the cost, and 3) the resources.
Quantifying attackers’ behavior has been attempted. An example is an in-
formal quantification in which a red team of experts is used to try to compromise
a system [78]. An alternative approach has been to probabilistically quantify an
attacker’s behavior. Littlewood et al. conducted early research in probabilistic mod-
eling of the attacker behavior [77]: the approach is based on the analogy between a
system failure and a security breach where the effort of the attacker is introduced as
a measure of the security of a system and is assumed to follow an exponential distri-
bution. Besides, Madan et al. model the attacker behavior through a semi-Markov
chain and defines the mean effort to security failure to be a good candidate for se-
curity quantification [80] while Stevens et al. define two measures [108]: the mean
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time to vulnerability discovery and the mean time to exploit a vulnerability. On
the other hand, Jonsson and Olovsson study the attacker behavior through empir-
ical data [69]. This work identifies three phases in the attack process: the learning
phase, the standard attack phase and the innovative attack phase. The experiment
shows that the times between security breaches are exponentially distributed. Or-
talo et al. propose modeling known vulnerabilities in a system using a “privilege
graph” [88]. By combining a privilege graph with simple assumptions concerning
an attacker’s behavior, the authors then obtain an “attack state graph”. Parameter
values for such a graph have been obtained experimentally; once obtained, an at-
tack state graph can be analyzed using standard Markov techniques to find several
probabilistic measures of security. Dantu et al. suggest a methodology for vulnera-
bility analysis based on attacker behavior [39]. The methodology proposes the use of
attack graphs that incorporate attributes related to the attacker such as computer
and hacking skills, tenacity, or cost of the attack. A Bayesian approach is used to
quantify the attack graph. Goseva-Popstojanova et al. propose a general model of an
intrusion-tolerant system to describe security exploits by considering attack impacts
where the system state is represented in terms of failure-causing events [59]. Jha
and Wing propose a combination of state-level modeling, formal logic, and Bayesian
analysis to quantify system survivability [59].
36
2.3.2 The Organization
The goal of the organization is to protect the organization’s assets. Several
characteristics related to the organization have been provided in the literature [72]
and have their importance when managing security. They include the budget allo-
cated to IT security, information security culture, security awareness [99], resources
such as staff, hardware, and software [94].
Martins suggests an information security culture model based on the concepts
of organizational behavior [81]. The author identifies information security controls
at the individual, group, and organization levels that could influence organizational
culture: policy and procedures, risk analysis, budget, benchmarking, trust, manage-
ment, ethical conduct, and awareness.
Schlienger and Teufel believe that focusing on the organizational culture re-
lies on addressing the human element and understanding its behavior [101]. They
propose a framework to analyze security culture of an organization through ques-
tions to users in the company. Each user is asked to answer questions such as “The
computer and electronic communications systems should be used for the company’s
business activities only” from his/her own perspective (“Personally I think this is
true/false/I don’t know”), from the company’s perspective (“The company regards
this as true/false/I don’t know”), and as the best solution (“If I were responsible, I
would regard this as true/false/I don’t know”). The objective of the questionnaire
is to assess whether employees know what security policies state and whether they
support them. The results of this analysis are shown as an information security
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culture radar. This approach allows assessing how employees perceive security cul-
ture and seeing where improvements need to be done. However, this approach may
be difficult to apply in some environments, such as universities, where responding
to the questionnaire will be up to user’s willingness to respond. Quite extensive
research exists on the topic of security culture ([38], [60], [81], [99]).
2.3.3 The User
Little work has been done with respect the user in security. However, Schneier
stipulated that the user is the weakest link and that security is “as good as its
weakest link” [102]. This assertion would place the user at the center of any security
system. Attributes of users have been studied in other areas, such as the human-
computer interaction area. Examples of characteristics that could be applied to
the user in the computer security field are the following: trust ([105] and [111]),
knowledge and expertise ([82] and [105]), user acceptance of the technology [40],
user perception such as perceived risk ([82] and [106]), or perceived ease of use and
perceived usefulness ([40] and [41]), computer-related knowledge and experience [76].
Mitchell mentions that the expertise can improve the perception of risks [82]. With
the increasing concern of social engineering [83], the user has become a major interest
in the computer security field recently. Indeed, even with the best well-protected
network, attackers can get into a system by manipulating the user to get his/her
password. Gonzalez et al. use system dynamics to model social engineering [56].
The authors suggest a simple way to recognize social engineering attack patterns by
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using feedback and reinforcing loops. The advantage of the suggested model is that
the model accounts for both the attack and defense process. There is a common
agreement that the best way to prevent social engineering to happen is to educate
users [54]. Especially, organizations can raise users’ awareness on security issues
through communication and users can be educated through the media.
2.4 Model Validation
Validation is defined by Balci as checking that “the model, within its domain
of applicability, behaves with satisfactory accuracy consistent with the study objec-
tives” [18]. In other words, validation consists in checking that the model built is the
right one ([18] and [87]). There is an extensive literature on validation plans in sev-
eral fields, including social sciences [29], operations research [52], safety assessment
of nuclear waste [115], and information security risk management [49]. Distinction
is made between two sources of information to support model validation: experts
and data.
First, several validation techniques involve experts. Sargent describes four
approaches for the validation of simulation models [98]: 1) asking the development
team if the model is valid, 2) asking the users, who have been thoroughly involved
in the development process, to check the model validity, 3) asking a third party
(also called IV & V: independent verification and validation), and 4) using a scoring
model based on subject matter experts who provide a scoring of several indicators
[17]. Balci provides a group of informal validation techniques, which rely on human
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reasoning [18]. They include:
• Face validity: People, from the model development team, users, or experts,
are asked if the model and/or its behavior is reasonable,
• Walkthrough: A team, involving model developers and from four to seven
people external to the development, meets to identify faults in the model,
• Inspection: A team of generally six people having precisely defined role meets
to identify faults in the model. Differences between a walkthrough and an
inspection include the people in the team and the number of steps of each
technique (two steps in walkthroughs and five in inspections),
• Reviews: A team, that includes managers, meets to check that the level of
quality of the model is attained.
Data may be collected and used to validate a model. Techniques defined in
[98] include:
• Sensitivity analysis: The effects of several inputs on the outputs are studied
(qualitatively and/or quantitatively),
• Historical data validation: If data are available, part of the data is used to
build the model, and the remaining data is used to check that the model
behaves as the system does,
• Predictive validation: The model is used to make predictions, which are com-
pared to the real system’s behavior.
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Although experts and data are two distinct sources of information, they may
be combined to validate a model. Hybrid techniques involving experts and data
include Turing tests, in which experts are asked to discriminate between the model
and system outputs (data). Law describes a 7-step process to build a successful sim-
ulation model [74]. The author lists validation techniques that can be applied to one
or several steps of the process, including: interviewing experts, using quantitative
techniques when possible, walkthroughs, and sensitivity analyses.
Although data may be a strong support to validation, the availability of data
and the appropriateness of available data may be a major issue. Kleijen discusses
the validation of a simulation model based on the availability of data [71]. Espe-
cially, the author concentrates on the use of mathematical statistics. The author
identifies three situations: 1) when no data is available, 2) when only output data
are available, but no data on the corresponding input or scenario is available, and 3)
when inputs and outputs are known. In the first situation, the author suggests the
use of knowledgeable experts, whose knowledge is qualitative. Sensitivity analyses
are also advised. In the two other situations, the author provides recommendation
on statistical tools to validate the simulation model.
As a conclusion, many validation techniques exist, that rely on experts and
data. The use of experts provides a subjective and often qualitative model valida-




Several conclusions can be drawn from the previous sections. First, frame-
works for IT risk assessments have been developed to assess the level of security of
organizations and decide how to invest in security. However, the feasibility of such
assessments is questionable and it is often difficult to communicate their results.
Therefore, the objective of this work is to provide a model for managing security
that is easy to use and that facilitates communication with managers.
Second, the human elements that are involved in security include the attacker,
the user, and the organization. Therefore, in the model, we want to identify major
components of security. For each of them, the objective is to distinguish characteris-
tics and influences among them. This approach facilitates communication between
IT security officers and managers regarding security management: implementing
solutions impact characteristics identified in the model and influences in the model
depict how the measure impacts security.
Third, developing a model also involves validating it. We described in the
third section of this chapter the validation techniques involving data and experts.
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Chapter 3
An Approach for the Development and Validation of a Model for
Decision Making in IT Security
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe the process to develop a model for IT security. The
objective is to develop a model to manage security that facilitates communication
between IT security officers and managers, and includes the human element. The
first section of this chapter presents the model representation that was adopted to
best achieve these goals.
When developing a model, we should ensure that the developed model is cor-
rect. In other words, it should identify correct components, characteristics, and
influences between characteristics. Besides, users of the model should be able to
believe the outcomes provided by the model. Both objectives are covered by model
validation. In the second section of this chapter, we discuss the model development
process and the challenges related to model validation, and especially focus on model
validation in IT security. We suggest that, although imperfect because of the lack of
available data and meaningful metrics, model validation in IT security is possible.
In the third section of this chapter, we describe the carefully thought process
to develop and validate a model for managing IT security from a theoretic point
43
of view. The process relies on four major steps. First, interviews are conducted
to obtain models from experts in different organizations. Second, surveys among
a larger number of experts are used to determine the characteristics to include in
the final model. A model resulting from insights drawn from the interviews and
surveys is developed. Third, the model is validated qualitatively through the input
of experts. Finally, parts of the model are validated by using case studies in a
real environment. Security data before and after the implementation of a security
measure are compared to the predictions of the model. This four-step process results
in a validated model for security management.
3.2 Model Representation
3.2.1 Motivations
Our objective is to develop a model for IT security officers to manage security
that facilitates communication with decision makers. In order to manage security
and decide where to invest in security, IT security officers and decision makers want
to see the impacts of implementing a security measure on security. As IT security
officers and decision makers are often not the same people, the model should allow
IT security officers, who have the technical knowledge, to convince decision makers
to invest in the most relevant security solution. To do so, IT security officers should
show that implementing a solution would impact a set of factors, which would
improve the overall security. Furthermore, when making decisions, there may be
a need of comparing security solution A versus security solution B. Therefore, the
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model should allow a comparison of the effects of both security solutions on other
factors, hence on security.
In conclusion, the specifications of the model are the following:
• A simple visual representation: This allows reasoning about security and fa-
cilitates communication between IT security officers and managers,
• Factors and influences : The model should include major factors of security and
the causal influences among them so that a security solution can be mapped
to a factor or a set of factors in the model, and impacts of implementing this
solution on other factors and on the overall security are identified,
• Comparison of solutions : The model should allow comparing security solution
A versus security solution B. Decision makers should be able, based on the
model, to identify which one would have the most impact on security and
should be implemented.
3.2.2 Model Constituents
In Chapter 2, we emphasized the relevance of including the human element in
security. We identified the user, attacker, and organization as the main stakeholders
to consider. The human components interact through the assets. It is then possible
to decompose each of them into factors that would impact security. Examples of
factors were identified in Section 2.3 and include the user’s risk perception and the
attacker’s motivations. As highlighted in the previous subsection, the objective is
to depict these factors in a model and the influences among them so that the model
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allows identifying the factors impacted by implementing a security solution.
Therefore, the model is composed of:
• Components : Security is decomposed into its major components. An example
of a decomposition is user, attacker, organization, and asset,
• Characteristics : Each component is then decomposed into attributes that af-
fect security. For example, if “attacker” is a component of security, the at-
tacker’s motivation is an example of its characteristics,
• Influences : Causal relationships among characteristics are identified. The ob-
jective is to see how changing one characteristic in the model through the im-
plementation of a security measure impacts other characteristics in the model,
and the overall security.
The next subsection defines the formalism that includes the aforementioned
constituents of the model.
3.2.3 Model Formalism
As we want to provide an effective tool to IT security officers to communicate
with decision makers the impacts of one solution versus another one, we believe that
an effective way of doing so is to visually represent elements and their relationships
with nodes and transitions respectively. Inspired from existing techniques such
as influence diagrams [67] and systems dynamics [95], we represent characteristics
with nodes and influences among them with arrows. Characteristics can take several
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values: in the remainder of the dissertation, we consider at most three values (high,
medium, or low). The relationship between two characteristics can be a positive,
negative, or neither of them. The third type of relationship implies that there is no
simple positive or negative influence of one characteristic on another. We represent
these three types of influences by adding to the arrow the sign “+”, “-”, and “?”
respectively (Figure 3.1). “A has a positive (respectively negative) influence on B”
means that if A is high (respectively low), B is high (respectively low). Moreover, we
introduce weights associated with the influences between characteristics to depict
the strength of influences. These weights are indicated by the thickness of the
arrow. We select a set of three possible weights: a thick arrow, a thin arrow, and a
dashed arrow. A thick arrow represents a strong influence, a thin arrow represents
a medium influence, and a dashed arrow represents a weak influence. Figure 3.2
depicts an example where characteristic A has a strong influence on C and B a
medium influence on C.
Figure 3.1: Positive and Negative Influences
Figure 3.2: Strong and Medium Influences
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For the remainder of the dissertation, we say that A is a parent node for B if
A influences B (hence arrow from A to B). In the same situation, B is a child node
for A.
3.3 Model Development and Validation
3.3.1 Objectives
As previously discussed, the objective is to build a causal model that includes
1) the components of security (for example, attacker, user, organization, and asset),
2) characteristics related to the previously identified components of security, 3)
influences among characteristics. Such a model aims at addressing communication
issues: with a model that identifies the influences of characteristics of security on
one another, security teams will be able to discuss with decision makers the impacts
of implementing one security solution versus another one.
The challenges of developing such a model are two-fold. First, the final model
should be correct, that is to say it should reflect reality. Secondly, users of the model
(IT security officers and decision makers) should be able to believe in the model and
believe its results. Both challenges rely on the model validation, which specifically
aims at answering the following questions:
• Does the model correctly identify characteristics and influences for security?
Does it include all characteristics? Does it include all relationships?
• Does the model correctly provide results for decision making?
48
However, validation of a model is challenging, as highlighted in Section 2.4.
The next sections presents an ideal validation plan and the challenges of validating
a model for IT security decision making.
3.3.2 An Ideal Validation Plan
An ideal validation plan involves the two sources of information previously
discussed in Section 2.4: experts and data.
First, experts elicitation can allow the identification of components, character-
istics and relationships between two characteristics. Several elicitation approaches
are possible: they include interviews (face-to-face or by phone) and surveys (by
phone, email, or mail). In the case of interviews, best results are obtained when
enough time is allocated to the interview, and several rounds of interviews should be
preferred to a single interview. In all cases, we need a sufficient number of experts
for the analysis to be relevant. However, there is no agreement on the optimal num-
ber of experts needed, although there seems to be a limit beyond which adding more
experts does not increase the accuracy of the results. Several studies (including [16],
[19], [125], [104]) argue on the number of experts needed. Besides, experts should be
from several organizations (in-house and external). Furthermore, if the scope of the
model is to develop a generic model, experts should come from different horizons,
such as companies, academic environments, or governmental agencies.
In addition to experts, case studies should be derived from data to validate
the model. This can be done in several ways, as discussed in Chapter 2:
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• Predictive validation: A security solution is implemented and its impacts on
the organization’s security are later compared to the model predictions,
• Historical data validation: For example, past records show the implementation
of a solution. The analysis of security data after the implementation may
provide insights on the impacts of the solution on security, which are compared
to the model predictions,
• Simulations: If each of the characteristics and relationships in the model can
be represented by a mathematical model, a high number of random inputs
provides a range of resulting outputs. The outputs should match collected
data to validate the model.
In all three approaches, data are compared against results provided by the
model. This is depicted in Figure 3.3.
The model should be applied in several organizations as case studies. The
major weakness of the case study method is that the results may be specific to the
organization and may not be generic. Despite this drawback, insights can still be
gained from a case study, and general theories can be generated from practice [51].
Validation of any model can be frustrating because it is not possible to achieve
an ideal validation. Experts may not be willing to help, or may not dedicate sufficient
time, or data may be unavailable or incomplete. The next section references reasons
to explain the difficulty of model validation in IT security.
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Figure 3.3: Validation through Case Studies
3.3.3 Why is the Validation of an IT Security Decision Model so
Challenging?
3.3.3.1 Experts
There is no formal definition of an expert, which is not specific to the IT
security field. An expert may be defined by his/her educational background, number
of years of experience, recognition by peers, or information he/she has access to. In
general, an expert is viewed as a human being who has specific knowledge in a field.
Therefore, we define an expert in IT security as a person who has knowledge in IT
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security, such as an IT security officer. Security experts have knowledge on security
issues and on how to deal with them.
Experts can help during the model development process by providing their
insights into what should be and should not be included in the model. In IT security,
we face the major issue that experts may not be willing to collaborate. Kotulic and
Clark recognize that the research field of IT security is one of the most intrusive
domains as there is a mistrust of any outsider who would like to gain any knowledge
on how practitioners think and act [72].
If experts accept to help developing the model, we may be limited in the
amount of time spent with them. For example, we may need to meet with experts
several times and for few hours every time, which experts may not agree on.
3.3.3.2 Data
3.3.3.2.1 Difficulty of Sharing Data
Most organizations collect logs of their network activity. Security data include
raw data collected by security devices such as intrusion prevention systems and
records of incidents. However, organizations are reluctant to share them. The first
reason to explain this is that data contain personal information on users. Through
the IP addresses, the user could be tracked and his/her habits could be determined.
Second, organizations are hesitant to disclose the types of successful attacks target-
ing their organizations and their numbers. This gives the image that the organiza-
tions’ network is unsecure and organizations are not willing to give this image. An
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alternative would be to use sanitized data. Sanitized data are data that are deprived
from personal information, such as IP addresses. However, sharing sanitized data is
still challenging for organizations because organizations are reluctant to share data
[68].
To face the issue of obtaining data by ourselves by involving organizations, we
investigated existing available sources of information. There are available resources
to allow the collection of data, such as the Protected Repository for the Defense
of Infrastructure against Cyber Threats (PREDICT). PREDICT is a centralized
repository of network operations data for research in IT security [4]. For example,
the category Traffic Flow Data regroups datasets on traffic flow information that
can be useful for research on denial of services. However, a set of security data is
not enough to validate the type of model we are developing. We need additional
information, such as specifics on the organization (security culture in the organiza-
tion, size of the IT security team), details on the users (types of users), or on the
data collection (for instance the configuration of the intrusion detection system that
collected data).
3.3.3.2.2 Lack of Accepted Security Metrics
Although organizations collect a vast amount of data, data are often raw data
and need interpretation. The first issue is that there is no accepted definition of
security terms. For instance, vulnerability, threat and risk have different meanings
from one person to another [53]. Secondly, although there is no doubt that metrics
are needed to understand security and manage it ([20], [27], [53], [85]), the com-
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munity has not come to an agreement on the metrics that should be considered
for security. Suggested metrics cover a wide spectrum: examples include metrics
based on performance, risk ([13] and [45]), financial field ([30] and [57]), and prob-
abilistic approaches ([69], [77], [121]). Despite the wide range, no metric has been
widely accepted and issues have been raised regarding IT security metrics [86]. As
an example, Wang identifies five of them [120]:
• Metrics are often qualitative rather than quantitative (e.g. TCSEC, ITSEC,
Common Criteria),
• Metrics are often subjective rather than objective (for example based on expert
opinion),
• Metrics are often defined without formal framework,
• There is no time aspect related to current metrics,
• Traditional two-value logics are not suitable.
Several guidelines have been developed for security practitioners to develop
metrics ([35] and [113]), and several required characteristics have been suggested.
For example, according to Brotby, metrics should be manageable, meaningful, ac-
tionable (what action should be taken), unambiguous, reliable (ability to believe the
metrics), accurate, timely, and predictive [27].
Even if there was an agreement on what metrics to use, there is no insurance




Without security metrics accepted among the security community, organiza-
tions can use their security logs to measure characteristics in the model. However,
it would be difficult to know the environment in which events occurred. In the case
of a failure in a nuclear power plant, conditions of the environment at the instant of
the failure can be investigated and a precise scenario can be built, as in the Three
Mile Island accident [23]. In IT security, it is often impossible to trace back the
scenario that led to a successful attack. Besides, there may be several causes to
explain an event and no evidence to decide which one is indeed the cause of the
successful attack. For example, if the number of corrupted computers has increased
in an organization, it may be due to an increasing number of attackers, a fault of the
user who did not correctly perceive risks, or a breach in a software that was recently
discovered. There may be no available evidence to support one of the potential
causes.
Although difficult to achieve perfectly, validation can be partially done. In the
next section, we describe the process adopted to develop and validate a model for




The objective is to build a causal model that includes 1) the components
of security (for example, attacker, user, organization, and asset), 2) characteristics
related to the previously identified components of security, 3) relationships (positive,
negative, or neither) between characteristics, and 4) strengths of relationships (weak,
medium, or strong influence) . The process is based on discussions with experts,
that rely on both interviews and surveys. The process is described in Figure 3.4 and
relies on the following steps:
• Model development: Two sets of experts are used to develop one unique model
through interviews (phase 1) and surveys (phase 2),
• Model validation (phase 3) through experts and case studies: The resulting
model is shown to the same experts to obtain their comments, and portions
of the final model are validated with case studies.
These items are detailed in the following subsections.
3.4.2 Phase 1: Building a Model through Interviews
3.4.2.1 Objectives
Several possibilities were considered to obtain a model based on the input of
several experts and are summarized in Table 3.1:
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Figure 3.4: Diagram of the Model Development and Validation Processes
• Showing the model: It consists in showing experts a model previously devel-
oped (by the research team for instance) and obtaining approval or disapproval,
and comments on it. The model can be changed following to these comments
and the modified model can be shown to the next expert. It is the easiest
solution in terms of analysis but it has the major disadvantage of biasing the
interviewees with the original model,
• Aggregation of expert opinion through a Delphi technique ([28], [63], [117]):
Experts are asked their opinions independently and have the opportunity to
revise their judgment based on the results of all interviews. Ideally, a first
round of interview would consist in the identification by each expert of a list
of characteristics that influence security. During a second round of interview,
the interviewees would be presented with an aggregated list of characteristics
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based on the first round and would be asked to depict the influences between
them. A third round of interview would lead to present an aggregated model
and obtain approval or comments on it. This solution allows the aggregation
of expert opinions without bias of experts on one another but has two major
drawbacks. It relies on experts willing to be interviewed three times, and the
aggregation of models may be difficult to do,
• Consensus among experts [84]: It consists in reaching a consensus among
experts through a meeting in which experts discuss together. As opposed to
the second solution, there is no difficulty in the aggregation of the model as
experts brainstorm together, which results in one unique model. However, it is
challenging to manage to have all experts in the same room, at the same time,
and less confident experts may be shadowed by more confident personalities.
We consider that the most dominant disadvantages are 1) biasing the experts
by showing them a previously developed model, and 2) having all experts in the same
location at the same time. Therefore, we opted for the second solution. As experts
may not accept three rounds of interviews, we decided first to conduct an interview
at the end of which we would obtain one model per expert, with characteristics and
influences. The second round of interview would consist in showing an aggregated
model based on all interviews and serves as validation for our model.
The objective of the interviews is to develop a complete model per expert.
More specifically, the objective is to 1) obtain approval of experts on a suggested
decomposition (for example “user, attacker, organization, and asset”), or suggestions
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Table 3.1: Alternatives for Interviews
Solution Description Pros Cons
Showing
the model
1) Show a model previously
developed
2) Obtain comments from
interviewees on the model
Least time consuming
solution for experts
Easy to analyze results
of interviews and mod-
ify model accordingly




1) Round 1: each expert in-
dependently identifies a list
of characteristics
2) Round 2: each expert is
provided with the results of
Round 1 and asked to draw
a model
3) Round 3: Aggregated
model based on all inter-
views is shown to experts to
obtain their comments on it
No bias on the initial
model




Analysis of the results
of each round may be
difficult: how to merge
several opinions? How
to account for contra-
dictory opinions?
Consensus
Have all experts present in
one room at the same time
to agree on a unique model
No difficulty for the
analyst as one unique
model results from the
meeting
Have all experts in the




by more dominant per-
sonalities
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of another decomposition, 2) identify characteristics for each component, 3) and their
relationships (type and strength).
We decided to conduct face-to-face interviews. They have the advantage to
allow the interviewer to follow the thinking process of each expert. Also, they limit
possible misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the questions, as the interviewer is
able to reorient the interviewee in his/her thinking process. However, the interviewer
needs to ensure that he/she does not bias the answers of the experts.
Building the model based on interviews relies on four steps: 1) designing
the interview, 2) selecting interviewees, 3) conducting interviews, and 4) drawing
conclusions (Figure 3.5). The following subsections specifically describe the steps of
the interviews and their limitations.
Figure 3.5: Interview Process
3.4.2.2 Interview Design
The interview is designed as a two-part interview. First, general questions
should address experts’ background, experience, and specifics about their organi-
zation (number of computers for instance). Second, their opinion on a model for
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security should be asked. The objective is to obtain the following points from each
expert:
• The components to be considered in security,
• The list of characteristics for each identified component: for example, the
operators fatigue is a characteristic for human error in a power plant,
• A diagram that depicts: 1) characteristics as nodes, 2) relationships between
them with arrows, 3) type of relationship (positive, negative, or neither), 4)
the strength of relationship through the thickness of the arrow.
3.4.2.3 Selection of Experts
There is no formal definition of what an expert is, hence, no agreement on
whether an expert is defined by the number of years of experience, educational
background, status among peers, or the amount of information he/she has access
to ([28] and [63]). Therefore, the selection of experts is challenging. Monitoring the
background of each expert is necessary for further analysis.
Besides, there is no optimum number for the number of experts to interview.
However, the number of interviewees may be bounded by two factors: 1) geographic
location of the experts as face-to-face interviews require that the interviewers phys-
ically go on site, and 2) the number of experts willing to participate in the study.
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3.4.2.4 Interview
Although he/she may reorient the interviewee in the thinking process, the
interviewer should not bias the responses of the interviewee. Second, results of the
interview depend on the time spent with each expert. The goal is to obtain the
maximum information within one interview as IT security experts may have very
busy schedules that do not allow them to meet with interviewers more than once.
The duration of the interview may be bounded by the experts’ time constraints.
A good time duration is two hours: a shorter time does not allow to gather all
the necessary information while it may be difficult for the expert to focus on the
interview more than two hours.
3.4.2.5 Analysis
After a number n of interviews, n models are available for analysis. The next
step is to conduct surveys among a larger population of experts to gather more
opinions in the model.
3.4.3 Phase 2: Conducting Surveys to Gather more Information
3.4.3.1 Objectives
Surveys are intended to gather specific information through a questionnaire
given to a large number of people. The major strength of surveys is that they allow
a quantitative analysis of the responses. Although a wide literature is available
on survey methodology ([14], [24], [62], [110]), designing a survey for our purposes
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is challenging. In most surveys, questions target demographics (such as gender
or age) or habits of respondents (frequency of computer use for example). On the
contrary, our survey aims at gathering opinions of experts on what they think about
characteristics of security. More specifically, the objectives of the surveys consist
in obtaining experts’ opinion on: 1) a decomposition of security (for example user,
attacker, organization, and asset), 2) a list of characteristics (based on a merged list
from the interviews), 3) and the impact of these characteristics on security.
The following subsections specifically describe the steps of the survey process
(Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.6: Survey Process
3.4.3.2 Survey Design
During the survey design, several decisions need to be made:
• What mean should be used: telephone, online, email, or mail surveys?
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• How many questions should be included?
• What type of questions should be used: open or closed-ended, scales?
• What questions should be asked: demographic, biographic, specific questions
on characteristic A impacting characteristic B, questions on characteristic A
impacting security?
The panel of respondents is a community of IT security experts so an appro-
priate way to conduct a survey is to create an online questionnaire.
The survey does not allow to gather as much information as interviews. There
should not be too complex questions or too many of them, otherwise, respondents
may give up answering the survey. Therefore, we decide to focus on some aspects
of the models. The format of the questionnaire should be user-friendly and quick
to answer: respondents should not spend more than fifteen minutes on the survey.
While designing the questions, limitations need to be considered [51]: 1) questions
should be asked in the right way and should not bias the answers (as opposed to the
interview process, an interviewer is not present to reorient the thinking process), 2)
questions may be misunderstood or misinterpreted (no interviewer is present), 3)
a sufficient number of responses is necessary for the conclusions to be significant,
4) closed-ended questions are preferred, 5) questions should be asked in a way that
the results will be efficiently exploitable, and 6) questions focus on parts of the
model as too many questions may prevent respondents from going through the
entire questionnaire.
The main components of the survey are (Figure 3.7):
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• Introduction: The objectives of the survey should be clearly defined. This
part needs to be appealing so that respondents will go further in the survey,
• Questions about the respondents: As IT security people are often reluctant to
share personal data, respondents name is not asked. However other details are
gathered, such as the name of the organization he/she is working in, the current
position, the number of years spent at this position (list of choices), and a list
of past experiences. The only required questions are the current position and
the number of years spent at this position so that the respondents’ background
is tracked,
• Questions about the respondents organization: Number of users, people work-
ing in the IT department and in the IT security department.
• Questions about the components of security: This section captures the confi-
dence of the respondents in a decomposition such as “Attacker, User, Organi-
zation, Asset”, and in the definition of each of the components,
• Questions on general influencing characteristics: Because questions about ev-
ery relationship in the model cannot be asked (in order not to prevent re-
spondents from not answering the entire questionnaire), we decided to ask
questions about the impact of characteristics on security. The list of charac-
teristics included in the survey is a result of the previously conducted inter-
views. Respondents are asked to assess the strength of each characteristic on
security,
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• Thank you page: On this page, respondents have the possibility to leave their
comments and email address for further studies.
Figure 3.7: Components of the Survey
3.4.3.3 Survey Testing
As sending out the surveys is a one-shot trial, the objective is to obtain a
maximum number of usable answers. Therefore, the survey should be extensively
reviewed. One possibility is to look for a survey center at the University. Another
possibility is to have people take the survey and provide comments. Ideally, they
should have a background in IT security so that they are representative of the
population of experts who will take the survey. The survey should be modified
accordingly to comments before being sent out to experts.
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3.4.3.4 Sample of Experts
Parallel to developing the survey and testing it, potential respondents should
be investigated. Sending the survey to a listserv of experts is a possibility. As there
is a mistrust in the IT security field of anyone who tries to capture how IT security
officers think and act, sending the survey through a credible source is recommended.
A credible source may be an IT security officer at the University.
3.4.3.5 Survey Implementation and Analysis
In order to maximize the probability of experts taking the survey, the date to
send the survey is carefully picked. On the one hand, we ruled out the possibility
to send it early in the week because returning from the weekend may result in a
high quantity of emails and in the possibility of having our survey directly sent to
the trash folder. On the other hand, sending it late in the week would provide
the opportunity to potential respondents of delaying answering the survey to the
following week and forgetting.
The major objective of the survey analysis is to obtain a list of characteristics
to include in the model and the strength of each of these characteristics on security.
Further, the results can be analyzed according to the type of positions of respon-
dents, for instance by separating managerial positions from technical positions.
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3.4.4 Phase 3: Incremental Validation
3.4.4.1 Objectives
As discussed in Section 3.3, a complete validation of the model is not possible,
but partial validation can be achieved. The objectives are to provide a model 1)
that correctly identifies characteristics of security and relationships between them,
and 2) that users of the model can believe. Two methods are considered:
• Validation through experts: The model is shown to experts who provide com-
ments and accordingly, changes in the model are considered,
• Validation through case studies: Data collected in a real environment are used
to validate relationships in the model.
The next two subsections present an overview of both validation approaches.
3.4.4.2 Validation through Experts
The Delphi method ([28] and [117]) recommends to reach a consensus among
experts by meeting with them in a second round of interviews. During this second
round of interviews, experts are shown the final model and are asked to comment
on the model. Questions asked to experts include:
• Do you agree with the structure of the model?
• Do you think all characteristics related to the attacker, user, organization, and
asset, that have an impact on security, have been identified?
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• Are there any characteristics missing?
• Do you agree with the relationships that were identified?
• Do you agree with the strength of relationships?
The targeted experts for this second round of interviews are the experts who
were interviewed during the first round, and experts who took the survey and pro-
vided their email address for further communication.
This second round of interviews does not require onsite meetings, as opposed
to the first round of interview. There is no need to follow the entire thinking process
of experts. Indeed, we need precise approval or disapproval about the structure of
the model, which can be obtained through email communication.
3.4.4.3 Validation through Case Studies
Ideally, the model should be applied in several organizations as case studies.
The major weakness of the case study method is that the results may be specific to
the organization and may not be generic. Despite this drawback, insights can still be
gained from a case study, and general theories can still be generated from practice
[51]. The idea is to check the conclusions of the model against data collected at
organizations, as discussed in Section 3.3 and depicted in Figure 3.3.
3.4.4.4 Use of Indicators
In cases where characteristics cannot be directly quantified with data, we use
indicators. Indicators are defined as metrics or factors that provide an indirect or
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secondary indication of the presence or magnitude of a primary factor or metric for
which we do not have a direct metric or method of observation. Examples of indi-
cators in economics are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the unemployment
rate. These statistics give a sense of how well the economy is in a country. Here, in-
dicators provide knowledge or information about the value of some characteristics.
An example of indicator of the level of security is the number of corrupted com-
puters. If an organization records a high number of corrupted computers, it may
mean that its level of security is low. On the contrary, a low number of corrupted
computers may reveal a high level of security.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the plan for developing and validating a model
to help communication during the IT decision making process. We described the
formalism used to depict components of security, characteristics of each components,
and influences among characteristics. We highlighted the challenges inherent to
model development and validation, and specifically, we raised the issues of involving
experts and gathering data in the field of IT security.
We suggested in this chapter a carefully thought approach to model develop-
ment and validation. The approach involves experts and data and can be decom-
posed into three steps. The first phase consists in interviews of experts in order
to obtain a model with components of security, characteristics of components, and
influences among characteristics. The list of characteristics is used in the second
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phase of the model development: surveys are conducted in order to obtain opinions
of experts on the influence of these characteristics on security. A model results from
these two phases and is used in the incremental validation phase: first the final
model is shown to experts in order to obtain their comments; second, case studies
are used to validate portions of the model.
The model development and validation process described in this chapter are
generic recommendations on how to build a model for decision making in IT secu-






The objectives of Chapter 4 are to present the results of the model development
for academic environments. We developed a strong collaboration with the Director
of Security at UMD over several years, who is present along the entire process of the
model development and validation. In the first section of this chapter, we present
a preliminary model including components of security, characteristics, and their
relationships. This initial model is based on the literature on how to characterize
human elements and on a series of discussion with the Director of Security at UMD
over several months.
In the second section of this Chapter, we present the results of the interviews.
We managed to interview three experts at other academic environments, who are
professional contacts of the Director of Security.
In the third section, we discuss the results of the survey. The survey was sent
to a mailing listserv of about 600 people and fifteen experts answered the survey.
In the fourth section, we present the main steps to aggregate results from
interviews and surveys. The resulting model is presented at the end of this section
and is ready for the validation phase.
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4.2 Initial Model
4.2.1 A Special Collaboration with the Director of Security
Since the beginning of this project, the Director of Security at UMD accepted
to work and weekly meet with us. He has over fifteen years of experience in dealing
with IT security issues at a large public university and is, through frequent inter-
actions with his colleagues at other universities nationwide, also very familiar with
security issues at other US universities. This special collaboration allowed us to cap-
ture his insights along the entire process of the model development and validation
and quantification. This relationship is a very valued asset to our research as often,
administrators do not trust anyone who tries to capture how they think and act.
The Director of Security at UMD helped developing a first model for managing
IT security. Furthermore, through his contacts with IT security officers at other
academic organizations, we are able to directly approach experts. We used his
connections to select experts for the model development and validation. Interviews
were initiated through his professional contacts, and surveys were sent on his behalf.
He is mainly in contact with security experts at other universities; hence, the scope
of the developed model is limited to academic environments. The model may not
be generic and applicable to all environments, such as companies. However, the
approach developed in this dissertation is a generic one that can be used to develop
a model in another specific environment. Besides his connections, the Director of
Security at UMD shared with us highly sensitive data to support the validation




As previously discussed, a first step of the model development consists in iden-
tifying the model’s major components. Gollman defines computer security to “deal
with the prevention and detection of unauthorized actions by users of a computer”
[55]. Consequently, this definition of computer security involves two stakeholders:
1) the attacker who attempts “unauthorized actions”, and 2) the organization (man-
agers, system administrators) that aims to prevent and detect actions of attackers.
Besides, focus has been especially put on the users (i.e. users of computers). For
example, users are the targets of social engineering. Thus, we identified three stake-
holders: the attacker, the user, and the organization. These three elements interact
through the organization’s assets. Therefore, to start with, we identified four com-
ponents of security to be the user, the attacker, the organization, and the asset,
which are defined as follows:
• User : We define the user in the computing field as someone who uses a com-
puter. In the case of computer security, a user is also referred as the target of
an attack,
• Attacker : Gollman defines the attacker to be “an individual who attempts one
or more attacks in order to achieve an objective” [55]. This definition involves
two concepts: 1) the attacker is a human being and 2) there is a willingness
to harm. Even though many attacks are automated, a human being is still
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the source of the attacks by developing them and launching the first attack
instance,
• Organization: Scott defines an organization as “a social arrangement, which
pursues collective goals, which controls its own performance, and which has a
boundary separating it from its environment” [103]. In the context of infor-
mation security, the organizational goal is to provide the most secure network
to users,
• Asset : In business and accounting, assets are often defined as everything
owned by a person or company that can be converted into money. We adapt
this definition to information security: assets include 1) physical entities such
as computers, and 2) data that can be sensitive, such as passwords, credit card
numbers, organizational secrets, or intellectual property.
Later, the component “Attacker” is replaced by a more general term “Threat”.
This change results from the discussions with experts and is explained in Section
4.3.
4.2.2.2 Model Development at the University of Maryland
The first step of the model development relied on developing a model with the
help of the Director of Security at UMD. Based on the four aforementioned com-
ponents, the objective is to identify characteristics for each of them and specify the
interactions between these characteristics. The identification of the characteristics
related to the human elements is supported by the literature (Section 2.3). Iden-
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tified characteristics include the attacker’s motivations, the user’s risk perception,
the value of the organization’s assets, or the IT team’s expertise. We focused on
characteristics that can influence security by increasing the level of security (for
instance the IT team’s expertise) or by decreasing the level of security (for instance
the attacker’s motivations). Age, culture, and gender are characteristics of humans
that we could consider in our study. However, we do not believe that any of them
sufficiently impacts security to be included in the model. The model is depicted in
Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Model Developed at the University of Maryland
The end node of the model is the “Unsuccessful Attack”: the objective of
the organization is to have a high number of unsuccessful attacks, which would be
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representative of high security. We view the “Level of Protection for the Asset” as
the different protecting layers that a computer possesses: protection at the network,
application, system, and data levels of protection. Users can act on all levels but
the network level of protection. This is the reason why the “User’s Risk Perception”
impacts the “Data, Application, System Levels of Protection” but doesn’t impact
the “Network Level of Protection”.
The characteristics identified in the model almost all have a positive influence.
For example, a high value of the user’s theoretical knowledge results in the high
value of the user’s expertise, or a high value of the organization’s communication
implies a high value of the user’s exposure to security. However, trust has a negative
influence on the user’s risk perception. Indeed, the more trust the user has, the more
he/she will be inclined to trust the organization to protect the network. Therefore
he/she will not have a good perception of risk. On the contrary, if the user has little
trust, he/she will rely on himself/herself to protect his/her asset and thus have a
better perception of risk.
The fact that an attack is successful (end node) depends especially on the
complexity of the attack (high influence), versus the IT team’s expertise (medium
influence) and personal qualities (low influence). The better the level of protection
for the asset, the more complex the attack needs to be in order to be successful. If the
attacker is motivated, he/she will be more inclined to develop a complex attack. The
same applies for the attacker’s expertise and attacker’s personal qualities. Therefore,
there is a positive influence between the nodes “Attacker Expertise” and “Attacker’s
Personal Qualities” and the node “Complexity of Attack”.
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4.3 Results of the Interviews
4.3.1 Model Developed at other Academic Environments
Interviews were led according to the discussions in Chapter 3. The questions
that were asked to experts are:
• What are the characteristics of each component (attacker, user, organization,
asset) that impact security (nodes in the model)?
• What is the influence between one another (arrows from one node to another)?
• What is the type of influence associated to each influence (“+”,“–”, “?” asso-
ciated to each arrow)?
• What is the strength of each influence (dashed, thin, and thick arrow for weak,
medium, and strong influence respectively)?
We succeeded in interviewing three experts at other academic environments,
which would not have been possible without the leverage of the Director of Security
at UMD. The interviews were taped and conducted by two interviewers together.
One of the interviewers is an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland.
The other interviewer is a graduate student at the University of Maryland.
The experts’ name and organization remain anonymous. The support sheet
for the interviewers and a blank questionnaire are shown in Appendix A. One expert
has over 30 years of experience and previously worked in a federal agency and in
a company before working in an academic environment. The second expert has 20
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years of experience and previously worked as a teacher and as a software engineer.
The third expert has 10 years of experience in IT networking. Specifics of each
expert’s expertise and organization is depicted in Table ??.
Because of time constraints (on average, the interviews lasted two hours), the
models developed by these three experts are less detailed than the one developed at
UMD. The three models are shown in Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.
Figure 4.2: Model Developed by Expert 1
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Figure 4.3: Model Developed by Expert 2
4.3.2 General Insights
One of the major insights provided by these interviews is that some character-
istics were not mentioned in the initial model, such as policies but we agreed that it
is an important characteristic that influences security and needs to be included in
the final model.
Even though all four experts did not use the same terminology, they identi-
fied some common characteristics, such as the expertise or training of the users or
the IT team, the budget, the available software (patches, detection and prevention
devices), the attacker’s motivations, the user’s risk perception, the hierarchy of the
organization, or policies.
Expert 2 suggested that we transform characteristic “Unsuccessful Attack” to
“Security” which is more intuitive as an end goal.
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Figure 4.4: Model Developed by Expert 3
The third expert (Figure 4.4) does not provide us with a model that is en-
tirely useful: identified characteristics are partially exploitable but the structure of
the model is not. Characteristics of this model can be grouped into three classes:
1) some characteristics correspond to what we are looking for, such as budget, 2)
some characteristics need interpretation, such as detection or prevention, which cor-
respond to available software and hardware resources, and 3) other nodes are facts
rather than characteristics (for instance, “any policy violation has no consequence”).
Regarding the structure of the model, some nodes do not influence the end node
“Unsuccessful Attack” while the objective was to identify characteristics that influ-
ence security, represented by that node. Despite our efforts, we were not successful
in obtaining an exploitable model for the study from Expert 3. This may be ex-
plained by is role in his organization, which was more operationally focused than
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the other experts. Therefore, this model is dropped for further analysis.
Expert 1 suggested the threat as a fifth component of security. After discus-
sions with the expert, we understood that the term Attacker implies the concept of
a human being as the source of the attack. Although an attacker is always at the
source of malicious attacks, automated attacks, such as worms, can spread by them-
selves. Therefore, we decided to label the component “Threat” as being anything
that can do harm and that includes the attacker.
Furthermore, it was suggested to use a more meaningful term for the end node
of our model. Therefore, we replaced “Unsuccessful Attacks”by “Security”.
4.3.3 Outputs
The interviews will be used for two purposes:
• From the three models developed by the Director of Security at UMD, Expert
1 and Expert 2, we extracted a list of characteristics. This list is used in the
surveys to gather opinions of experts on the strength of the influence of each
characteristic on security,
• Once the surveys are conducted, the structure of the models developed by the
Director of Security at UMD, Expert 1, and Expert 2, are used to develop the
final model.
4.4 Results of the Surveys
This section describes the results of the survey at several levels: population of
respondents, opinion on the decomposition “User, Organization, Threat, and Asset”,
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and opinion of the influence on security of each characteristic previously identified.
4.4.1 Survey Implementation
4.4.1.1 Survey Design
As discussed in Chapter 3, the survey is administrated online. Two choices
within free software were considered: Survey Monkey and the online Google Doc-
uments Forms. The free version of Survey Monkey is limited in the number of
questions; hence we opted for the second solution.
Besides, the first page of the survey is located on a UMD URL and a UMD tem-
plate to increase the credibility of the study. When clicking on “Start the survey”,
the respondent is redirected towards the first page of the questionnaire. Snapshots
of the survey and the complete list of questions are provided in Appendix B.
4.4.1.2 Survey Testing
Before sending it out, we considered having the survey reviewed by the sur-
vey methodology department at UMD and by an organization at UMD that deals
with surveys. First, a mass email was sent to students in the survey department
methodology, in which students were asked to review the survey on a voluntary basis.
Second, an email was sent to a person from the Research Population Center, who
is accustomed to designing surveys. Unfortunately, we did not receive the expected
feedback and the reasons are the following: 1) both centers are not providing services
for reviewing surveys, 2) people are asked to respond on a voluntary basis, with no
reward, and 3) the type of survey is different from surveys where demographics or
habits are usually investigated. The person from the Research Population Center
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was unable to review the survey, mainly because of the field of study.
Besides, a testing phase was launched. The Director of Security, three secu-
rity officers, three computer security graduate students, and three undergraduate
students who are members of the UMD Computer Security Club took the survey,
monitored the time to take the survey, and provided feedback. The survey was
modified accordingly.
4.4.1.3 Survey Administration
The Director of Security at UMD is a member of the EDUCAUSE community.
EDUCAUSE is “nonprofit association whose mission is to advance higher education
by promoting the intelligent use of information technology” [2]. The survey was
sent to an EDUCAUSE listserv. This listserv targets about 600 individuals who are
responsible of IT security within a community college or university at the enterprise-
wide level (no individual responsible of IT security at the department level in a
university for example) from about 300 academic environments in the USA mostly
but also in Canada and New Zealand. These individuals include day-to-day IT
security practitioners (later called technical positions) but also IT security managers
(later called managerial positions). The Director of Security provides credibility to
the project and sent the survey under his name to this listserv.
4.4.2 General Insights
4.4.2.1 Visit and Response Rates
The Google Document Forms structure allows us to collect the answers only if
experts indeed go through all the pages and click on the button “submit my answers”
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on the last page of the survey. We decided to monitor the number of experts who
visited the first page of the survey.
Out of 600 experts, 33 visited the first page of the survey and 15 answered the
survey, which makes a visit rate of 5.5% and a response rate of 2.5% of the emails
sent. 15 out of 33 experts who visited the first page answered the questionnaire: in
this context, the response rate is 45.5%. We are not able to track the exact number
of organizations (out of 300) that responded to the survey as the organization name
was not a required field. However, 10 respondents out of 15 provided us with their
organization name and all 10 are different organizations. Based on this number, the
response rate regarding the responding organizations is at least 3.3% (10 distinct
organizations out of 300) and at most 5% (16 organizations out of 300). Figure 4.5
shows the number of visits and answers to the survey per day.
Figure 4.5: Visit and Response Rates
Visit and response rates are low, and taken out of their context, would be
critiqued by many survey analysts. By replacing the survey in its context, we came
up with a set of explanations for such low response rates:
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• A sensitive field: The IT security field is not open on sharing information. We
are not the first researchers to realize it. The authors of [72] recognize that
the research field of IT security is one of the most intrusive domains as there
is a mistrust of any outsider who would like to gain any knowledge on how
practitioners think and act. They attempted to gather information from IT
security officers and managers in firms through mail surveys and 23 firms out
of 1,500 surveyed firms (response rate of 1.6%) responded. In our research,
even if we sent the survey through a legitimate source, the Director of Security
at UMD, IT security officers may still be reluctant to share their opinions,
• Type of questions: The survey does not ask for habits but for opinions, there-
fore requires time and energy from respondents. It is easier to answer questions
such as “how many hours per week do you spend in front of a computer?” than
“how would you rate the strength of the influence of the user’s expertise on
security?”,
• Survey instrument, emails: IT security officers receive many emails per day.
Although, we sent the survey out during the week, in order to avoid the flood
of emails at the beginning of the week and early weekends, our survey was
certainly in the middle of other emails that would end up in the trash folder.
4.4.2.2 Technical versus Managerial Positions
In the analysis process, we decided to differentiate answers from respondents
working in technical positions and managerial positions. The motivations behind
this action are to see if answers are clustered by experts’ position: by aggregating all
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answers together, we may miss insights that could be gained if answers were grouped
by experts’ position for instance. It is expected that technical people have a better
understanding of the protections of the assets, whereas managerial people have a
better knowledge of the policies implemented in the organization. The weakness
of differentiating between the two groups resides in the small available sample: the
small number of respondents in each group may not be representative but we may
be able to draw insights, although imperfect, from the responses.
Out of 15 respondents, 8 people have technical positions (such as security
analyst positions) whereas 7 people have managerial positions (such as Chief Infor-
mation Security Officer). Figure 4.6 represents the number of years of experience
at the current position and the total number of years of experience respectively,
for respondents working at a technical position (labeled [T]), a managerial posi-
tion (labeled [M]) and all respondents together (labeled “All”). The majority of
respondents spent less than 5 years at their current position (8 respondents, which
represents 53% of all respondents1, including 63% of technical respondents and 43%
of managerial people). Only one respondent (7%) has less than 10 years of total
experience; in other words, respondents, both at technical and managerial positions,
are experienced IT officers.
Figure 4.7 provides statistics about the organizations: number of users, IT
officers and IT security officers. At UMD, there are about 40,000 users, about 260
IT officers and 7 IT security officers. Most organizations (60%) are of medium size
1According to Figure 4.6, 13% + 13% + 13% + 13% = 52% of all respondents have less than
5 years of experience at their current position while in reality, 8 out of 15 respondents represent
53%. This is due to the rounding error encountered when summing up rounded percentages. For
more accurate approximations, the reader should refer to Appendix C.
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Figure 4.6: Total Number of Years of Experience: Managerial [M] versus Technical
[T] Positions of Respondents
(between 10,001 and 25,000 users). The number of IT officers per organization seems
fairly distributed among organizations. On the contrary, most respondents (57% of
managerial positions, 88% of technical positions and 73% total) assessed the number
of IT security officer to be less than 4 in their organization. These numbers allow
capturing an idea on the size of the organization, the IT and IT security departments
but these numbers should be considered with care. They rely on the respondents’
assessment of these numbers, but it may be difficult, for instance, for an IT security
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officer to assess the exact number of IT officers in one’s organization.
Figure 4.7: Organizations of Respondents: Managerial [M] versus Technical [T]
Positions
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4.4.3 Components of Security
Respondents were first asked to assess their confidence in the decomposition
“threat, user, organization, assets”, and in the description of each of them as:
• Threat: Anything that had the potential to do harm and contains attackers,
• User: Anyone who uses a computer,
• Organization: Includes security team and managers,
• Assets: Include computers and data.
Experts had the choice between not believing or agreeing on the decomposi-
tion or description, somewhat confident, confident, and very confident. Results are
provided in Figure 4.8. The majority of respondents (73%) are confident or very
confident in the previous decomposition and 60% of respondents are confident or
very confident in the description of the components. Comments received on these
two questions included a suggestion of a decomposition that is similar to the risk
analysis decomposition with the threat, vulnerabilities, risks, and controls.
4.4.4 Characteristics of Security
From the interviews, we identified a list of characteristics for each of the four
components of security. This list was enhanced with some characteristics that we
expect not to have an influence on security, such as the user’s place of birth. For
each characteristic, respondents are asked to assess the strength of the influence of
each of them on security: no influence, weak influence, medium influence and strong
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Figure 4.8: Confidence of Experts in the Decomposition and Description Users,
Organization, Threat and Assets
influence. The list of characteristic per component is provided in Table 4.1. The list
was reviewed and modified by the Director of Security in order to use terms that
would be familiar to IT security officers. When needed, a description was added to
the characteristic.
For the purpose of visualizing the results of this part of the survey, we use the






Where cx,y is the coefficient for characteristic x and group of respondents y
(managerial, technical positions, or all positions), i is the strength of the influence
(no influence, weak, medium, strong influence), ni is the number of experts answer-
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User’s Exposure to Security (for example through media)
User’s Theoretical Knowledge in Using Computers or/and in
Security
User’s Experience in Using Computers or/and in Security
User’s Gender
User’s Age
User’s Place of Birth
User’s Role (if the user is an undergraduate/graduate student,
a faculty, a staff, an intern, etc...)
Organization
Security Awareness Communication to Users
Management Understanding of Security Needs
Security Team Talent
Security Team Qualities (for example withstanding stress)
Financial Resources Available for Security
Available Security Hardware (for example security devices such
as intrusion prevention systems)
Available Security Software (for example patches, signatures)
Risk Assessment Program
Security Policies





Attacker’s Qualities (for example perseverance)
Asset
Value of the Asset from the Attacker’s Point of View
Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View
Depth of Protection of the Asset (includes all protections of an
asset - passwords, firewalls...)
ing influence i for characteristic x, nT is the total number of respondents, wi is the
weight assigned to the influence of strength i (0, 1, 2, and 3 for no influence, weak,
medium, and strong influence respectively).
Let us illustrate this equation through the results for characteristic “User’s
Risk Perception” for all respondents. Table 4.2 provides the number of respondents
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per influence. The calculated coefficient is 2.6.









No influence 0 0 0
Weak influence 1 1 1
Medium influence 4 2 8
Strong influence 10 3 30
nT = 15 cUR,all = 2.6
Based on its definition, cx,y, ranges from 0 to 3. If all experts answer that
characteristic x has no influence on security, then the coefficient will be 0. On
the contrary, if all experts answer that a characteristic has a strong influence on
security, then the coefficient will be 3. For a given characteristic x, a coefficient
is calculated for each group of respondents (managerial and technical positions,
all positions), leading to three numbers for each characteristic. This is done for all
characteristics included in the survey. The results are shown in Figure 4.9. All three
numbers are represented on a unique vertical line. If all three numbers are stacked
(for example for characteristic “User’s Experience in Using Computers or/and in
Security”, respondents from managerial positions and from technical positions agree.
On the contrary, if the three points are spread (characteristic “User’s Exposure to
Security”), there is a disagreement between experts.
The results do not show a strong disagreement between groups of experts.
At one end of the spectrum, the characteristics for which there is the strongest
agreement are: “Organizational Attitude towards Security”, “User’s Theoretical
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Figure 4.9: Influence of Each Characteristic on Security
Knowledge and Experience in Using Computers or/and in Security”. At the other
end of the spectrum, the strongest disagreement is on the “User’s Exposure to
Security”. However, if we look more closely at the raw numbers on the “User’s
exposure”, we see that 63% of technical positions think that there is a medium
influence on security, whereas 71% of managerial people think that it is a strong
influence. In summary, both groups do not strongly disagree as they believe there
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is a relatively important influence (medium or strong).
We can draw two conclusions from the analysis of Figure 4.9. First, there is no
characteristic for which there is a big difference between technical and managerial
positions (for example, for a given characteristic, coefficients of 0.5 and 2.5 for
technical and managerial positions): thus, there is a consensus between the two
groups. Second, when we look more closely at the characteristics where there would
be a difference, even small, such as the “User’s Exposure”, the gap is not due
to a strong disagreement between respondents (for example one group saying low
influence, the other strong influence). Therefore, we do not lose much insight by
only looking at the aggregated number (all positions), as it is depicted in Figure
4.10.
In Figure 4.10, lines show the limits between strong, medium, low and no
influence. Table 4.3 supported the choice of these limits: characteristics are ordered
by decreasing coefficient. The third column depicts the difference in coefficient with
the previous characteristic. This table supported discussions with the Director of
Security at UMD to determine the limits between strong, medium, low, and no
influence.
4.4.5 Outputs
First, the results of these surveys allowed us to have an overview of the char-
acteristics to include in the model. Those for which no influence was identified were
discarded: “User’s Age”, “User’s Gender” and “User’s Place of Birth”. Second, we
identified the strength of remaining characteristics on security (Table 4.4).
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Figure 4.10: Limits between Strong, Medium, Low and No Influence
Deciding on which characteristic to include in strong, medium, low or no
influence, is based on our interpretation. We do not expect all readers to agree
with the thresholds set in this dissertation but we provide the methodology and
the results of the surveys so that people can reproduce this analysis with their own
thresholds. More detailed results on the survey are provided in Appendix C.
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Table 4.3: Ranked Coefficients
Characteristic Coefficient Difference
Organizational attitude towards security 2.87 -
Management understanding of security needs 2.80 0.07
User’s risk perception 2.60 0.2
User’s trust 2.60 0
Security team talent 2.60 0
Attacker’s qualities (for example perseverance) 2.60 0
Depth of protection of the asset (includes all protec-
tions of an asset - passwords, firewalls...)
2.53 0.07
Attacker’s motivations 2.47 0.07
Value of the asset from the attacker’s point of view 2.47 0
Available security software (for example patches, sig-
natures)
2.40 0.07
Threat awareness 2.40 0
Risk assessment program 2.33 0.07
Security policies 2.33 0
Attacker’s expertise 2.33 0
Value of the asset from the organization’s point of view 2.33 0
Security team qualities (for example withstanding
stress)
2.27 0.07
Available security hardware (for example security de-
vices such as intrusion prevention systems)
2.27 0
User’s exposure to security (for example through me-
dia)
2.20 0.07
Financial resources available for security 2.20 0
User’s experience in using computers or/and in security 2.13 0.07
Security awareness communication to users 2.00 0.13
User’s theoretical knowledge in using computers or/and
in security
1.87 0.13
User’s role (if the user is an undergraduate/graduate
student, a faculty, a staff, an intern, etc...)
1.73 0.13
User’s age 1.40 0.33
User’s place of birth 0.67 0.73
User’s gender 0.33 0.33
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User’s Risk Perception Strong
User’s Trust Strong
User’s Exposure to Security (for example through media) Medium
User’s Theoretical Knowledge in Using Computers
or/and in Security
Weak
User’s Experience in Using Computers or/and in Security Medium
User’s Role (if the user is an undergraduate/graduate
student, a faculty, a staff, an intern, etc...)
Weak
Organization
Security Awareness Communication to Users Weak
Management Understanding of Security Needs Strong
Security Team Talent Strong
Security Team Qualities (for example withstanding
stress)
Medium
Financial Resources Available for Security Medium
Available Security Hardware (for example security de-
vices such as intrusion prevention systems)
Medium
Available Security Software (for example patches, signa-
tures)
Medium
Risk Assessment Program Medium
Security Policies Medium





Attacker’s Qualities (for example perseverance) Strong
Asset
Value of the Asset from the Attacker’s Point of View Medium
Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View Medium
Depth of Protection of the Asset (includes all protections
of an asset - passwords, firewalls...)
Medium
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4.5 Developing the Final Model
4.5.1 Objective: Aggregating the Results of the Interviews and Sur-
veys
At this point, we have two models from the interviews, one extended model
developed at UMD, and insights from the surveys. These three sources of informa-
tion will be used to develop an aggregated model, which will be shown to experts
for validation (Figure 4.11). On the one hand, surveys will be used to identify the
characteristics to include in the model and give an idea of the strength of their
influence on security. On the other hand, the resulting models from the interviews
and from our discussions with the Director of Security at UMD will serve through
the structure. The idea is to merge insights from the three models into one model.
Figure 4.11: Flowchart of the Model Development Process
An issue that was raised when trying to merge these models is: how can we
aggregate several influential models? As opposed to reaching a consensus between
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experts present at the same time in the same location, independent interviews that
led to independent models require that the analyst develops a process to aggregate
all models. This step necessarily contains some subjectivity. The final model, based
on interviews and surveys (surveys will be discussed in the next section), is based
on the interpretation of the analyst. However, we provide in this dissertation all
the results so that analysts who disagree can reuse the results of this study. The
process is described in Figure 4.12 and identifies three steps that are described in
the next subsections.
Figure 4.12: Process to Aggregate Several Influential Models?
4.5.2 Step 1: Vocabulary Checking
In this first step, the objective is to match characteristics identified by inter-
viewees with characteristics in the survey. The objective is to obtain a common
syntax between all models and the survey. For example, Expert 1 identifies “User
Security Awareness”. We are confident in the mapping between that characteris-
tic and the “User’s Risk Perception” identified in the surveys. However, mapping
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between characteristics may not be obvious. On the one hand, characteristics iden-
tified by interviewees may be too broad: the Director of Security at UMD identifies
the availability of resources, which includes characteristics such as “Financial Re-
sources Available for Security”, “Available Security Hardware” and Available Secu-
rity Software. On the other hand, experts may be too specific: Expert 2 identifies
characteristics “C, A, I”, “Access (Physical, Remote, Authorized)”, “Logs”; they
are included in characteristic “Depth of Protection of the Asset” in the survey. The
mapping shown in Table 4.5 was reviewed and confirmed by the Director of Security
at UMD. Table 4.5 also provides abbreviations for each characteristic that will be
used in the next subsection.
4.5.3 Step 2: Extensive Listing of all Relationships
Once all characteristics identified by interviewees have been mapped with char-
acteristics selected in the survey, the next step consists in identifying all relation-
ships. In order to have a user-friendly overview of these relationships, we will use a
matrix, shown in Figure 4.13:
• If characteristic A influences characteristic B, we find A in the first column
and B in the first line. The intersection between the row of A and the column
of B contains the relationships identified by interviewees (Director of Security
at UMD, Expert 1, and Expert 2),
• In each cell, direct influences (for instance A directly influences B) are depicted
by a number. 1, 2, and 3 represent a weak, medium, and strong influence in
the model drawn by the expert respectively. Indirect influences (for instance A
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Table 4.5: Characteristics and their Influences in Experts’ Models
Survey UMD Expert 1 Expert 2
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influences B through characteristic C) are depicted by a star “*”. No influence
is depicted by a dash “-”,
• In each cell, all three models are represented. For instance if for statement
“A influences B”, the Director of Security at UMD identifies a strong direct
influence, Expert 1 an indirect influence and Expert 2 no influence, we have
”3*-”,
• All 24 characteristics that were identified in the survey are represented in the
matrix through an abbreviation that is referenced in Table 4.5. For instance,
the depth of protection of the asset is represented in the matrix as PA. A
column security is added to represent the influences on security. As it is the
final node in the model, security does not have child nodes and do not need
to be represented as a line in the matrix,
• The last column summarizes the strength of the influence of each characteristic
on security identified through the survey. 1, 2, and 3 represent a weak, medium
and strong influence respectively,
• The last line represents the number of parents for each characteristic depicted
in the column,
• The diagonal is shaded for ease of reading. If numbers or stars are in the




















4.5.4 Step 3: Final Model Development
The final step consists in developing a unique model based on the interviews
and the survey. The final model is based on our interpretation of the results but we
reduce the subjectivity involved in the process by taking the following control steps:
• We pushed the analysis to be as formal as possible, with the definitions of the
coefficient and matrix for instance,
• The Director of Security at UMD was involved along the entire process and
gave his acknowledgement at each milestone, such as the interview and survey
designs, or the merging process. This ensures the credibility of the model.
The objective of this subsection is not to exhaustively describe how the model
was built but to provide general guidelines that allowed us to develop such a model.
We try to reference our justifications on the building process but despite our efforts,
the reader may disagree with these guidelines. Therefore, we provide in this disser-
tation the results of the interviews and survey so that analysts who disagree can
develop their own model.
The following list provides with a set of guidelines to develop the final model:
• An initial step (Step 0) aims at rearranging the previously presented matrix
(Figure 4.14). The matrix should be rearranged so that columns are ranked in
the order of increasing number of parents pi and the lines are in the same order
(labeled “1” and “2” in Figure 4.14). Ranking the columns by increasing pi
enables building the nodes at the top of the model first (with few parents), then
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progressing towards deeper layers in the model (nodes with many parents),
• The first step (Step 1) allows building the primary structure of the model,
based on direct influences only (depicted by numbers in the matrix, versus
“*” and “-”), without taking care of the strength of the influences,
• Through Step 2, we add indirect influences to the primary model if they are
not already there. At this point, the relationships are built. The next steps
consist in adding the strength of these relationships,
• In Step 3 of the process, the model is enhanced with the strengths of direct
relationships. Numbers 1, 2, and 3 for weak, medium, and strong influence
in the matrix allow adding the strength of these direct relationships in the
model,
• Step 4 is less formal than the previous steps. Strengths of relationships that
have not been added through Step 3 are determined based on the judgment
of the analyst. This task is supported by the last column of the matrix that
references the impact of each characteristic on security from the analysis of
the surveys,
• By definition, the characteristics we have selected and included in the matrix
all have an influence on security, which was demonstrated through the surveys.
Therefore, Step 5 consists in linking all nodes to security, directly or indirectly.
We had several discussions with the Director of Security at UMD. He followed
the entire development process and agreed that the model we obtained after the five
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Figure 4.14: Initial step (Step 0) of the Final Model Development
steps described above led to a too complicated model. The Director of Security did
not agree on everything that was in the model. We modified the model accordingly.
Finally, we decided to merge few characteristics because separating them did not
bring a additional refinement to the model. For example, available security hardware
and additional software were combined together. The resulting model is presented
in Figure 4.15. Validation of this model is presented in Chapter 5.
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Figure 4.15: Model before Validation
4.6 Summary
In Chapter 4, we presented the results of the development of a model for
universities environments. A model based on the literature and on insights from the
Director of Security at UMD led to the development of an extensive model. Two
other models were developed through interviews with experts in other academic
environments. Surveys were conducted to gather opinions of a larger population
of experts: the survey was sent to a listserv of 600 IT security officers and fifteen
experts accepted to answer the survey. We presented the method to merge all sources
of information to develop a unique model. The resulting model can be submitted





In this chapter, we present the approach for model validation, which relies on
two steps:
• Validation by experts,
• Validation with case studies.
We contacted experts from interviews and surveys, who provided us with their
email address. The objective was to obtain their agreement or comments on the
model presented in Figure 4.15. A model resulting from these insights and from
discussions with the Director of Security at UMD was developed and ready for the
second step of validation. This first step of model validation is described in the first
section of this chapter.
In the second section, we present an approach to validate the model through
case studies. We collected a list of implemented security measures at UMD since
1996. Two additional datasets are available and consist in the number of accounts
corrupted by phishing attacks and the number of incidents. The objective is to study
the trend of these data after the implementation of a measure through the Laplace
trend test. The measure is mapped to a path in the model and when the outcomes
of the analysis match the consequences expected after the implementation of the
measure, we have more confidence in the identified path. We present the results of
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the validation of parts of the model through case studies and list the limitations
inherent to this analysis.
5.2 Validation by Experts
5.2.1 Objectives
The model presented in Figure 4.15 was sent by email to interviewed experts
(Expert 1 and Expert 2) and to the three experts who took the survey and provided
their email address. The email also included a description of the project, of the
model components, and the following questions:
• What do you think of the decomposition user/organization/threat/asset and
the descriptions?
• Do you think we included all characteristics that influence security in the
model or would you add or delete some characteristics?
• Would you modify the strengths of some influences in the model (meaning:
change the thickness of the arrow)?
• What are your general thoughts on the model?
• How could this model help you in your work?
5.2.2 Results of the Validation by Experts
We received feedback from two experts: Expert 1 and one expert who took
the survey, named Expert 4 for the remainder of the dissertation.
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Expert 1 agreed with the presented components’ description and model. No
changes were recommended. Expert 1 believes that this model can be useful in
communicating with “directors and managers of OTS” (Office of Information Tech-
nology) and in the risk assessment process as the model allows listing all aspects
that should be considered in the risk assessment process.
Expert 4 sent a detailed modified model presented in Figure 5.1. He believes
that this type of model is “a good exercise in attempting to understand some of
the key components of communications and their relationship”. We appreciated
the effort of the expert, who spent a significant amount of time to send us a new
version of the model. He highlighted that he could spend much more time on it
before he would be fully satisfied. Although he kept the four components when
building a model, he suggested decomposing security into more layers than the four
we mentioned. Although we agree with his comments, as the model could be more
detailed and could include more layers of decomposition, our primary objective is
to develop a model useful for communication purposes. In that sense, the model
should not be too detailed and complex.
5.2.3 Resulting Model
The model was modified according to comments provided by experts and dis-
cussions with the Director of Security. Modifications include:
• Including a more general component “Attacker’s Resources”: Expert 4 iden-
tified several components of the attacker, that we decided to include under a
single component “Attacker’s Resources”. The justification is that we cannot
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Figure 5.1: Model Suggested by an Expert after Presentation of the Model Devel-
oped based on Interviews and Surveys
know the details on the attackers; subsequently, we do not need to break down
the attacker into too many components. Also, the resources of the attacker in-
clude the majority of characteristics identified by Expert 4, which are his/her
knowledge and experience, the tools and funding available to him/her,
• Adding an influence from the “Value of the Asset from the Organization’s
Point of view” to the “Risk Assessment Program”: Risk is defined as the
product of the value of the asset by the probability that the asset is attacked,
therefore the value of the asset impacts risk assessment,
• Adding an influence from the “Organizational Attitude towards Security” to
the “Risk Assessment Program”: If security is a priority of the organization’s
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managers, there should be a risk assessment program in place,
• Adding an influence from the “Security Awareness Communication” to the
“User’s Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security”: Awareness cam-
paigns towards users help educating users on security issues, hence impact
their expertise.
The modified model is presented in Figure 5.2. The next step is to validate
parts of the model with case studies.
Figure 5.2: Model Validated by Experts
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5.3 Validation with Case Studies
5.3.1 Objectives
Specific case studies at UMD for which data are available are used to validate
the model.
The measurement of characteristics in the model can be direct or indirect.
Direct measurements, or metrics, are values that directly quantify characteristics.
For example, the carbon footprint is a metric of one’s impact on the environment.
Indirect measurements, or indicators, indirectly quantify characteristics. The Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) is an indicator of a country’s economy and reveals how
well the economy is in a country. Indicators were introduced in Section 3.4.4.4.
This dissertation does not include a quantitative framework of the model. In
other words, if we manage to measure characteristics in the model based on data,
we cannot propagate these measures in the model in order to obtain a numerical
value for characteristic “Security”.
Furthermore, we are not able to measure all characteristics in the model be-
cause we may not know how to quantify them (for example, characteristic “Organi-
zational Attitude towards Security”), or because we cannot quantify them (attackers
characteristics may be difficult to quantify as it may be difficult to gather informa-
tion on attackers). However sensitivity analyses can be performed: by changing one
factor, one sees how the change affects the model, hence security.
The objective of the validation with case studies consists in validating the in-
fluences between characteristics. Data support the measurements of characteristics
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in the model. The outcomes of the model are compared against data. For example,
let us consider a case study that consists in implementing security solution S. This
solution was implemented in the organization and data on the number of corrupted
computers per day are available. The first step of the validation consists in relating
measure S to one or several characteristics in the model. Other available data may
provide information on other characteristics. All pieces of data, associated to char-
acteristics in the model, translate into a low, medium, or high value characteristics.
By propagating them into the model, we can determine a low, medium, or high
value of our node of concern “Security”, or an increasing or decreasing level of secu-
rity. Let us assume that solution S can be mapped to characteristic A in the model,
which has a positive influence on security. In other words, according to the model,
implementing solution S should improve the overall security. The second step of the
validation consists in analyzing the rate of corrupted computers and determining
the trend after the implementation of measure A. Under the assumption that the
number of corrupted computers is an indicator of security, the trend after measure
S is implemented is compared to the outcome of the first step. If they match, we
have more confidence in the positive influence of characteristic A on characteristic
“Security”. If they don’t match, the model may need to be modified accordingly.
We present the results of several case studies at UMD. In addition to the secu-
rity measures implemented at UMD, three types of data are considered to support
these case studies: Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) data, incidents, and accounts
corrupted by phishing.
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5.3.2 The University of Maryland
The environment under study and available for the validation through case
studies is the University of Maryland, College Park, which is a public research
university. The average enrollment over the last ten years is 35,754 students and
the average campus population is 43,613 people. The campus population includes
undergraduate and graduate students, faculty members, instructors and lecturers,
and staff. The number of people included in each category from 2001 to 2010 is
shown in Table 5.1. The total campus population is a good approximation of the
number of users at UMD.
5.3.3 Available Data
5.3.3.1 List of Security Measures
In order to investigate the impact of security measures, the Director of Security
at UMD provided us with the list of measures implemented at UMD since 1996. The
list of measures are provided in Table 5.2. It was challenging to obtain the exact
dates of these measures, this is the reason why for some of them, only the year
is available. This is especially the case for events that occurred before 2001. In





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.2: List of Security Measures Implemented at UMD
Date Security measure
1996
Creation of the project NEThics to promote acceptable use and pros-
ecute IT related student violations
1999
Creation of the virus notification program to distribute free anti-
virus software and to keep users informed on virus outbreaks
2000 Creation of a security engineer position within the Networking group
2001 Deployment of Snort Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
2001
Launch of virtual private network service to provide secure network
paths into the campus network
6/17/2002
Creation of IT Security Officer position within OIT and of one intern
position to monitor security events
6/28/2002 Blocking of routing of Microsoft protocols from outside campus
2003
Creation of a full-time analyst position reporting to the IT Security
Officer
7/2003 Project NEThics merged with the IT Security Office
7/2003
Introduction of packetshaping to limit resource consumption by file
sharing
5/2004
Creation of the Security Office as an OIT department reporting di-
rectly to VP (Vice President)/CIO
8/2004 Addition of audit compliance to Security department duties
1/3/2005
Creation of a second full-time analyst position reporting to the IT
Security Officer
1/23/2006
Creation of a third full-time analyst position reporting to the IT
Security Officer
8/2006
Implementation of a campus password policy with 180 days on pass-
word life
8/2006 Approval of Acceptable Use Policy by Campus Senate
9/01/2006 Installation of IPSs
2/2007 Creation of a compliance position
2007 Launch of Forensics Lab
6/28/2007 Wireless network put behind IPSs
1/2008 Protection of OIT Data Centers by firewalls
2008 Launch of an awareness communication campaign
2009 Protection of OIT Data Centers by IPS
7/2010 Addition of Data Policy and Administration to Security Department
9/2010
Introduction of IronPort anti-spam/anti-malware system to protect
campus email
Some measures are expected to have campus-wide consequences, that is to
118
say they focus on a large proportion of assets in the organization, such as the hire
of analysts to deal with IT security in the university. On the other hand, some
measures focus on specific assets such as the OIT data centers.
Before 2002, security was part of the networking group in the OIT department.
In 2002, an IT security pole was developed at UMD within the OIT department.
This action was accompanied by the advancement of a security engineer in the
networking group to the newly created security pole. The engineer was previously
in charge of networking duties and incidents monitoring. After his advancement, he
focused on security tasks, versus networking tasks. Since then, he directly reports to
the deputy Chief Information Officer (CIO). His hire was accompanied by the hire of
an intern to support the IT security officer’s monitoring duties. Since 2002, several
analysts were hired to support IT security at UMD at several levels: prevention,
protection, and mitigation. In the next subsections, we present the datasets that
could support our analyses.
5.3.3.2 Intrusion Prevention System Data
An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is a security device that monitors ma-
licious activity and reacts in real-time by blocking a potential attack. An IPS is
considered as an extension of an intrusion detection system (IDS). An IDS is a pas-
sive device that monitors activity whereas an IPS is an active device that blocks
potential malicious activity. In 2006, signature-based IPSs were installed at the
border of the University: the IPS blocking decision relies on a set of signatures that
are regularly released by the vendor as attacks are newly discovered on the Internet.
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IT security officers choose to enable or disable them. When characteristics of an
attack match the ones of a defined signature, the attack is blocked and an alert is
recorded in the IPS logs ([33] and [34]).
An alert provides several pieces of information, including the date and time,
signature, source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port,
or the IPS device name that blocked the communication. Organizations use IPSs to
monitor their traffic. The monitored activity provides insights into an organization’s
security and may help identifying potentially corrupted computers. While in some
organizations the quantity of monitored traffic is manageable, it becomes a hassle
to analyze security data for large organizations. For example, IPSs could record
thousands of alerts per day and the security team cannot investigate every alert.
Moreover, although IPSs are aimed at detecting and blocking malicious activity,
they also raise false alarms. Due to this limitation, we cannot derive indicators of
security based on IPS alerts but can be used to support further analyses. This will
be shown later in this chapter.
5.3.3.3 Incidents Data
Incidents are daily recorded at UMD, based on three sources of information:
1) intrusion detection system alerts, 2) reports from users, 3) and reports from other
system administrators [36]. Each incident is reviewed by security officers and leads
to the blocking of the suspicious computer’s IP address. As a result, there is no
false positive in the incidents data, as opposed to IPS data. It is the reason why
the rate of incidents is a relevant indicator of security. Depending on the context,
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an increasing or decreasing rate of incidents may provide insights into the level of
security of an organization. The incidents are collected at UMD since June 2001.
The objective is to use the incidents data to validate the model. More specif-
ically, we aim at investigating the impact of security measures (such as hiring an-
alysts or installing security devices) on the number of incidents per day. As we
are interested in the rate of compromised machines on campus, we use a subset of
the incidents data and look at the incidents related to computers on campus. The
increasing or decreasing rate of incidents after the implementation of the measure
should match the expected outcomes provided by the model for the model to be
partly validated.
When proceeding in the analysis of these security measures, we faced several
limitations:
• All measures do not have an impact on incident detection. On the one hand,
the rate of incidents is expected to be impacted by the hire of analysts, who
work on identifying incidents. On the other hand, password policies are not
expected to have a consequence on the incidents. In addition, some measures
are implemented to solve a problem, such as the blocking of the Microsoft
protocols routing, whereas others are implemented in prevention of future
attacks. For example, it was decided to protect data centers by putting them
behind firewalls in 2008 and behind IPSs in 2009. No incident on the OIT data
centers was previously recorded but the measure was implemented to prevent
a harmful loss of the data centers. These reasons also explain why we did not
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try to gather exact dates for all security measures, as all measures are not
expected to impact the rate of incidents,
• We should account for a delay after which the measure becomes effective. For
example, when analysts are hired, they go through a training phase. Therefore,
the expected decrease in the rate of incidents may appear several weeks after
they were hired. This delay is indeed difficult to assess accurately but the
Director of Security at UMD gave us, when possible, orders of magnitude for
these periods,
• As each suspicious IP address is reviewed by a security officer, we are sure that
it is corrupted, but the number of incidents per day may be bounded by the
number of available IT security staff, as each IT security officer may be able
to handle only a few incidents per day. The number of incidents per day may
also depend on the type of incident. Indeed, if there is a fast spreading worm,
users may be reactive to report it and analysts learn to detect the same type
of incident, which would lead in a high number of incidents per day,
• Although the incidents data do not include false positives, we are concerned
by not having all pieces of information. Indeed, if the analysis reveals that
the measure decreases the rate of incidents, several reasons other than the
implementation of the measure may explain it. For example, reasons include
the campus population (less populated during summer and winter breaks), the
IT security team size (if analysts are on vacation, therefore fewer employees
to deal with incidents), or the attack pattern (campus not being targeted at
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that period) may explain it.
5.3.3.4 Number of Corrupted Accounts by Phishing Attacks
In 2008, there was a significant number of successful phishing attacks targeting
UMD accounts. Phishers sent emails to UMD users that appeared to be sent by
OIT, requiring users to reset their usernames and passwords through a webpage that
was very similar to one OIT could have designed. Once accounts are corrupted, they
are used to send mass phishing emails. Due to the noise these phishing emails make
on the network, IT security officers manage to shut down the account within hours.
The number of accounts corrupted by phishing attacks (or the number of successful
phishing attacks) indicates how well users perceive risks related to phishing attacks.
The dates and user accounts are saved in a database.
When using this dataset, we consider the following:
• We want to emphasize that this dataset only includes accounts corrupted by
masquerading the University entity. For example, they do not include phishing
attacks that aim at stealing bank or Yahoo email credentials,
• Because of the method of identification of corrupted accounts, there is no false
positive in the dataset,
• Data does not include cases where the phisher steals a user’s credentials with-
out using them.
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5.3.4 Laplace Trend Values
As previously mentioned, the objective is to identify trends in the datasets
after the implementation of a security measure. The Laplace trend test allows
identifying trends in a dataset based on the Laplace trend value u(k) for period [0,












• k is the day number
• ni is the number of incidents or successful phishing attacks during day i,
• N(k) is the cumulative number of successful attacks until day k.
The practical interpretation of the Laplace trend analysis can be done at two
levels [70]:
• Globally: If the Laplace trend values are positive (respectively negative), there
is a global increase (respectively decrease) in the rate of successful phishing
attacks. Values between −2 and +2 indicate stability,
• Locally: Increasing (respectively decreasing) values indicate a local increase
(respectively decrease) of the rate of successful phishing attacks.
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5.3.5 Approach
In subsection 5.3.1, we presented the objectives of the validation through case
studies. More specifically, the approach consists in looking at trends of indicators:
the number of incidents is considered an indicator of “Security” whereas the num-
ber of successful phishing attacks (or number of corrupted accounts by phishing
attacks) is considered an indicator of the “User’s Risk Perception”. In other words,
we want to study their Laplace trend values to study the impact of the implemen-
tation of a security measure. If the trend observed after the implementation of a
measure matches its expected consequences, the confidence in the portion of the
model concerned with the measure is increased.
When calculating the Laplace trend values, we should select an appropriate
starting date. The trade-off consists in choosing a starting date so that we have
enough data before the implementation but not too much, as a too long history
may interfere in the interpretation of the results. We decided to start the analysis
one month before the implementation of the measure, when possible. On the other
hand, the choice of the end date is more flexible. If we want to observe effects on
the long term, the analysis may be done over several months, six for example. If we
want to focus on the short term, we may only need one or two months of Laplace
trend values.
We will show Laplace trend values over a period of several months to be able to
investigate impact on a longer term. As the environment quickly changes, with the
change in campus population but also to the attack profiles, there is a limit beyond
125
which trying to observe the effects of the implementation of a measure is useless.
We will show the Laplace trend values over a period of eight months, although we
might make our observations on a shorter time window. For most measures, we do
not think that the consequences are observable beyond eight months. However, if
we need a longer time window, we can lengthen it for specific case studies.
Several discussions with the Director of Security at UMD were conducted in
order to identify expected consequences of the implementation of a measure. For
example, if an analyst is hired, his/her duties may focus on incidents detection, or on
prevention. If his/her focus is on incidents detection, we expect to see an increase in
the rate of incidents on the short term because there are more resources to deal with
incidents. If the analyst is also expected to work on prevention, the effects may be
noticeable on the long term by an overall decrease in the rate of incidents. Besides,
discussions with the Director of Security also allow mapping the security measure to
the model. For example, we need to understand why the hire of an analyst occurred.
An analyst may be hired for at least two reasons: 1) budget becomes available, or
2) there is a need for hiring an IT security officer. In the first case, the measure
is mapped to characteristic “Budget” in the model, while in the second case, it is
mapped to “Security Team’s Expertise and Qualities”. Besides, we need to capture
the exact tasks of the analyst in order to identify the path under validation in the
model. In the second example mentioned above, if the analyst is mainly in charge of
awareness or policies, the path under validation is different. Therefore, discussions
with the Director of Security are necessary to capture the expected outcomes of the
implementation of a security measure but also to select the path under validation
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in the model.
Three conclusions are possible from the analysis of the Laplace trend values.
In the first scenario, the analysis may be inconclusive: this is the case when the
Laplace trend values are evolving in the [−2, +2] interval. Another example is
when external factors may explain the observed trend: an increasing trend at the
beginning of the Fall or Spring semester may be explained by the increasing number
of users, as students come back on campus. When coming back, students may plug
their infected machines to the network and trigger more incidents. If we reach an
inconclusive conclusion, the model is unchanged. In the second scenario, we may
observe that the conclusions of the analysis (increasing or decreasing trend) match
the expected outcomes. In this case, we have more confidence in the path under
validation, and the model is unchanged. In the third scenario, the conclusions of
the analysis do not match the expected outcomes. In this case, the path under
study may be incorrect and the model may need to be modified accordingly. For
example, the modification of the model may consist in changing one type of influence
(positive or negative). We want to emphasize that in the second and third scenario,
the conclusions drawn from the Laplace trends are not always obvious. We may
need to investigate additional information, such as the number of users per period
(Summer versus Fall semester).
In conclusion, the steps of the validation through case studies are the following:
1. Select a security measure to analyze and the appropriate dataset: All measures
listed previously may not have observable effects on the available data, such
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as password policies,
2. Identify with the help of the Director of Security at UMD the expected out-
comes of the implementation of the measure,
3. Calculate the Laplace trend values for the selected data: We decide to start
the analysis one month before the implementation of the measure and to cover
a period of several months (typically eight months),
4. Map the measure to a node and a path in the model, which is possible through
discussions with the Director of Security at UMD,
5. Draw conclusions: If the Laplace trend values are between −2 and +2, the
trends are not significant and the analysis is inconclusive. If the outcomes
of the analysis match the expected consequences, we have more confidence
in the path of the model related to the security measure under study. In
both previous cases, we do not modify the model. On the contrary, if the
conclusions of the analysis and the expected outcomes do not match, we may
need to modify the model accordingly. Conclusions of the analysis should be
handled with care as, due to the lack of information, it is possible that the
observed consequences are the result of other factors, such as the change in
campus population.
In the next subsection, we apply this process to validate parts of the model.
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5.3.6 Results
5.3.6.1 Impact of the Hire of an Analyst
Measures and dataset
According to Table 5.2, four hires occurred since 2001:
1. Hire of an IT security officer and of an intern on June 17, 2002,
2. Hire of an analyst in 2003: the intern who was working in IT security since
June 2002 was hired as a full-time analyst,
3. Hire of an analyst on January 3, 2005,
4. Hire of an analyst on January 23, 2006.
All officers, when they were hired, were assigned the task of incidents iden-
tification and response. Therefore, the hires should have an impact on the rate of
incidents.
Expected outcomes
For the first measure, the hired IT security officer was previously working at
UMD as a security engineer within the Networking group. His advancement is the
result of the will of the organization to build a Security department, as security
became a priority for OIT. The security engineer was handling networking duties
and security incidents identification. When he became a security officer in 2002, he
was relieved from his networking duties and could focus on security tasks. Therefore,
the expected outcomes of his hire and the hire of an intern to support his tasks are
an immediate increase in the rate of incidents. On the longer term, the rate of
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incidents is expected to decrease as their tasks towards prevention would lead to
fewer incidents on campus.
The intern who started working for the Security department in 2002 was grad-
ually assigned incidents detection between 2002 and 2003. Therefore, when he was
hired as a full-time analyst in 2003, his tasks were unchanged and his new hire is
not supposed to have an effect on the rate of incidents. Therefore, this measure is
not included in the analysis.
Both analysts hired in 2005 and 2006 (third and fourth measure), are expected
to work on incidents mitigation. On the short term, we are expected to observe an
increase of the rate of incidents shortly after both measures are implemented. On
the longer term, analysts earn more responsibilities and work on prevention, which
is expected to result in a decrease in the rate of incidents.
The Director of Security estimates the short term to be two months after the
measure is implemented.
Laplace trend values
The Laplace trend values of incidents for measures 1, 3, and 4 are calculated.
Their analyses are explained in the following paragraphs.
From Figure 5.3, we observe a slight increase in the rate of incidents over the
first two months. However, the increase mostly occurs within the [−2, +2] interval,
which indicates that the trend is not significant. On the long term, we observe
an increasing rate followed by an overall decreasing rate. The first observation
matches the beginning of the Spring semester: students come back to campus with
their potentially infected machines and plug them to the network, resulting in an
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increasing incidents rate. The decreasing rate that follows matches the expected
outcomes. Therefore the analysis for the hire of the IT security officer in 2002 is
inconclusive on the short term but matches the expectations on the long term, if we
do not account for the increase probably due to the beginning of the Fall semester.
Figure 5.3: Laplace Trend Values for the Hire of the IT Security Officer in 2002
We observe an increasing trend for more than one month and a half after
the hire of an analyst in 2005 (Figure 5.4). This increase spans over a period
that includes the beginning of the Spring semester. Before the semester begins, the
increasing trend is inconclusive as it happens in the interval [−2, +2]. The increasing
trend continues after the semester has begun. Therefore, the increase in the Laplace
trend values after the beginning of the semester may be explained by the hire of the
analyst, by the beginning of the Spring semester, or by a combination of the two
effects. In order to study the effects of the beginning of the semester, we compare
the cumulative number of incidents for years from 2002 to 2007, as shown in Figure
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5.5. We compared the beginning of the Fall semesters over these years but it is fair
to assume that the conclusions also hold for the beginning of the Spring semesters.
A vertical line at day 32 in Figure 5.5 shows the day the Fall semester begins for
each year. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 zoom on a time window around the beginning of the
Fall semester and show that the effects of the beginning of the semester occur on a
short period of time around the date the semester begins. For example, according
to Figure 5.6, in 2002, there was a significant increase in the number of incidents
on the day the semester begins (Day 32). In 2004, the peak seems to occur the
day after the semester begins. Similarly, in 2003 (Figure 5.7), the increase occurs
from the day before the classes begin (Day 31) until two days after the semester
has begun (Day 33). We believe that the increase in the number of incidents due
to students coming back on campus is roughly limited to a time window of few
days before and after the semester actually starts. Data show that the increase of
the number of incidents during the five-day time window around the beginning of
the semester (two days before and two days after classes start) with respect to the
preceding five-day time window ranges between 30% and 1,800% for the years under
study. When comparing that time window with the following five-day time frame,
there is a decrease for all years but 2003, ranging between 25% and 79%. 2003 is an
outlier, as we can see from Figure 5.5, and may not be representative of the incidents
data. To conclude, this analysis shows that when the semester begins, the rate of
incidents increases. This observation, made for the beginning of the Fall semester,
also holds for the beginning of the Spring semester. As previously highlighted, the
increase occurs on a period of time of few days. Therefore, the increasing trend that
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takes place for one month and a half after the analyst is hired in Figure 5.4 may be
explained by the beginning of the Spring semester but the effects of the beginning
of the semester only act for few days. For the other days, we can reasonably assume
that the hire of the analyst contributed to the increasing trend, which matches our
expectations on the short term. On the long term, we observe a significant decrease
in the rate of incidents, as expected.
Figure 5.4: Laplace Trend Values for the Hire of an Analyst in 2005
For the last measure (Figure 5.8), we observe an increasing rate of incidents
on a period of one month and a half, followed by a decrease. The same discussions
on the beginning of the semester and on the [−2, +2] interval apply here. Indeed,
the increase that occurs over the first two weeks that follow the hire happens in the
[−2, +2] interval. In addition, the hire of the analyst coincides with the beginning
of the semester and the increase on the short term may be explained by the change
in campus population. However, there is a significant increase until one month and
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Figure 5.5: Cumulative Number of Incidents for Years from 2002 to 2007
Figure 5.6: Cumulative Number of Incidents for Years 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, and
2007
a half after the beginning of the semester. It is unlikely that the change in campus
population has effects over such a long period, as previously discussed. Therefore,
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Figure 5.7: Cumulative number of incidents for year 2003
we have confidence that on the short term, the hire of the analysis contributed to
the increase in the rate of incidents, which matches our expectations. On the long
term, we observe a decreasing rate of incidents until the end of April (around Day
126), as expected. Therefore the results of the analysis of the hire of an analyst in
2006 match the expected outcomes.
Figure 5.8: Laplace Trend Values for the Hire of an Analyst in 2006
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Insights on the model validation
On the one hand, we studied the effects of the measure on the rate of incidents,
considered as an indicator of security. On the other hand, we need to relate the
measure to a node in the model, and more precisely to a path in the model.
The hire of the security officer in 2002 results from a change of culture within
the organization: managers identified a need of differentiating security duties from
networking ones. Therefore, a Security Department was launched, resulting in the
hire of the security officer and the intern. This measure relates to the node labeled
“Organizational Attitude towards Security”. Fourteen paths are possible from this
node to node “Security”, which are depicted in Figure 5.9: they are labeled 1,
2, 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2.1, 3.1.1.2.2, 3.1.1.2.3, 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.3, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3,
3.1.3, and 3.3. Because the change in culture (mapped to node “Organizational
Attitude towards Security”) resulted in budget allocation for hiring the security
officer, the path under validation should go through nodes “Budget” and “Security
Team Expertise and Qualities”. Thus, paths 1, 2, 3.2, and 3.3 in Figure 5.9 are not
the ones concerned with the implementation of the measure. During the first eight
months of his hire, the security officer was working on detection and reaction, which
relates to the “Depth of Protection of the Asset” in the model. At this point, his
tasks do not focus on “Security Policy” and “Security Awareness Communication”.
Therefore, the path under validation in the model is the one labeled 3.1.3 in Figure
5.9 .
The analysis of the Laplace trend values for the hire of the Security officer and
hire of an intern to support him was inconclusive on the short term but matched
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the expected outcomes on the long term. Therefore, we have more confidence in the
influence of the “Organizational Attitude towards Security” on security. More pre-
cisely, the analysis increases our confidence in the path through “Budget”, “Security
Team Expertise and Qualities”, and “Depth of Protection of the Asset”.
Figure 5.9: Mapping of the Hire of the Security Officer in 2002 to the Model
Both analysts in 2005 and 2006 were hired because there was a need of ana-
lysts to support the security officer’s duties. Therefore, both measures are mapped
to characteristic “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” in the model. If these
measures were the results of available budget allocated to IT security and a decision
was made to use it to hire an analyst, then the measures would have been mapped
to node “Budget”. It is important to understand the reasons why measures are
137
implemented in order to best map the measures to the model.
Figure 5.10 shows the eight possible paths from characteristic “Security Team
Expertise and Qualities” to characteristic ”Security”. Analysts’ primary tasks did
not concern policies or communication to users but consisted in incidents detection.
Therefore, the path under validation with these measures is path 3, which goes from
“Security Team Expertise and Qualities” to “Depth of Protection of the Asset”. The
analysis of Laplace trend values for the hire in 2005 is inconclusive on the short and
long term whereas it matches the expected outcomes on the short and long term
for the hire of an analyst in 2006. Consequently, through this analysis, we are more
confident in the path that goes from “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” to
“Security” through the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”.
Summary
In this subsection, we analyzed the effects of hiring personnel to deal with
security. Three of these hires are expected to impact security through incidents
identification: on the short term, officers are expected to work on their mitigation,
resulting in an increasing detection rate; on the long term, officers learn how to
incorporate tools in their work to prevent successful compromises, resulting in a
decreasing detection rate of incidents. In 2003, the hire concerned an intern who
was already working in the newly formed Security Department. His advancement
as a full-time analyst did not change his day-to-day tasks, thus no effect on the rate
of incidents is expected to result from this measure.
Discussion with the Director of Security at UMD allows understanding the
motivations behind these hires. This major step enables the mapping of the mea-
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Figure 5.10: Mapping of the Hire of the Security Officer in 2006 to the Model
sures in the model. The hire of the security officer in 2002 relates to the node
“Organizational Attitude towards Security” whereas the hires of analysts in 2005
and 2006 map to the “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”. More specifically,
we identified the path under validation from these nodes to node “Security”.
The analysis of the first measure on the long term, and the analysis of the hire
in 2006 on the short and long term increase our confidence in the identified paths
in the model. The analyses of the first measure on the very short term and of the
hire in 2005 were inconclusive: we observed the expected outcomes but they were
either non-significant (occurring between −2 and +2) or they can be explained by
the change in campus population.
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Discussion
These conclusions need to be handled with care. We are aware that other
factors may have had an effect on the rate of incidents, which could also explain the
outcomes. For example, the beginning of the semester results in an increase in the
number of incidents. By investigating the beginning of the semester, we showed that
this effect occurs on few days only. If an increase occurs on more than few days,
we can fairly assume that the implemented measure contributed to the increase.
Other factors that could have affected the trends are the attack profiles. However
we cannot gather data on the attacks that target the organization. Considering the
information available, we can however increase our confidence in the identified paths
in the model.
5.3.6.2 Blocking of the Routing of Microsoft Protocols from Outside
Campus
In 2001, highly critical vulnerabilities related to NetBIOS ports were discov-
ered on Microsoft operating systems [3]. NetBIOS ports are used for Microsoft file
sharing and contain security issues that attackers were able to exploit to get remote
access to computers [6]. For example, attackers could access sensitive information
on computers or create self-propagating malware. Besides, the fact that Windows
XP firewalls were disabled by default led to a large number of corrupted machines.
In order to prevent external scanners from exploiting vulnerable machines inside the
network, the routing of packets sent to Microsoft ports was blocked at the border
of the campus on September 2, 2002. Therefore, the implementation of this mea-
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sure should reduce the number of infected machines and have a direct effect on the
incidents. It is expected that the rate of incidents immediately decreases after the
implementation of the measure.
The Laplace trend values from one month before the measure is implemented
(August 2, 2002) to eight months after (May 1, 2003) are depicted in Figure 5.11.
Overall, we observe a decreasing rate of incidents. Immediately after the implemen-
tation of the measure, there is a peak, that is explained by the change in campus
population: students come back to campus, bring their potentially corrupted ma-
chines, and plug them on the University network. This results in an increasing
number of incidents at the beginning of the semester. Although we observe a quick
decrease after the peak, and an overall decrease of the rate of incidents, we can-
not conclude with confidence that the implemented measure led to the expected
outcomes. Therefore, this analysis is inconclusive because of the bias due to the
beginning of the semester.
In order to remove the effect of the beginning of the semester and draw better
conclusions, the campus population before and after the beginning of the semester
could have been investigated. For example, we could normalize the incidents by
the campus population, as there are more users after the beginning of the semester.
However, this type of data is not available: although we have access to the campus
population for each academic year (Table 5.1), we cannot obtain the number of users
on campus during Summer. Therefore, it is challenging to analyze the immediate
effects of measures that are implemented at the same time as the beginning of the
semester.
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Figure 5.11: Laplace Trend Values for the Routing of Microsoft Protocols from
Outside Campus in 2002
5.3.6.3 Installation of IPSs at the Border of the University
Measures and dataset
On September 1, 2006, signature-based IPSs are installed at the border of
the campus. These IPSs are active devices that block traffic based on triggered
signatures. IT security officers can choose the signatures to enable or disable.
When the IPSs were installed on the network, they immediately collected
alerts, that may be viewed by IT security officers. The average number of alerts
during the first week of the implementation is 3,545. In other words, the IPSs
collected a vast amount of alerts: the security team needed to understand what alerts
mean. This corresponds to a learning phase for IT security officers to understand
and use IPS alerts in their work of mitigation and prevention. Once they assimilate
this, they gain visibility into machines that are already compromised, thus, IPS
alerts are used to detect and report incidents. Then, the IPS becomes an integrated
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tool for the protection of the network.
Expected outcomes
The implementation is expected to have consequences on the rate of incidents:
• Learning phase: IT security officers try to understand the meaning of alerts.
No effect on incidents is expected immediately after the installation of IPSs,
• IPS alerts used for incidents detection: IT security officers gain visibility into
already compromised computers on campus and this results in an increasing
rate of incidents on the short term,
• IPSs are integrated to the existing solution for protection of the network and
help preventing the corruption of machines in the network. On the long term,
the rate of incidents is expected to decrease.
Laplace trend values
Figure 5.12 depicts the Laplace trend values before and after the implemen-
tation of the measure. We observe an increasing rate of incidents from Day 42,
ten days after the IPSs are installed on the network. This increase continues until
Day 52 where an overall decreasing trend follows over the next months. The three
phases, also depicted in Figure 5.12, from the implementation of the IPSs to Day
42 (labeled “Learning phase”), from Day 42 to Day 52 (labeled “Detection”), and
after Day 52 (labeled “Prevention/Protection”), correspond to the expected time
windows: learning phase, IPS alerts used for incidents detection, and IPS alerts
used for protection of the network.
Insights on the model validation
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Figure 5.12: Laplace Trend Values for the Installation of IPSs in 2006
The installation of IPS devices involves a better protection of machines inside
the network at the network level. Therefore, this measure is directly related to the
node “Depth of Protection of the Asset” in the model. As incidents are an indicator
of security, the path under validation is the path from “Depth of Protection of the
Asset” to “Security”.
The expected outcomes consisted in three different phases, as listed above. The
analysis of the incidents rate shows that the expected outcomes are met. Therefore,
we have more confidence in the path from “Depth of Protection of the Asset” to
“Security”.
Summary
In this subsection, we analyzed the effects of installing IPS devices at the
border of the University to block incoming or outgoing potentially malicious activity.
The analysis of the Laplace trend values of the number of incidents matches the
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expected outcomes: after a learning phase, the IT security team gained visibility
into compromised machines, which led to an increasing rate of incidents. On the long
term, the IPSs become part of the solution for protection and prevention, resulting
in a decreasing rate of incidents.
Discussion
In addition, the Fall semester started on August 30, two days before the IPSs
were installed. According to our discussion in the previous subsection, we would
expect a significant increase in the rate of incidents few days before or after the
beginning of the semester, due to the change in campus population. Although we
cannot ensure it, it is possible that the installation of IPSs reduced the effect of
students coming back on campus and that it explains why there is no significant
increase at the beginning of the Fall semester.
In order to increase our confidence in the effects of the IPSs on security for
UMD, we wanted to compare the speed of detection of incidents after the beginning
of the semester over several years. To do so, we investigated the percentage of the
normalized detected incidents per day over the total number of incidents normalized
discovered during the month of September. For a period starting the day before the
Fall semester begins and spanning over one month, the percentage per day k is given














Where ni is the number of incidents for day i, nT is the total number of
incidents for the period under study, nU is the number of users for the period under
study.
The number of users is estimated to be the campus population provided by
Table 5.1. To be more accurate, we would need to find an approximation of the
campus population the first day of the time window, which corresponds to the day
before the semester actually begins. For example, it would be ideal to have the
number of users during the Summer semester but we cannot obtain this number, as
previously discussed. Besides, we believe that students come back the day before
the semester begins to move in the dorms. Thus, we think that using the campus
population for the academic year is an appropriate estimation. Table 5.3 provides
the beginning and ending dates of each period, and the campus population.
Table 5.3: Data to Support the Comparison of the Speed of Incidents Detection over
Four Years - The time window for the analysis starts one day before the semester
begins and spans over one month
Period Year Start date End date Number of users
1 2004 8/29/2004 9/28/2004 42,377
2 2005 8/30/2005 9/29/2005 42,987
3 2006 8/29/2006 9/28/2006 42,859
4 2007 9/28/2007 9/27/2007 43,936
The comparisons between years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 are depicted in
Figure 5.13. It is expected that once the IPSs are installed, IPS alerts provide visi-
bility into corrupted machines that are plugged on the network after the beginning
of the semester. In other words, in 2006, the detection of corrupted machines should
occur earlier in the period than in 2004 and 2005. This trend should be even more
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noticeable in 2007, as the IPS is entirely integrated to the overall security solution.
Therefore, it is expected that the curves representing 2006 and 2007 are above the
ones for 2004 and 2005. From Figure 5.13, the curve representing 2004 is above the
other curves for half of the period under study. We would have expected this curve
to be lower than the curve for 2006 and 2007, when the IPS is implemented. How-
ever, from one year to another, many factors can impact the number of incidents.
Few reasons include:
• Awareness of users: from one year to another, users learn about potential
attacks and learn how to better protect their assets,
• Attack profile: attacks targeting UMD can be very different from one year to
another, which would affect the number of incidents
Figure 5.13: Comparison of the Percentage of Detected Incidents for the Month of
September
In conclusion, the comparison of the incidents over several years does not allow
us to improve our confidence in the conclusions already drawn: the installation of
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IPSs at the border of the University led to three phases (learning, detection, and
protection/prevention), which matches the expectations.
5.3.6.4 Wireless Networks Put Behind IPSs
Wireless networks are a major concern for UMD because it is difficult to track
wireless computers. When users plug in their computers to the wireless network,
they are asked to enter their username and password to be given access to the In-
ternet. These computers are allocated dynamic IP addresses that may change every
time users log off and log in. From UMD’s point of view, each wireless computer
is recognized by the username used to connect to the network, an internal wireless
IP address, and a routable IP address. The latter is the IP address that can be
viewed from outside the network. However, one routable IP address hides several
dynamic private IP addresses, which are not visible from the outside world. Figure
5.14 provides a graphical representation of this network address allocation.
When corrupted wireless computers are plugged on the network, they may in-
fect other computers inside the organization. This is especially true at the beginning
of the Spring and Fall semester, when students come back to campus and connect
their potentially corrupted machines to the network. Therefore, on June 28, 2007,
IPSs were put between the wireless network and the rest of the organization. The
motivation is to provide IT security officers with visibility into compromised wireless
computers that are plugged on the University network (Figure 5.15).
According to this discussion, one would expect to observe an immediate in-
creasing rate of incidents as the measure helps detecting already compromised com-
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Figure 5.14: Graphical Representation of the Network Address Allocation - A wire-
less device inside the organization is provided with a dynamic private IP address
that can only be seen from inside the organization network. Attackers from outside
the network can only see routable IP addresses, behind which several dynamic pri-
vate IP addresses can be hidden. Incidents focus on routable IP addresses and do
not concern dynamic private IP addresses.
puters. On the long term, the measure should help decrease the number of incidents.
However, the incidents dataset available does not contain dynamic IP addresses.
Two reasons explain it:
1. There is no point of blocking a dynamic IP address as the IP address is relo-
cated to another computer when a user needs to connect to the network, and
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Figure 5.15: Graphical Representation of the Network Address Allocation after the
Wireless Networks are put behind IPSs - After the measure, IPSs can trigger alerts
related to the internal wireless network.
it does not prevent the corrupted wireless computer to connect to the network
from another dynamic IP address,
2. Keeping track of these IP addresses in the dataset are meaningless as they are
relocated to other computers later on.
Consequently, we cannot observe direct consequences of the implementation of
the measure on the short term, as compromised wireless computers are not recorded
in the incidents dataset. However, the indirect effect resulting from the identification
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of these corrupted machines and the prevention of having other machines in the
network corrupted by them can still be observed in the rate of incidents. This
indirect effect is expected to be observed on the long term.
The Laplace trend values from May 28, 2007 to February 27, 2008 are shown
in Figure 5.16. We observe a decreasing incident rate after day 137, which matches
our expectations. This measure is related to the path from the “Depth of Protection
of the Asset” to “Security”.
Figure 5.16: Laplace Trend Values for the Installation of Wireless Networks behind
IPSs in 2007
Although the results match the expectations, they should be handled with
care. Unlike previous case studies, the decreasing rate of incidents is an indirect
consequence of the measure. One could look into IPS alerts concerned with dynamic
IP addresses, keeping in mind that IPS alerts may contain a high number of false
positives. Keeping this in mind, we observe that on the period from June 28, 2008
to February 27, 2009, on average per day, 45% of alerts originating from inside the
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University (static and dynamic IP addresses) are from internal wireless machines.
This represents on average per day 44% of source IP addresses within the network.
5.3.6.5 Impact of a Communication Campaign
Measures and dataset
In 2008, in order to tackle the issue of phishing attacks at UMD, an anti-
phishing awareness campaign was launched. The campaign aimed at making users
sensitive to phishing attacks through four measures:
• First mass email sent on April 11,
• Second mass email on May 12,
• Message on login page on June 15,
• Message on webmail page on July 28.
The first and second mass emails were sent to make users sensitive to ongoing
fraudulent emails that appeared to be sent by OIT and that required users to provide
their University username and password. The new message that was displayed on
the login and webmail pages was the following “OIT will never ask you to put your
password into an e-mail message, but scammers will. Do not share your password
with others!”. The decision on the last two measures was made at the same time but
it was more challenging to change the webmail page than the login page, resulting
in the delay between the two measures.
These measures implemented in the scope of an awareness campaign commu-
nication are expected to impact the number of corrupted accounts by phishing.
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Expected outcomes
Once a measure of the anti-phishing awareness campaign is implemented, there
is a delay between the implementation and the effectiveness. For example, when a
mass email is sent, there is a delay before users read the email, and another delay
before users indeed take the advice into consideration. The Director of Security at
UMD expects a decreasing rate of corrupted accounts within days of the implemen-
tation of the measure.
Insights on the model validation
Implementing an anti-phishing awareness campaign implies a high value for
characteristic “Security Awareness Communication” in the model, therefore the
campaign can be mapped to that node in the model. The number of successful
phishing attacks is an indicator of the “User’s Risk Perception”: the higher (re-
spectively lower) the number of successful attacks, the less (respectively more) users
perceive risks related to phishing attacks. The objective of this case study con-
sists in studying the impact of the awareness campaign on the number of successful
phishing attacks. If after the implementation of the campaign, the number of suc-
cessful attacks decreases (hence user’s risk perception increases), then there is a
positive influence of the awareness communication on “User’s Risk Perception and
we have more confidence in the positive influence of the “Security Awareness Com-
munication” on the “User’s Risk Perception”. On the contrary, if data show that
the awareness communication does not decrease the number of successful phishing
attacks, there is no validation of the positive influence of node “Security Awareness
Communication” on node “User’s Risk Perception” in the model.
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Laplace trend values
The Laplace trend values for the period from April 10, 2008 to September
12, 2008 are shown in Figure 5.17. During the first nineteen days following the
mass email on April 11, the Laplace trend values fluctuate between −2 and +2,
which makes the analysis on the impact of sending the first mass email inconclusive.
Unfortunately, we do not have data for dates before April 10, which prevents us from
building a history for the Laplace trend values. After the second measure (second
mass email), there is a significant decrease of the rate of incidents that starts three
days after the mass email is sent, as expected.
Figure 5.17: Laplace Trend Values for the Number of Successful Phishing Attacks
at UMD from April 10, 2008 to September 12, 2008
A decrease follows immediately the implementation of the third measure but
the decrease only becomes significant ten days after the measure is implemented.
The measure was implemented while the trend was already decreasing. The same
observation is made for the fourth measure: we observe a decreasing rate before the
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measure is implemented and the trend continues afterwards. For both measures, it
is difficult to draw conclusion, and the reason may be due to a bias inherent to the
starting date for the Laplace trend values. In order not to keep too much history,
Figures 5.18 and 5.19 show the Laplace trend values for each measure starting one
month before the implementation of the measure.
Figure 5.18: Laplace Trend Values for the Number of Successful Phishing Attacks
at UMD from May 15, 2008 to September 12, 2008
From Figure 5.18, we observe that the message on the login webpage was
released while the rate of successful phishing attacks was decreasing. We observe
that a significant decrease follows the measure. Two conclusions are possible: either
the measure did not contribute to the decrease and without it, the trend would have
kept decreasing, or the measure helped continuing the decrease. A conservative
conclusion would be that the outcomes do not contradict the expectations (decrease
after the measure is implemented).
The same observations can be made from Figure 5.19. The warning message
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Figure 5.19: Laplace Trend Values for the Number of Successful Phishing Attacks
at UMD from June 28, 2008 to September 12, 2008
was displayed on the webmail page while the rate of successful phishing attacks
was decreasing. If we look at data after August 2008, we see that the rate keeps
decreasing, as fewer and fewer accounts are corrupted. No corrupted accounts are
registered for the first half of 2009. Several reasons could explain this trend. First,
users may have become aware of phishing attacks, thanks to the four implemented
measures. Second, the change in campus population from Spring to Summer may
have an effect, although, there is no clear correlation between observed trends and
the end or beginning of the semester. Third, there may be fewer phishing attacks. In
conclusion, even though we cannot conclude that the measure acted upon decreasing
the rate of successful phishing attacks, we can fairly say that the analysis does not




In conclusion, on the one hand, the analyses of the second, third, and fourth
measures match the expected outcomes and increase our confidence in the path
from “Security Awareness Communication” to “User’s Risk Perception”. Indeed, the
implementation of the second measure is followed by a significant decrease three days
after the measure is implemented, which matches our expectations. The interval of
three days includes the time for users to notice the new message on the login page
and take it into account when they receive an email asking for their credentials.
Besides, the third and fourth measures were implemented while there was already
a decreasing trend. Although we cannot conclude if the measure participated in
the decreasing trend, we can still conclude that the measure did not contradict the
expected outcomes.
On the other hand, the first measure is inconclusive: it is difficult to draw
conclusions as we do not have more than one day of data before the implementation
of the measure.
5.4 Summary
The validation process described in this chapter relies on two initiatives: we
first provide experts with the model resulting from the model development (Chapter
4) and then, we use data collected at UMD to validate several nodes and paths in
the model.
We managed to have feedback from two experts. We also led several discussions
with the Director of Security at UMD. A resulting model is derived and ready for
validation through case studies.
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In this second step, we used a list of measures implemented at UMD and
two datasets: corrupted accounts by phishing attacks, and incidents. We derived
a method to study the consequences of implemented measures on security, which
relies on the following steps:
1. Selection a measure and a dataset : For example, we investigated the effects
of hiring analysts, who work on incidents detection. Therefore, this measure
should impact the rate of incidents,
2. Elicitation of the expected outcomes : We identify, with the help of the Director
of Security, the expectations after the implementation of the measure in terms
of increasing or decreasing trend of incidents for example, on the short and
long term,
3. Calculation of the Laplace trend values : The Laplace trend test is used to
investigate increasing or decreasing trends in the data,
4. Drawn insights on the model validation: Discussions with the Director of Se-
curity at UMD enables us to understand how the measure can be mapped to
a node in the model, and more precisely to a path in the model,
5. Conclusions : The analysis of the Laplace trends are compared to the expected
outcomes. If they match, we have more confidence in the path under valida-
tion. If they do not match, the model may need to be changed accordingly.
We analyzed the implementation of several measures since 2001. A summary
of the measures, their expected outcomes, the results of the analysis of the Laplace
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trend values, and the validated paths in the model are shown in Table 5.4.
In our analysis, we faced several limitations, due to the nature of the available
data and to the lack of data:
• We cannot validate the entire model: Measures and data available to us limit
the analysis to some nodes and paths in the model,
• We cannot validate the strengths of relationships,
• The lack of data does not enable us to conclude with full confidence that
the measure actually matches the outcomes: Other factors, that we cannot
quantify or identify, may come into account. These factors include the change
in campus population, or in the attack profiles.
Despite encountered limitations, we provided a carefully thought method to
analyze available data to validate parts of the model. The analysis allows gaining in-
sights into model validation. Several attempts were made to remove the uncertainty
on the campus population or attack profiles and were discussed in this chapter. The
method described here can further be used to validate other nodes and paths in
the model when other security measures are implemented, or when other types of
datasets are available.
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Chapter 6 presents the model resulting from 1) the literature, 2) interviews
with experts, 3) surveys, 4) validation with experts, and 5) validation with case
studies at UMD. In the first section of this chapter, we define the model compo-
nents: user, threat, organization, and asset. In the second section, we focus on
characteristics for each component and present the model resulting from our study.
In the last section, we illustrate the use of the model through two examples.
We first show that the model can be used by IT security officers to start the discus-
sion with managers on security solutions. We compare three solutions for which the
objective is to increase the level of security of the organization: sending frequent
emails to make users sensitive to security issues, implement new policies, and invest-
ing in security devices to protect assets in the organization. In the second example,
we show how the model can be used to reason about security. We take the example
of an organization where data show that users are not aware of social engineering
techniques. The model is a support for communication and is a common language




Our objective was to identify major components of security, with a focus on
the human element. The final decomposition is the following:
• User: Anyone who uses a computer,
• Threat: Anything that has the potential to do harm. It includes the attackers,
• Organization: “A social arrangement, which pursues collective goals, which
controls its own performance, and which has a boundary separating it from
its environment” [103]. It includes the IT security team and managers,
• Asset: Anything that is owned by a person or by the organization that can
be converted into money. It includes 1) physical entities such as computers,
and 2) data that can be sensitive, such as passwords, credit card numbers,
organizational secrets, or intellectual property.
6.2.2 Model Characteristics
The validated model, based on interviews and surveys, is shown in Figure 6.1.
“Security” is impacted by two groups of nodes: a group that includes attacker re-
lated characteristics (“Attacker’s Motivations”, “Attacker’s Resources”, and “Value
of the Asset from the Attacker’s Point of View”) and a defense group (all charac-
teristics going through the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”). Both users and the
organization have a role in the defense process. Besides, the model depicts how the
















The identification of characteristics is based on the literature and inputs of
experts. In Chapter 2, the literature was investigated to identify some characteristics
to consider. These findings are summarized in Table 6.1.





User’s Trust [105], [111]







Organizational Attitude towards Security
[38], [60], [72],
[81], [101]
Risk Assessment Program [81]
Management Understanding of Security Needs [72], [119]
Budget [72], [81]





Available Software and Hardware [94]
Value of the Asset [114]
Each characteristic for the user, threat, organization, and asset is defined in
Tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5. “Security” is not part of any of the four components
previously identified. Defining security is challenging: there is no accepted definition
of what good security or bad security means. One can view security as a risk
informed process: as the objective is to increase the level of security, organizations
ultimately aim at decreasing the frequency or the gravity of successful attacks.
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Subjective judgment one makes
on the risks related to security
A high number of accounts cor-
rupted by phishing attacks may
reveal that users do not perceive
the risks related to such attacks
User’s Trust
Belief one has that one’s asset is
not at risk
People may trust the IT security






Knowledge, training, and experi-
ence in using computers or/and
security one has or gains
Means to gain more knowledge
or experience include reading the
news, using computers, or taking
classes
User’s Role
Function one has (for an aca-
demic environment, if the user is
an undergraduate, graduate stu-
dent, a faculty, or a staff member)
Represents how much one cares
about protecting one’s assets - An
intern may care less than a faculty
member




Reasons why people attack assets
Can consist of a specific purpose




All resources (personal and mate-
rial) available to the attacker
Include expertise (computer or
attack skills gained by academic
learning, experience, or reading
news/blogs), qualities (such as
perseverance), and material (soft-
ware and hardware)
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How an organization feels about
security
An organization involved with
critical non-IT risks (e.g. mili-
tary, banking, nuclear power) has
a culture of risk intolerance. The
relative lack of gravity in the risks
faced by some other organizations
(such as universities) results in a
culture of risk acceptance.
Threat
Awareness
Represents the knowledge of
threats by the IT security team
and the understanding of how rel-












Level to which the organization
understands the needs for secu-
rity
May translate into the budget al-
located to IT security or the po-
litical cover provided (for instance
in the case of unpopular password
policies)
Budget
Financial resources available for
IT security
Includes resources to buy devices





Theoretical knowledge of security,
of how to protect a network, expe-
rience gained, and personal qual-
ities useful to deal with security
issues











How the organization communi-
cates security issues to its users
Awareness campaigns include





Includes resources available for IT
security
Includes patches (software), In-
trusion Detection Systems (hard-
ware)
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Gain for the attacker if the at-
tack is successful








Represents the importance of
an asset to the organization
Servers and institutional data




Layers of protection deployed
to protect the asset from at-
tacks
Includes all protections of an
asset, at the network, system,
application, and data levels (in-
trusion detection systems, fire-
walls, passwords)
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6.3 Qualitative Use of the Model
The model aims at helping reasoning about IT security and easing commu-
nication between IT security officers and managers. It is a resource for security
officers to convince decision makers on how to invest in security. In the following
subsections, we illustrate how IT security officers can discuss with managers where
to invest in security, and how to identify causes of a low security level.
6.3.1 How to Use the Model to Decide Security Strategies?
Let us consider three security strategies and show how security officers can dis-
cuss with managers the impacts of implementing each measure, and which measure
they should invest in. We investigate the following security solutions:
• Solution 1: Send frequent emails to make users sensitive to issues related to se-
curity such as phishing. This means a high value of node “Security Awareness
Communication”,
• Solution 2: Implement new policies. This means a high value of node “Security
Policies”,
• Solution 3: Buy security devices to protect the network (such as intrusion
detection or prevention systems). This means a high value of node “Available
Software and Hardware”.
Increasing the organization’s communication (Solution 1) allows the user to
have a better exposure to security. Therefore, his/her risk perception has a higher
probability to be high: in other words, the user is more aware of security issues.
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In addition, the user gains expertise in security through awareness communication.
As the user is more aware of risks and more knowledgeable, he/she is more inclined
to better protect his/her assets (“Depth of Protection of the Asset” in the model).
For example, he/she can protect his/her system by updating the anti-virus, or by
choosing a strong password to protect his/her assets. Implementing new policies
(Solution 2) has a direct consequence on the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”. The
increase of the availability of resources (Solution 3) positively impacts the “Depth
of Protection of the Asset”.
Therefore, all solutions positively impact the “Depth of Protection of the As-
set” but the strength of the impacts differ. Solution 1 has a strong influence on
the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”, through the “User’s Risk Perception” and
“User’s Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security”, Solution 2 has a medium
influence on the “Depth of Protection of the Asset” and Solution 3 has a strong in-
fluence on it.
Consequently, Solution 1 has the most impact on the target node “Security”
as it positively influences the “Depth of Protection of the Asset” through two paths,
one being a strong influence, the other one being a medium influence. Solution
2 impacts the “Depth of Protection of the Asset” with a unique medium positive
influence, whereas Solution 3 impacts it with a unique strong influence.
The outcomes of this analysis may be discussed as in IT security, budget
plays a major role. Comparing the three aforementioned methods, managers may
decline implementing Solution 3, given the monetary cost it would imply. The
model provides a basis on which to open the discussion between IT security officers
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and managers. With this tool, IT security officers can help managers reason about
the impacts of implementing a security measure. For example, sending frequent
emails may have a double effect on security: the action increases users’ knowledge
on security issues (“User’s Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security”) but
also increases their perception of security-related risks (“User’s Risk Perception”).
Therefore, the model allows people (managers and security officers) brainstorming
about security in order to implement the most efficient security strategy.
6.3.2 How to Identify Causes of Security Issues?
Let us consider the following scenario: data show that users do not perceive
the risks related to social engineering. This translates in the model as a low “User’s
Risk Perception”. In order to deal with this issue, the model allows identifying the
causes of the problem: the user’s trust, expertise, or exposure to security (through
security awareness communication). Therefore, the organization can directly decide
how to increase the value of one or all three nodes.
Moreover, additional evidence can support decision making in this case. Let
us assume that in the previous months, 1) the organization has especially focused on
communicating with the users by sending emails about security issues and 2) media
have developed reports on stories in which users have been stolen credentials on the
Internet. Therefore, the value of the node “Security Awareness Communication”
is high. This evidence reveals that the causes that explain a decrease of the user’s
risk perception are related to one of the two following causes: the user’s trust or the
user’s expertise.
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Thus, the organization may decide to develop workshops to educate users.
Such an initiative would increase the user’s theoretical knowledge, hence the “User’s
Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security”.
6.4 Discussion
The model development and validation may be questioned. First, its devel-
opment relied on the identification of characteristics in the literature (Chapter 2),
but mostly on expert opinion. Therefore, the development process may be criticized
for the subjectivity involved at several steps of the process. However, the structure
of the model is flexible so that characteristics or influences in the model may be
modified, added, or removed. In addition, the description of the carefully thought
methodology that involves experts and combines several expert opinions and several
sources of information (interviews and surveys) and the outcomes of the interviews
and of the surveys are made available in this dissertation for reuse. Second, the val-
idation of the model relied on expert opinions but also on data collected at UMD.
The analysis of available data before and after the implementation of a security mea-
sure at UMD allows validating paths in the model. However, it was not possible to
validate all paths in the model because of the lack of sound, available data relevant
to all paths. Also, case studies allowed the validation of the type of influence from
one node to the node “Security”, but did not allow the validation of one node on
another along the path, nor the validation of the strength of influences.
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6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we defined model components, listed descriptions of character-
istics of each component, and presented the final model. We then showed how the
model can be used in a qualitative manner for security officers to have a justified
discussion with managers on how to invest in security. The model shows how the
implementation of a measure translated in the model affects other parameters of se-
curity. It aims at facilitating communication between security officers and managers
by providing a visual support to reason about security.
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Chapter 7
Towards a Quantitative Model
7.1 Introduction
At this point of the dissertation, we have presented a model for decision mak-
ing in IT security. The objectives of the model are to represent causal relationships
among characteristics of the user, threat, organization, and asset and improve com-
munication between IT security officers and decision makers. In Chapter 6, we
showed how the model can be qualitatively used to reason about security. For
example, we showed how the model can help discussing and comparing several secu-
rity decisions such as the implementation of new security policies, the installation of
security devices, and the implementation of an awareness communication campaign.
In Chapter 7, we start the discussion on how to further push the capabilities
of the model. We want to give insights into the following question: How can an IT
security team use the presented model in their organization to start the discussion
on security decisions with their managers? Ultimately, we want to give practical
directions on how organizations can measure characteristics identified in the model.
Measurements are either qualitative or quantitative. Chapter 7 tries to answer
questions such as: How can I know the level of expertise of my security team? How
can I evaluate the depth of protection of the assets in my organization? How can I
measure the user’s risk perception? The objective is not to provide measurements
for all characteristics in the model but to provide directions on qualitative and
quantitative measurements of a set of characteristics.
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We first detail the approach for measuring characteristics in the model. This
task is difficult for the reasons that were raised in this dissertation: there may not
be obvious measurements for characteristics in the model, and data in security are
difficult to obtain. In this chapter, we provide a series of techniques and examples
to illustrate how quantification, although imperfect, is possible. The objective is
to provide recommendations on measurements of characteristics in the model that
are practical and achievable. For example, in the second section of this chapter,
we focus on attacker-related nodes. Challenges exist while trying to understand
attackers targeting an organization. Often, it is not possible to have a complete
picture of the attackers targeting a specific organization. We suggest using nodes
related to the attacker as parameters of the model. In the next section, we compare
the use of the model over all assets of the organization and the use of the model for
categories of assets. Next, we provide directions of measurements (qualitative and
quantitative) for selected characteristics in the model: IT security team’s expertise
and qualities, security awareness communication, and user’s risk perception. At
the end of this chapter, we present a five-step methodology to use the model and
an example. We then introduce the concept of facets: the model can be used by
focusing on selected attributes of the attacker or specific categories of assets in the




The major objective of the model is to provide IT security officers with a
support when discussing with decision makers what security solution to implement.
For example, when deciding between hiring additional staff or buying a new security
device, IT security officers face the issue of convincing their managers of the benefits
of these solutions. With the presented model, IT security officers can explain that
hiring additional staff impacts several aspects of security: for instance, a newly hired
analyst can help the current team to develop stronger security policies, work on de-
veloping security awareness communication to improve the user’s risk perception, or
participate in identifying security issues in the organization. These justifications are
possible with the model as node “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” positively
impacts “Policy”, “Security Awareness Communication” and “Depth of Protection
of the Asset”.
When applied to an organization, the model needs to be organization-specific.
Indeed, organizations are different from the perspective of their policies, IT security
team attributes such as the IT security team size, or attacks targeting them. There-
fore, the question is “How can organizations translate the specifics of their attributes
into the model?”
First, in order to use the model, organizations need recommendations on how
to measure characteristics in the model. However, characteristics may not be easily
quantifiable: for example, how can we measure the “Organizational Attitude to-
wards Security”? Measurements have several attributes. First, they can be either
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qualitative or quantitative. Second, these measurements may not directly assess
the nodes: a set of indicators may provide evidence on the measurement of nodes
(see Section 3.4.4.4 for more details). In addition, one should identify data or evi-
dence that can be gathered in the organization and used to measure characteristics.
Besides, once measurements are available, the objective is to determine how they
translate into the model as high, medium, or low values. For example, if the num-
ber of incidents is available and is considered an indicator of node “Security” in the
model, does a number of 4 incidents for a given day mean a low, medium, or high
value for “Security”? Often, an absolute number does not have much meaning in the
model. Instead, relative values may be preferred: an increasing number of incidents
over a period of time has more meaning than an absolute number of incidents for a
given day. In addition, measures are organization-specific: a number of 4 incidents
for a given day may be usual for some organizations whereas it may by low for
others. Therefore, the translation of the measures (4 incidents for a given day or an
increasing number of incidents over a period of time) into a high, medium, or low
value in the model requires the expertise of an analyst. The analyst decides, with
respect to the organization, if the value is high, medium, or low. In this task, the
concern appears when a set of indicators is provided to measure a node and there is
a need to aggregate these measures into one unique value (high, medium, or low) of
the corresponding node in the model. This is even more challenging when indicators
provide contradictory conclusions.
In summary, providing recommendations on measurements of characteristics is
a tedious task, and achieving a recommendation of all characteristics in the model
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requires considerable research. In this chapter, we provide a set of practical and
achievable techniques for the measurement of selected characteristics and illustrate
the approach with examples. This proof-of-concept shows that measurement, al-
though imperfect, is possible.
The following sections consider several characteristics or groups of character-
istics in the model. Each section lists examples of measurements inspired from
existing techniques. Then, we suggest approaches to measure some characteristics
through one or a set of measurements (direct or indicators) and explain how the
measurement or set of measurements can be translated into a high, medium, or
low value in the model. Finally, we illustrate the measurement approach through
examples.
7.3 Attacker-Related Nodes as Parameters of the Model
In the model, characteristics related to the attacker are his/her motivations
and his/her resources. Resources include knowledge and expertise, the available
software, hardware, and financial resources.
Organizations have visibility into some attacks targeting their network as they
result in a large amount of traffic in the case of scanning activities, or in corrupted
machines. However, organizations cannot have a complete picture of all targeting at-
tacks. For example, they do not have information on all attacks that are attempted
but not successful. In addition, organizations do not have information on motiva-
tions behind attacker’s actions or know exactly the resources available to attackers.
In this context, how can nodes related to the attackers be assessed? The solution is
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to consider these characteristics as parameters of the model. In other words, nodes
“Attacker’s Resources” and “Attacker’s Motivations” can be used to model profiles
of attackers. Looking more closely at attacker profiles allows the organization to
implement measures targeting specific attackers.
In the literature, taxonomies of attackers exist ([92] and [96]). These tax-
onomies often rely on the knowledge or motivations of the attackers. On the one
hand, Rounds [96] suggests an extension of the taxonomy of attackers provided
by Falk [48] based on attackers’ motivations. The decomposition includes script
kiddies, malware developers, hacktivist, vigilante, state sponsored hacking, thieves,
defensive hackers, innocent hackers, enforcement DOS hackers terrorists. According
to Landreth [96], attackers can be divided into five categories depending on their
motivations (fun, curiosity, or money): novice, student, tourist, crasher, and thief.
On the other hand, Pfleeger [91] bases his taxonomy on motivations of attackers
but also their knowledge: amateurs, who have no motives and no knowledge, crack-
ers, who have general knowledge but no motives, and career criminals, who are
knowledgeable and motivated by money.
In the model, we can describe profiles of attackers with combinations of low,
medium, and high values for “Attacker’s Resources” and “Attacker’s Motivations”.
For the following analysis, we limit these two characteristics to two possible values:
low and high. This allows to have four attacker profiles based on combinations of
these values, which are shown in Table 7.1. At one end of the spectrum, attack-
ers have many resources, such as strong attack skills, and are highly motivated,
by money for example. In particular, this category includes professional attack-
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ers. This situation translates into high values for the “Attacker’s Resources” and
“Attacker’s Motivations”. At the other end of the spectrum, attackers who have
little resource, such as knowledge or hardware and software resources, and little
motivation, translate into the model as low values for both nodes. We include in
this category scripts kiddies or attackers who have no specific motivation other than
having fun and no specific material to launch attacks besides their personal comput-
ers. When attackers have specific motivations but few resources, they fall into the
case where node “Attacker’s Resources” is low and node “Attacker’s Motivations”
is high. This category is often neglected in existing taxonomies, as shown in Table
7.1: hacktivists, described by Falk [48] and Round [96], have political motivations
but their apparent skills are low because their objective is to propagate a political
message and they want to be seen. However, professional hacktivists may fall in
the category of high “Attacker’s Resources” and high “Attacker’s Motivations” (e.g.
Anonymous [1]). The last category with low “Attacker’s Motivations” and high
“Attacker’s Resources” include attackers who have some level of motivations and
have knowledge, but not enough to make it a professional activity, as opposed to
the category composed of attackers with high resources and high motivations.
Both “Attacker’s Motivations” and “Attacker’s Resources” have a negative
influence on “Security”, according to the model. Therefore if both characteristics
have a high value, “Security” is more likely to be low than high. The only action
organizations can work on is to act on the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”:
Figure 7.1 shows a simplification of the model focusing on the four nodes of concern
in this section.
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Figure 7.1: Attacker’s Motivations, Resources, and Depth of Protection of the Asset
in the Model
The value of “Security” is based on combinations of low and high values for
characteristics “Attacker’s Motivations”, “Attacker’s Resources”, and low, medium,
and high values of the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”. These three charac-
teristics have different impacts on security: positive or negative, medium or strong
influences. Intuitively, among all combinations, the case where the organization is
the most secure (high “Security”) is when the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”
is high and the other two attacker-related nodes are low. On the other hand, the
case where the organization is the least secure is when the “Depth of Protection of
the Asset” is low and the other two nodes are high. Other combinations lead to a
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level of security between these two extreme cases. Values of “Security” based on its
three parent characteristics are derived based on Appendix D and are referenced in
Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Value of Security given Two Possible Values of Attacker’s Motivations









High High High Medium
High High Low Medium
High Low High High
High Low Low High
Medium High High Low
Medium High Low Medium
Medium Low High Medium
Medium Low Low High
Low High High Low
Low High Low Low
Low Low High Medium
Low Low Low Medium
Based on this approach, IT security officers can use the model and Table 7.2 to
discuss with managers that in some specific situations (where an attacker profile is
considered), security needs to be enforced by improving the “Depth of Protection of
the Asset”. For example, let us consider the case where an organization is targeted
by highly motivated attackers (high “Attacker’s Motivations”) who appear to have
strong knowledge about attacks (high “Attacker’s Resources”). If the “Depth of
Protection of the Asset” is evaluated to be medium, the level of security is low
according to Figure 7.2. In order to increase the level of security, actions need to
be taken to improve the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”, from medium to high,
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which would result in a medium level of security. Therefore, IT security officers can
justify, thanks to the model, the implementation of an awareness campaign or a
change in policies in order to improve the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”, hence
“Security”.
7.4 Using the Model per Category of Assets
In quantitative security risk assessments, assets need to be given a value in
order to perform ALE analyses. The SANS institute provides a guide step-by-step
for security risk assessments [114] in which they differentiate two types of assets:
tangible assets such as computers and software, and intangible assets such as patents
and users’ personal data. On the one hand, the value of assets of the first category
can be determined through several alternatives: IT managers can be asked the cost
of tangible assets, these values can be researched on the Internet for example, or the
value can be estimated from previous projects. On the other hand, two approaches
are possible to value intangible assets: the cost approach consists in assessing the
fair market value whereas the income approach focuses on the income-producing
capability of the asset. In reality, assessing the value of assets is difficult. This
section looks at the use of the “Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of
View” in the model.
One approach to measure node “Value of the Asset from the Organization’s
Point of View” consists in aggregating the value of all assets in the organization
to determine a unique value. A simple scheme for aggregating the value consists in
using a the following equation with parameters i as the asset category, vi as the value
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vi ∗ wi (7.1)
k∑
i=1
wi = 1 (7.2)
Categories of assets for a University environment can include: laboratory
computers, personal computers, servers and data centers, data related to human
resources, grades, and health. Table 7.3 provides an example of categories and
weights. Privately-owned computers, mobile devices, and personal data present on
these computers and devices are of lower concern to the organization: the organiza-
tion gives more importance to desktop computers because they are the organization’s
property and it is held liable if any problem occurs. Institutional data are of major
concern as their loss would result in the loss of highly sensitive information such
as financial or health data. Servers, data centers and the network infrastructure
are another focus for organizations because their loss may result in unavailability
of services. Research data may also be important in research universities that base
their recognition among national universities on successful research.
The value vi of category can be evaluated by an analyst or it can be calculated
by multiplying the value of one asset in category i by an average value avi of an
asset in category i. For example, for an organization of 40,000 users, the value of
the category “personal computers” can be calculated by multiplying 40,000 by an
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Table 7.3: Example of Categories of Assets for a University Environment and Quan-
titative Value
Category of asset Weight





Servers, data centers, and network infrastructure 0.28
Institutional data (human resources, financial data,
grades, health information)
0.5
average value of one personal computer, assuming that each user in the organization
owns a personal computer. Determining whether the computed aggregate value V
is high, medium, or low in the model depends on the analyst and may be difficult
to do. In addition, when managing security, IT security officers are interested in
risks or potential attack scenarios targeting specific asset. Therefore, focusing on
categories of assets makes more sense than looking at an aggregate asset.
Let us consider the decomposition suggested in Table 7.3. For each category,
the importance of a category translates into a high, medium, or low value of “Value
of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View”. For example, if the university
considers that the most important assets are the servers and data centers, and
data, both categories are assigned a high value. Data concerning research may be
considered of medium value and the remaining categories may be considered of low
value to the organization. Table 7.4 shows an example of values by category of
assets. Deciding whether a category has a high, medium, or low value depends on
the analyst.
By looking at several classes of assets, instead of looking at an aggregate as-
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Table 7.4: Example of Categories of Assets for a University Environment and Qual-
itative Value
Category of assets Value of the asset





Servers, data centers, and network infrastructure High
Institutional data (human resources, financial data,
grades, health information)
High
set, IT security officers can suggest defense mechanism specific to the class of assets
under investigation. Thus, the model can be used with a low value of assets when
investigating personal computers for example whereas the model can be used with
a high value of assets when investigating sensitive data such as grades or health
information. Deciding whether a class of assets is of high or low value can be de-
termined respectively to other classes of assets. For example, let us consider servers
in the organization. Servers are a major concern for organizations as successful at-
tacks against them can lead to unavailability of services in the organization. If the
organization noticed that servers were recently attacked, it may reveal a low value
for characteristic “Depth of Protection of the Asset”, the asset being the pool of
servers in the organization. Therefore, IT security officers can emphasize buying
new hardware or software (characteristic “Available Software and Hardware” in the
model) in order to improve the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”, hence “Security”
for the servers category.
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7.5 Security Team Expertise and Qualities
There is an extensive literature on how to measure expertise. For example, in
the field of human factors, expertise is characterized by attributes such as knowledge,
experience, training, skills and familiarity with a given situation [61]. Knowledge
is the “understanding of the system design, purposes, elements, functions, and op-
erations, in relation to one’s responsibilities, position, and the specific activities or
tasks undertaken” whereas experience is the knowledge and practice gained through
training and interactions with the system or activities. In this work, training is
defined as the common training all employees undergo while skills are defined as
the abilities that require little cognitive effort. There may be similarities between
present and past situations, this is how the familiarity with a given situation is
defined.
Forrester’s work focuses on attributes of experts [50], which includes publica-
tions in the field of concern, professional memberships in the field, average years
of academic experience on specific topics and in the field, average years of expe-
rience on specific topics and in the field, nominations by peers on specific topics
or in the field, type of employee (company, organization, institution), if the com-
pany/organization/institution specializes in specific or similar fields.
Houmb suggests characterizing the trustworthiness of an information source
based on two trust variables: knowledge level and expertise level. The knowledge
level is evaluated by assigning weights to knowledge domains. Examples of domain
knowledge include security management, network management, and code develop-
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ment. The author develops a simple mathematical framework to combine all experts
and domains of knowledge to derive a knowledge score and an expertise score for
the set of experts.
Inspired from the previous work, we define several attributes for each member
of the IT security team to characterize the “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”:
• Knowledge: Based on the SANS Training and Career Roadmap [5], the cur-
riculum of an IT security officer should include intrusion analysis, system
administration, incident handling, penetration testing, and network security.
These five fields can be used to assess the level of knowledge of an IT security
team. Most of the time, all officers have general knowledge in each field but
they often specialize in two or three of them,
• Number of years of experience in IT security,
• Number of years of experience in IT: This indicator reveals the experience of
an officer in general IT topics, such as networking. This experience allows
officers to have a bigger picture of security instead of a narrowed vision,
• Number of years at current position: This information may reveal qualities of
officers. If an officer has been serving for several years at the current position,
it shows familiarity with tasks handled on a day-to-day basis,
• Position in diverse environments, such as a company or a governmental agency:
It reflects versatility of the officer.
Table 7.5 shows an example of a team of four IT security officers. For each
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attribute of the “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”, we decided on an equiva-
lent level of “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”. This assessment relies on the
analyst’s judgment. For example, regarding the knowledge within one of the five
knowledge categories, if three or all four experts have the knowledge in the field, we
assume a high value for the overall knowledge level. If two experts out of four have
the knowledge, the overall level is considered medium. If fewer than two experts
have the knowledge, we assign a low value. We apply the same rule for the attribute
“Position in diverse environments”. Our rationale behind assigning a high value for
the remaining three attributes rely on the presence in the team of an experienced IT
security officer. For the example depicted in Table 7.5, we believe that characteristic
“Security Team Expertise and Qualities” has a high value in the model.
Table 7.5: Example of Expertise and Qualities of the IT Security Team
Officer
Team
Information 1 2 3 4
Knowledge
Incident handling x x Medium
Penetration testing x Low
Intrusion analysis x x x High
System administration x x Medium
Network security x x x x High
Number of years of experience in IT Security 1 3 2 10 High
Number of years of experience in IT 1 4 7 13 High
Number of years at current position 1 1 2 10 High
Position in diverse environments x x Medium
Another approach consists in looking at the “Security Team Expertise and
Qualities” given a specific attack or asset. The rationale behind this type of analysis
is that domains of knowledge may have more or less importance considering a type
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of attack or asset. For example, knowledge on incident handling is useful when
focusing on users’ personal computers or when focusing on spreading viruses. On
the other hand, penetration testing may be of more concern to servers than personal
computers.
7.6 Security Awareness Communication
The human element is considered the weakest link in security because it is
sometimes the reason why attacks such as phishing are successful. A solution to
prevent these attacks to succeed are to educate users of the organization. This is
done through awareness programs.
Brodie and Wanner suggest types of training that can be used in companies to
educate employees of the company [26]: classroom-style training, security awareness
website, helpful hints on user screens when they log in, advertisement means such
as posters and flyers. Brodie also lists a series of topics to include in security aware-
ness: physical security, desktop security, wireless networks and security, password
security, phishing, hoaxes, malware, file sharing and copyrights. On the other hand,
Voss emphasizes that upper management support and funding are critical for an
awareness program to be successful [119]. In addition, there should be an organi-
zational structure with an individual or a team to support training with a specific
plan. Another recommendation includes the use of multiple means of communica-
tion. Finally, Voss suggests several specific topics to include in awareness training:
who the threats are and what is protected in the organization, physical and tech-
nical security awareness, policies and procedures, how incidents are handled in the
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organization, social engineering, password management, email and web threats.
Table 7.6 provides a list of suggested measures that can be in place in a
University environment. In an organization, the analyst should reference all means
of educating users and qualitatively assess whether this list reflects a low, medium,
or high level of security awareness communication. Intuitively, some measures cited
in Table 7.6 have more impact than others. For example, flyers or posters are less
visible than warning messages on the webmail page, therefore they may have less
impact on users’ awareness.
Table 7.6: List of Possible Awareness Measures
Measure Examples
Classroom-style training
Brown bag lunches over an IT security issue
Class/workshop on IT security
Security awareness website Website with podcasts, videos, examples
Hints on websites
“Do not share your password” on webmail
“Do not share your password” on user login page
Advertisement
Monthly IT newsletter
Posters hung at strategic places
Occasional flyers distributed to users
Mass emails Mass email sent when increase in phishing attacks
Other Phishing attack launched by the organization
Table 7.7 provides an example where some of the listed measures listed in Table
7.6 are implemented in an organization. In order to assess whether characteristic
“Security Awareness Communication” is high, medium, or low in the model, we
provide an efficiency level for each measure. Efficiency measures the impact on
users. An objective measure of efficiency can be the number of users exposed to the
measure. For example, the total population is concerned by messages displayed on
webmail or login pages and by mass emails: therefore, the efficiency is considered
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high. One can argue that after a period of time, users get used to the displayed
message and do not pay attention to it anymore. However, these messages are still
useful for users who are new to the organization. On the other hand, newsletters,
website, posters, and flyers concern a small portion of the users population: only
users who notice these actions are impacted, and these actions are considered of low
efficiency. Brown bag lunches and workshops are considered of medium efficiency
because their advertisement can be done via email, hence the measures target the
entire user population. In addition, because they are intended to go into more
details than posters or flyers on security issues, brown bag lunches and workshops
are expected to improve users’ knowledge and understanding of security. Hence,
their efficiency is considered high.
Table 7.7: Examples of Awareness Measures in an Organization
Efficiency Examples Present?
High
“Do not share your password” on webmail Yes
“Do not share your password” on user login webpage No
Mass email sent when increase in phishing attacks Yes
Phishing attack launched by the organization No
Medium
Brown bag lunches over an IT security issue Yes
Class/workshop on IT security No
Low
Monthly IT newsletter Yes
Website with podcasts, videos, examples No
Posters hung at strategic places No
Occasional flyers distributed to users No
In the example presented in Table 7.7, the organization has implemented two
of the most efficient measures, one of the two medium efficiency ones, and one of
the low efficiency ones. Therefore, we can consider that the “Security Awareness
Communication” has a high value. Another analyst may assign different efficiency
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levels than the ones suggested or may decide another value for “Security Awareness
Communication”. Alternatively to the qualitative approach, a semi-quantitative
one consists in providing weights to the list of possible measures and calculating
an awareness score. This approach has the advantage of providing a quantitative
measure but the analyst still needs to decide the thresholds between low and medium
awareness levels and between medium and high awareness levels.
7.7 User’s Risk Perception
Risk perception represents the awareness of users regarding security issues.
For example, if a user has a high risk perception, there is a lower probability that
he/she falls for a phishing attack than for a user who has a low risk perception.
Kruger and Kearney provide a methodology to measure awareness (or risk
perception) by using a scoring model [73]. A questionnaire intended to be given
to users of an organization is developed and focuses on one of the three following
aspects, borrowed from the social sciences: knowledge (what users know), attitude
(what users think), and behavior (what users do). Each question is answered on
a two-point scale (true or false) or a three-point scale (true, false, I don’t know)
and a score per aspect is computed based on a weight assigned to the aspect and
the number of answers. Similarly, the evaluation is done with respect to six main
rules instead of the three aspects: rules include the adherence to policies, keeping
passwords secret or using emails or Internet with care. This methodology provides
a quantitative measurement for the organization relative to one of the three aspects
and one of the three policies and allows identifying where to make improvements.
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In Section 5.3.1, we provided an example of an indicator of the “User’s Risk
Perception” at UMD, which is the trend of the rate of accounts corrupted by phishing
attacks. Phishing attacks are attributed to users not knowing or not recognizing
phishing attacks. The number of accounts corrupted by phishing attacks collected
at UMD focuses on attacks targeting UMD usernames and passwords. The number
of successful phishing attacks can be interpreted in a relative manner by looking
at trends (e.g. through Laplace test), or in an absolute manner. If the rate of
these incidents is increasing, either user’s risk perception is worsening or there is
a higher number of phishing attacks. In both cases, users were not able to detect
the masquerading website or email. This translates into a low value for the “User’s
Risk Perception” in the model. On the contrary, if the rate is decreasing, it can be
because there are fewer phishing attacks, or there are fewer victims. In the second
case, the trend can be decreasing because the number of successful phishing attacks
is decreasing and also because there are no successful phishing attacks. If there
are no phishing attacks, the “User’s Risk Perception” is considered to be high. If
the trend is decreasing but phishing attacks are still occurring, we can consider the
“User’s Risk Perception” as medium in the model. Table 7.8 summarizes the values
of characteristic “User’s Risk Perception” in the model based on the observed trend
and values of the number of successful phishing attacks.
Investigating specific incident records collected in an organization may reveal
the awareness of users. For example, viruses that spread through email attachments
need that users open the attachment. When successful, these attacks reveal that
users were not able to detect potential malicious content. Another example of
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Decreasing trend and number of successful
phishing attacks not equal to 0
Medium
Number of successful phishing attacks
equal to 0
High
incident that reflects the unawareness of users is the case of viruses spreading through
Instant Messenger. The same analysis on the trend of the number of these incidents
as the one suggested previously provides insights into the value of the “User’s Risk
Perception” in the model.
7.8 Example
7.8.1 Overall Security
We introduce a five-step method to use the model (Figure 7.2):
1. Collect evidence in the organization: Data such as the expertise of the secu-
rity team, the awareness communication measures in place, or the user’s risk
perception should be gathered,
2. Set evidence in the model: Collected evidence should be mapped to the model
and translated into a low, medium, or high value,
3. If needed, consider parameters: If the organization is concerned by a category
of attackers with low or high values of resources and/or motivations, the model
allows representing specific scenarios. This step is optional,
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4. Propagate evidence and parameters in the model: The types and strengths
of influences allow propagating values related to evidence and parameters
through the model. Appendix D provides a technique to propagate values
in the model,
5. Provide recommendations: The visual representation allows determining the
actions that the organization can take to improve security.
Figure 7.2: Five-Step Method to Use the Model
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Let us consider a fictional organization for the purpose of illustrating the use of
the model. This organization is a university including 40,000 users. The IT security
team is composed of four experts whose expertise and qualities are the ones depicted
in Table 7.5. In addition, awareness measures are in place to raise users’ awareness
on attacks and include mass email sent to warn users against current attacks and
a “Do not share your passwords with others” on the webmail page. If a budget of
100,000 US dollars is available, how should the budget be allocated to improve the
overall security?
Both pieces of information on the IT security team expertise and qualities and
on the awareness communication campaigns in place represent gathered evidence
resulting from step 1. With this set of experts, we assess that the value of the
“Security Team Expertise and Qualities” is high and communication measures are
interpreted by a medium value for “Security Awareness Communication” (step 2).
On the one hand, “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” positively influences
“Security Policies”, which results in a high value of “Security Policies”. On the other
hand, “Security Awareness Communication” positively influences “User’s Expertise
in Using Computers or/and in Security”, which provides a medium value of the latter
characteristic. Besides, “User’s Risk Perception” is influenced by medium values of
“Security Awareness Communication” and “User’s Expertise in Using Computers
or/and in Security”, thus has a medium value. “Depth of Protection of the Asset”
is then impacted by four parent characteristics:
• “Security Policies”, which has a medium positive influence and a high value,
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• “User’s Risk Perception”, which has a strong positive influence and a medium
value,
• “User’s Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security, which has a medium
positive influence and a medium value,
• “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”, which has a medium positive influ-
ence and a high value.
These pieces of information result in a medium value of “Depth of Protection
of the Asset”, as explained in Appendix D. With no evidence on the attacker, this
value translates into a medium value for “Security” (step 4). Figure 7.3 shows the
model with set evidence and propagated values: evidence gathered in steps 1 and
2 are represented as bubbles whereas propagated evidence resulting from step 4 are
depicted by dashed squares.
IT security officers can then use the model to start the discussion with man-
agers on how to invest in security. Improving security implies improving the level
of the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”. Several alternatives are possible. First,
improving the “User’s Risk Perception” by implementing additional awareness mea-
sures would result in a high value of the “Security Awareness Communication”,
which impacts “User’s Risk Perception” and “User’s Expertise in Using Computers
or/and in Security”. Ultimately, this alternative propagates into high values of the
“Depth of Protection of the Asset” and of “Security”. Another solution consists in
buying new security devices or software in order to set a high value to characteristic
“Available Software and Hardware”, which would result in high values of “Depth
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Figure 7.3: Model with Pieces of Evidence Gathered in an Organization - H, M, and
L stand for High, Medium, and Low respectively
of Protection of the Asset” and “Security”. In order to compare both alternatives,
we need to look at the weights of each measure on the first common characteristic
in the model. On the one hand, the first solution, through “User’s Risk Percep-
tion” and “User’s Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security”, impacts the
“Depth of Protection of the Asset” with a strong and a medium influence. On the
other hand, the second solution impacts the “Depth of Protection of the Asset” with
a strong influence. Therefore, the first solution is preferred. The strength of the
model resides in the common language that it brings between experts in IT security
and managers, who have less IT security expertise. The model allows opening the
discussion between the two parties in order to implement the most suitable solution.
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7.8.2 Using Facets
Although organizations are interested in managing the overall security, they
are often also concerned with specific categories of assets or classes of attackers. We
introduce the concept of facet to address this issue. A facet is a perspective of the
model. The model can be used by focusing at specific facets, including a specific
asset category or attack type. For example, the model can be used to study the
facet “phishing attacks” to determine the actions to pursue to improve the level of
security of the organization against phishing attacks.
We define a systematic six-step method to use the model in an organization.
The six steps are the following (Figure 7.4):
1. Select a facet: The organization can decide to investigate a specific attack
type (e.g. phishing) or a category of assets (e.g. institutional data),
2. Collect evidence on the specific facet: Evidence can be collected in the organi-
zation, such as the level of IT security team expertise for the specific asset. For
instance, network security knowledge and skills are important when focusing
on asset category “servers”,
3. Set evidence in the model: Evidence is mapped to low, medium, or high values
of characteristics in the model,
4. If needed, consider parameters: The organization may be concerned with a
specific category of attackers (of high or low values of resources and motiva-
tions). This step is optional,
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5. Propagate evidence and parameters in the model: Through the types and
strengths of influences in the model, collected evidence and parameters are
propagated in the model to determine a level of security with respect to the
facet under study. Appendix D provides a technique to propagate values in
the model,
6. Provide recommendations: Depending on the analysis, IT security officers can
recommend security solutions to improve the level of security with respect to
the facet.
In order to illustrate the approach, let us consider a fictional organization.
This organization is a university including 40,000 users. The IT security team is
composed of four experts whose expertise and qualities are the ones depicted in
Table 7.5. We present in the next subsections two examples to illustrate how to
set evidence in the model, propagate evidence throughout the model, and draw
conclusions. These examples show how the model can be used from specific facets.
7.8.3 Facet 1: Servers
In this first facet, we are concerned with the level of security of servers in the
organization (step 1). The second step of the analysis consists in gathering evidence
on this facet. According to Section 7.4, servers are considered an important asset
for which the value is high (Table 7.4). All knowledge domains for IT security
officers defined in Table 7.5 but incident handling are concerned with servers: indeed,
incidents mostly focus on computers rather than servers. Based on the other four
knowledge domains and the other attributes, we interpret that the level of expertise
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Figure 7.4: Six-Step Method to Use the Model within a Facet
and qualities of experts is high. In the model, we translate these two pieces of
evidence as (step 3):
1. Characteristic “Value of Asset from the Organization’s Point of View” is high
because we focus on servers which has been identified as one of the most
important assets of the organization,
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2. Characteristic “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” is high based on the
attributes of the team of four experts.
The next step of the analysis consists in propagating these values into the
model. On the one hand, “Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of
View” positively impacts the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”. On the other
hand, the “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” positively impacts the “Depth
of Protection of the Asset” through several paths. The ones that go through char-
acteristics related to users, such as “Security Awareness Communication”, do not
concern servers. The paths that are concerned by servers are the following:
1. From “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” to “Security Policies”, and
“Depth of Protection of the Asset”,
2. From “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” directly to “Depth of Protec-
tion of the Asset”.
Therefore, the high value of “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” trans-
fers to “Security Policies”. “Depth of Protection of the Asset” is influenced by high
values coming from “Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View”, “Se-
curity Policies”, and “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”, and is subsequently
high. In addition, “Depth of Protection of the Asset” impacts “Security”. Its ef-
fects are counteractions of the “Attacker’s Motivations” and “Attacker’s Resources”
and depending on their values (high or low), “Security” has different values. Based
on Figure 7.1, the only case where “Security” is not high is the case where both
“Attacker’s Motivations” and “Attacker’s Resources” are high. Figure 7.5 shows
202
the model for the facet under investigation: evidence on characteristics “Value of
the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View” and “Security Team Expertise
and Qualities” are set as bubbles, parameters on the attacker-related characteristics
are depicted by diamonds, and propagated values of “Security Policies”, “Depth of
Protection of the Asset”, and “Security” are represented by dashed squares (step
5).
Figure 7.5: Model with Pieces of Evidence for Servers - H, M, and L stand for High,
Medium, and Low respectively
In order to increase the level of “Security” of servers, the model identifies
a set of possible actions (step 6). The “Depth of Protection of the Asset” can be
improved by only targeting characteristic “Available Software and Hardware”, as the
other actions impact users (“User’s Risk Perception”, “User’s Role”, and “User’s
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Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security”) and users are not concerned
with the facet servers. Therefore, IT security officers can recommend investing in
stronger software or additional hardware to protect servers. The model serves as a
support for IT security officers and managers to discuss security solutions specific
to a category of asset.
7.8.4 Facet 2: Phishing Attacks
In this section, we focus on a common social engineering attack: phishing
(step 1). Step 2 consists in collecting evidence: as we are concerned about phishing
attacks, assets at risk are users’ personal data. In addition, the expertise of IT
security officers relevant to phishing attacks should be gathered. Finally, security
awareness actions in place are important to raise users’ awareness.
Phishing attacks target information of users, which is considered as a low-value
asset by the organization (Table 7.4) with respect to other assets that belong to the
organization, such as servers and institutional data. Based on the fact that the IT
security team is an experienced one with an IT security officer having 13 years of
experience in IT, we interpret that their expertise with respect to phishing attacks
is high. In addition, awareness measures are in place to raise users’ awareness on
phishing attacks and include mass email sent to warn users against current phishing
attacks and a “Do not share your passwords with others” on the webmail page.
These measures are interpreted by a medium value for awareness communication
on phishing attacks. In summary, pieces of evidence regarding this facet are the
following (step 3):
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• Low value for the “Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View”,
• High value for the “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”,
• Medium value for the “Security Awareness Communication”.
Next, these values propagate in the model. On the one hand, the value of “Se-
curity Team Expertise and Qualities” results in a high value of “Security Policies”.
On the other hand, the value of “Security Awareness Communication” translates
into a medium value of “User’s Risk Perception” and “User’s Expertise in Using
Computers or/and in Security”. Therefore, “Depth of Protection of the Asset” is
influenced by five values:
• Low value of “Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View” which
has a medium positive influence,
• High value of “Security Policies” which has a medium positive influence,
• Medium value of “User’s Risk Perception” which has a strong positive influ-
ence,
• Medium value of “User’s Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security”
which has a medium positive influence,
• High value of “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” which has a medium
positive influence.
The combination of this information results in a medium value of “Depth of
Protection of the Asset”. More details on how to combine these pieces of information
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to derive this value are provided in Appendix D.
In addition, “Depth of Protection of the Asset” positively impacts “Security”
but the value of “Security” also depends on parameters related to the attacker’s
attributes. Phishing attacks are highly motivated as the objective is to gather
credentials of users. Phishing attacks are considered a professional activity, thus
characteristic “Attacker’s Resources” is considered high. Considering high values
of the “Attacker’s Motivations” and “Attacker’s Resources” and a medium value of
the “Depth of Protection of the Asset”, “Security” is low (Figure 7.1). Figure 7.6
shows the model representing the facet under concern (step 5).
Figure 7.6: Model with Pieces of Evidence for Phishing Attacks - H, M, and L stand
for High, Medium, and Low respectively
In order to increase the level of security, IT security officers can recommend
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actions based on the model (step 6). Increasing “Security” implies increasing the
“Depth of Protection of the Asset”, which is impacted by five characteristics. “Avail-
able Hardware and Software” are not concerned with phishing attacks as the success
of phishing attacks relies on the inability of users to recognize a masquerading en-
tity. Besides, organizations cannot act on characteristics “Value of the Asset from
the Organization’s Point of View” and on “User’s Role”. However, organizations
can make decisions that impact the “User’s Risk Perception” or the “User’s Exper-
tise in Using Computers or/and in Security” by improving the “Security Awareness
Communication”. For example, organizations can implement additional awareness
measures such as adding a warning message against phishing attacks on the login
webpage or increase the funding allocated to awareness to develop workshops to
make users sensitive. Improving awareness communication to act against phishing
attacks is intuitive but the model brings a support for communication and a common
language between IT security officers and managers.
7.9 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an approach to incorporate in the model mea-
surements collected in organizations. We looked at five characteristics in the model:
“Attacker’s Motivations”, “Attacker’s Resources”, “Value of the Asset from the Or-
ganization’s Point of View”, “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”, “Security
Awareness Communication” and “User’s Risk Perception”. We suggested using the
first three characteristics to derive facets to investigate. For example, high values of
the attacker’s motivations and resources represent professional hackers whereas low
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values represent script kiddies. In addition, we defined categories of assets so that
analyses can focus on specific assets of importance for the organization such as in-
stitutional data or servers and data centers. We provided recommendations on how
to measure the “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” though a set of attributes,
including the IT security officers’ knowledge and years of experience at the current
organization. “Security Awareness Communication” is measured through a checklist
of several awareness measures such as the implementation of IT security classes in
the organization. Finally, we used the trends of the number of successful phishing
attacks as evidence on the “User’s Risk Perception”. Presented measurements are
mostly qualitative and the use of an analyst usually allows the interpretation of a
measurement into a low, medium, or high value in the model. For each measurement,
we provided an example to show how we would interpret the measurements.
In the last section of this chapter, we presented a systematic five-step method
to incorporate evidence in the model. The method is illustrated with an example
in order to study how to invest in security in an organization. We introduced a
systematic six-step method to focus on facets. The approach is illustrated through
two facets. The first one focused on the category of assets composed of servers in a
fictional organization. We integrated pieces of evidence collected at the organization
that are specific to the facet. Other characteristics in the model serve as param-
eters, such as the attacker-related characteristics. We illustrated the propagation
of evidence and parameters in the model to derive a level of security and suggest
recommendations that would specifically target servers. In the second selected facet,
we looked at phishing attacks. These examples show that not only the model can be
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In this dissertation, we presented an approach to help decision making in IT
security. The approach consists in the development of a model that identifies ma-
jor components of security, with a focus on the human elements (attacker, user,
organization), characteristics of each component, and causal influences among char-
acteristics. Influences have two attributes: a type, which is positive, negative, or
neither positive nor negative, and a strength, which is weak, medium, or strong.
The model is represented with nodes to represent characteristics and arrows to de-
pict relationships among them. The visual representation of the model allows IT
security experts and people with less expertise, such as managers, to communicate
on a common basis.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, we presented existing frameworks to
manage IT security. We emphasized that existing methods are often not applicable
in practice and that it may not be easy to communicate their results with other key
players in IT security. We then referenced supporting literature on characterization
of the human elements involved in security: user, attacker, and organization. Finally,
we documented the literature to develop and validate a model.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, we introduced an approach for devel-
oping and validating such a model based on experts’ opinions and empirical data.
However, as there is mistrust of anyone who tries to understand how practitioners
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act and think, managing to involve experts in the model development and validation
processes is difficult. Second, obtaining empirical data collected in organizations is
challenging because organizations are often not inclined to share data, even if they
were, there is no accepted security metrics, and available information is frequently
incomplete. In this context, we developed a carefully thought approach, although
imperfect, for the development and validation of a model. The development is based
on interviews and surveys of IT security experts, and the validation is based on both
experts and data.
In the fourth chapter of the dissertation, we presented the results of the model
development for academic environments. We first developed a model based on the
existing literature of characteristics of the human elements involved in security (at-
tacker, user, organization) and on several months of discussion with the Director
of Security at UMD. We interviewed experts at other academic environments and
managed to obtain two two-hour interviews. The outputs of the interviews were
the following: a suggestion of a decomposition of security (for example attacker,
user, organization, and asset) and a complete model with characteristics and influ-
ences among them. Characteristics of these models are extracted and used in the
survey. The survey was sent to an EDUCAUSE listserv and fifteen experts took
the survey. The survey’s objective was to gather agreement or disagreement on a
suggested decomposition of security in “threat, user, organization, and asset” and
to gather experts’ opinion on the strength of the influence of a list of characteristics
on security. A model was derived from these three sources of information (initial
model, interviews, and surveys).
211
The model is then submitted to the validation process in the fifth chapter of
this dissertation. We presented a two-step validation process. First, the model was
sent to interviewed experts and to experts who took the survey and provided us with
an email address. Two out of five experts provided us with feedback and the model
was modified accordingly. Second, we developed a method to validate influences
in the model with data collected at UMD. We investigated the trend of the rate
of security incidents before and after the implementation of a security measure to
see if it matches the outcomes expected after the implementation of the measure
(e.g. sudden decrease afterwards). Besides, the measure is mapped to a path in the
model, from a characteristic to “Security” for example. Therefore, if analysis of the
trend matches the expected outcomes, the portion of the model under validation is
validated. Otherwise, the model should be reviewed accordingly. We presented the
analysis of five different measures and showed that none contradicted the expected
outcomes.
The model that was developed and partly validated in Chapter 4 and Chapter
5 is presented in Chapter 6 of the dissertation. We identified four components of
security: threat, user, organization (IT security officers and managers), and asset.
For each of these components, we described a list of characteristics. They include
the attacker’s motivations and resources, the user’s risk perception and expertise
in using computers or/and in security, the organizational attitude towards security,
the security team expertise, the value of the asset, and its depth of protection. In
this chapter, we also show how the model can be used qualitatively to reason about
security.
212
In Chapter 7, we tried to push the capabilities of the model further. When
using the model in their environment, organizations want to know how to make
the model organization-specific, in other words, they want to know how they can
measure characteristics. However, the road towards the full measurement of char-
acteristics the model is a tedious one. We proposed a series of techniques and ex-
amples to show that measuring characteristics in the model, although imperfect, is
possible. We focused on five characteristics: “Attacker’s Motivations”, “Attacker’s
Resources”, “Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View”, “Security
Awareness Communication, and “User’s Risk Perception”. We introduced the con-
cept of facet as a perspective of the model: the model can be used by looking at a
specific class of attackers or at a specific category of assets. We present a system-
atic five-step approach to use the model in an organization, and derived a six-step
approach to use facets.
8.2 Contributions
The objective of this research is to provide IT security officers a tool to start
reasoning about IT security, and a support to communicate with decision makers.
More specifically, the contributions are the following:
• Development of an approach to produce a model to help reasoning and commu-
nicating about IT security : the approach consists in developing an influence-
based model that identifies major components of security, characteristics of
components, and influences among them. This provides IT security teams
and managers a clear, high-level picture of what should be considered when
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managing security,
• Development of a systematic method to apply the model in organizations : we
provided directions on how to measure some characteristics in the model and
developed a method to incorporate evidence in the model. We introduced the
concept of facet to use the model from different perspectives at a lower level
of detail,
• Development and validation of a model for academic environments : the de-
velopment and validation of this model rely on a combination of experts and
empirical data. More specifically, they include a detailed model based on the
literature and on discussions with the Director of Security at UMD, two mod-
els resulting from interviews with experts, surveys answered by fifteen experts,
and empirical data collected at UMD. The model is flexible and characteristics
or relationships can be added or removed if other analysts disagree with the
presented model.
8.3 Future Work
Evaluation of the usability of the model
We showed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 how the model can support reasoning
about security. We believe that the model would improve reasoning about security
and would improve communication while making decisions in practice. However, we
did not evaluate it. A relevant approach to address this issue would be to conduct
an evaluation of the usability of the model: it would be insightful to take part in
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a meeting with IT security officers and observe them brainstorm on security issues
as well as to observe IT security officers convince managers to invest in a solution.
In addition, brainstorming and convincing managers without the model on the one
hand and with the model on the other hand should be compared. We envision that
the model allows a documentable, repeatable, justifiable process of brainstorming
and decision making.
Measurement of the model
In Chapter 7, we provided measurements for a set of characteristics. Although
the task is tedious and complex, we demonstrated that providing useful, practical
measurements for characteristics in the model is achievable. It is important for
organizations to have directions on indicators of characteristics in the model, such
as the “User’s Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security”, “Organizational
Attitude towards Security” and “Budget”, and on how to map measurements in
the model. Indicators can be qualitative or quantitative, and measuring them in
organizations should be possible in practice.
Quantification of the model
The model presented in this dissertation is qualitative at several levels. First,
values of characteristics are assessed through low, medium, and high values. Sec-
ond, the influence of one characteristic on another is a weak, medium, or strong
influence. Third, when alternatives are possible, one decision is made because it
has relatively more impact on security than another one. We showed in Chapter 6
and Chapter 7 that, although qualitative, the model is still useful and insights can
be gained. Deriving a quantitative model would allow more accurate conclusions.
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Several aspects in the derivation of a quantitative model could be considered:
• Development of a quantitative framework : For example, a Bayesian Belief
Network (BBN) can be derived from the causal model presented in this dis-
sertation. The quantification of the BBN can be supported by experts or
empirical data, but may be challenging. A solution is to derive an algorithm
to quantify the BBN based on the type and strength of influences. By setting
evidence on characteristics in several alternatives, a probability may be com-
puted for security that would be meaningful in a relative manner. If a BBN
is selected, one should take care of loops in the model,
• Incorporation of models at a lower level : The model presented in this dis-
sertation is a high-level model. For some characteristics, such as attackers’
behavior, models have been developed at a lower level. It would be relevant
to study how to incorporate these detailed models into our comprehensive
approach,
• Fusion of several types of data: Empirical data can support the quantification
of characteristics. Another relevant approach, when empirical data is unavail-
able, is to use simulations. Combining experts’ opinions, empirical data, and
simulations, would bring another level of refinement and more accuracy to the
model.
Development of the model in other environments
In this dissertation, we introduced an approach to help reasoning and com-
municating about security issues and presented a model. Although the model was
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developed based on experts and data in academic environments, we believe that
some characteristics and influences in the model are applicable to other environ-
ments. In addition, as the model is flexible, one can easily modify it by changing,
adding, or removing characteristics or influences. A solution to address the issue
of the applicability of the model in other types of organizations is to conduct the
development and validation of a model in these environments based on the method




This appendix is composed of two elements:
• An interview sheet: It is a support for interviewees to gather general informa-
tion on the interviewer’s expertise and organization,
• A six-page questionnaire: It is provided to the interviewer and is collected at
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Model-Based Information Security Management 
University of Maryland, College Park Page 1 of 6
This interview is part of a research led at the University of Maryland to develop a model to 
manage security. This model will 1) allow security administrators assess and manage 
information security at their organizations and 2) be a tool for communication with decision 
makers and users. The model is a causal model that 1) identifies characteristics that influence 




Question 1: What are the characteristics for each of the 4 main components that increase or 
decrease the number of unsuccessful attacks in an organization? 
 
 
In our study, we will consider 4 main components:  
- The attacker (“an individual who attempts one or more attacks in order to achieve an 
objective”),  
- The user (“someone who uses a computer”),  
- The organization (“a social arrangement, which pursues collective goals, which 
controls its own performance, and which has a boundary separating it from its 
environment”; includes the IT team), and  
- The asset (everything owned by a person or company; includes computers and data). 
 




Characteristics consist in attributes of each of the 4 main components that have an influence 
on increasing or decreasing security. 
 




Example: We want to model human error in a power plant. A characteristic for human error is the 
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In order to end up with a tool for communication purposes, we will use a visual representation 
where characteristics will be represented as bubbles. Relationships between characteristics will be 
depicted by arrows. We will define positive (“+”) or negative (“-”) influences.  
 
►Draw a figure that includes a) bubbles to represent the characteristics you identified in 
question 1, b) arrows to represent influences between these characteristics, c) “+” or “-” to 




Example: The operator’s fatigue and knowledge influence the human error. The more fatigue, the 
more prone to error. On the contrary, the more knowledge on the procedures, the fewer errors. 
These influences are depicted by a positive influence (“+”) of the fatigue on the human error and 






Loops may be considered.  
The more stress an operator is exposed to, the more prone to error he/she is. Besides, the more 
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Question 3: What are the most/least influencing characteristics? 
 
 
When several characteristics influence one characteristic, the thickness of the arrow will 
depict the strength of the influence.  
 




Example: The operator’s fatigue, knowledge and stress influence the human error. Fatigue and 
stress positively influence the human error whereas knowledge negatively influences the human 
error. We will assign a thickness to arrows to depict the strength of influences. For example, 
knowledge of the operator has the highest influence on the human error: we will assign a thick 
arrow to that influence. Fatigue has a higher influence than stress on the human error and will be 
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This appendix provides snapshots of the online survey sent to IT security
officers. It includes:
• Introduction page,
• Questions about the experts’ experience and organization,
• Questions on the decomposition of security into “users, organization, threat,
assets”,
• Questions on the strength of characteristics on security,
• Questions on the impact of two security measures,














Results of the Survey
This appendix presents the results to the question: “Please indicate how strong
you consider the influence of the following characteristics on the security level”.
Table C.1: User’s Risk Perception
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 4 27%
Strong influence 10 67%
Table C.2: User’s Trust
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 2 13%
Medium influence 2 13%
Strong influence 11 73%
Table C.3: User’s Exposure to Security (for example through media)
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 3 20%
Medium influence 6 40%
Strong influence 6 40%
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Table C.4: User’s Theoretical Knowledge in Using Computers or/and in Security
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 5 33%
Medium influence 7 47%
Strong influence 3 20%
Table C.5: User’s Experience in Using Computers or/and in Security
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 0 0%
Medium influence 13 87%
Strong influence 2 13%
Table C.6: User’s Gender
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 11 73%
Weak influence 3 20%
Medium influence 1 7%
Strong influence 0 0%
Table C.7: User’s Age
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 1 7%
Weak influence 7 47%
Medium influence 7 47%
Strong influence 0 0%
Table C.8: User’s Place of Birth
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 7 47%
Weak influence 6 40%
Medium influence 2 13%
Strong influence 0 0%
239
Table C.9: User’s Role (if the user is an undergraduate/graduate student, a faculty,
a staff, an intern, etc...)
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 4 27%
Medium influence 11 73%
Strong influence 0 0%
Table C.10: Security Awareness Communication to Users
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 3 20%
Medium influence 9 60%
Strong influence 3 20%
Table C.11: Management Understanding of Security Needs
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 0 0%
Medium influence 3 20%
Strong influence 12 80%
Table C.12: Security Team Talent
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 4 27%
Strong influence 10 67%
Table C.13: Security Team Qualities (for example withstanding stress)
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 9 60%
Strong influence 5 33%
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Table C.14: Financial Resources Available for Security
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 10 67%
Strong influence 4 27%
Table C.15: Available Security Hardware (for example security devices such as in-
trusion prevention systems)
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 9 60%
Strong influence 5 33%
Table C.16: Available Security Software (for example patches, signatures)
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 7 47%
Strong influence 7 47%
Table C.17: Risk Assessment Program
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 8 53%
Strong influence 6 40%
Table C.18: Security Policies
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 2 13%
Medium influence 6 40%
Strong influence 7 47%
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Table C.19: Organizational Attitude towards Security
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 0 0%
Medium influence 2 13%
Strong influence 13 87%
Table C.20: Threat Awareness
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 7 47%
Strong influence 7 47%
Table C.21: Attacker’s Motivations
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 6 40%
Strong influence 8 53%
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Table C.22: Attacker’s Expertise
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 2 13%
Medium influence 6 40%
Strong influence 7 47%
Table C.23: Attacker’s Qualities (for example perseverance)
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 0 0%
Medium influence 6 40%
Strong influence 9 60%
Table C.24: Value of the Asset from the Attacker’s Point of View
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 0 0%
Medium influence 8 53%
Strong influence 7 47%
Table C.25: Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 1 7%
Medium influence 8 53%
Strong influence 6 40%
Table C.26: Depth of Protection of the Asset (includes all protections of an asset -
passwords, firewalls...)
Type of influence Number responses Percentage
No influence 0 0%
Weak influence 0 0%
Medium influence 7 47%
Strong influence 8 53%
243
Appendix D
Propagating Values in the Model
In this appendix, we present the technique used to propagate values of char-
acteristics in the model, based on the type and strength of the influence. The
technique used is a simple one but other techniques such as fuzzy logic or Bayesian
Belief Networks could have been used to propagate values.
D.1 Method
If a child node C has n parent nodes of influence of type positive or negative
and of strength si (strong, medium, or weak), as depicted in Figure D.1, and we
have evidence for parent nodes, the value vC of the child node is calculated based
on the following simple equation:
vC =
∑n
i=1 si ∗ vi∑n
i=1 si
(D.1)
Each variable is defined as follows:
• si is the strength of the influence of parent i on child node C: It is equal to 1,
2, or 3 if the influence is weak, medium, or strong respectively,
• vi is the value of parent i: If the parent node has a positive influence on C,
it is equal to 1, 2, and 3 if the value of the node is low, medium, and strong
respectively. If the parent node has a negative influence on C, the values 1,
2, and 3 are assigned to high, medium, and low respectively (reverse order).
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Indeed, if a node has a positive influence on a node, and the parent node is high
(respectively low), then the child node is more likely to be high (respectively
low). On the contrary, if a node has a negative influence on another node, and
the parent node is high (respectively low), the child node is more likely to be
low (respectively high).
Figure D.1: Child Node with n Parent Nodes - Each parent Pk has an influence of
type tk and of strength sk on child node C.
Once a value vC is determined, thresholds are set to decide what values of vC
are low, medium, or strong. These thresholds may vary from one analyst to another.
We chose the following thresholds:
• If vc ≤ 1.5, then child node C has a low value,
• If 1.5 < vc < 2.5, then child node C has a medium value,
• If 2.5 ≤ vc, then child node C has a high value.
This technique was verified for the case of two parent nodes. Each combina-
tion of strength of influence (strong, medium, or weak influence), type of influence
(positive, or negative), and value of the parent nodes (high, medium, or low value),
was checked for inconsistency. For example, in the case of two nodes positively
impacting a child node (irrespectively from the strength of the influence), if parent
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nodes are high, the child node should be high. In the case where the strength of
the influence of both parent nodes on the child node are similar, if one of the parent
node is high and the other one is low, the child node should be medium. However,
if one parent is high and the other one is medium, it may be unclear for an ana-
lyst wether the child node should be high or medium. In this case, the described
technique allows discriminating between a medium and a high value. This value is
flexible and can be changed according to the analyst by modifying the thresholds.
D.2 Examples
D.2.1 Example 1: Two Parent Nodes
In this example, we consider two parent nodes P1 and P2 influencing node C
with a medium positive influence (Figure D.2). Values of C are derived from values
of P1 and P2 and are shown in Table D.1. We show in parenthesis the computed
value vC based on values of A and B, with sP1 = sP2 = 2.
Figure D.2: Example of Two Parent Nodes
From Table D.1, the highest (respectively lowest) value of C is obtained when
both parents are high (respectively low). When both parents are medium, the child
node is medium. When one parent is low and the other one is high, the child
node is medium. These results match the intuition one may have when thinking
about the qualitative values only. However, in the two cases where 1) one of the
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Table D.1: Values of the Child Node C based on Values of its Two Parents P1 and
P2 in Example 1
Value of P1 Value of P2 Value of C
High High High (3)
High Medium High (2.5)
High Low Medium (2)
Medium High High (2.5)
Medium Medium Medium(2)
Medium Low Low (1.5)
Low High Medium (2)
Low Medium Low (1.5)
Low Low Low (1)
parent is low and the other one is medium, and 2) one of the parent is medium and
the other one is high, it may be unclear to determine the value of the child node
with qualitative thinking. This technique is deterministic by nature through the
thresholds: a quantitative value of 1.5 for the child node falls into a low domain
while a quantitative value of 2.5 falls into the high domain. These thresholds can
be refined by the analyst.
D.2.2 Example 2: Three Parent Nodes
In this subsection, we present the case of a node with three parent nodes. In
the model, “Security” has three parent nodes (Figure D.3):
• “Attacker’s Motivations” have a medium negative impact on “Security”,
• “Attacker’s Resources” have a strong negative impact on “Security”,
• “Depth of Protection of the Asset” have a strong positive impact on “Security”.
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Figure D.3: Example of Three Parent Nodes
The value of “Security” depends on values of its three parent nodes, as shown
in Table D.2. In this example, “Depth of Protection of the Asset” has three possible
values (high, medium, or low) whereas “Attacker’s Motivations” and “Attacker’s
Resources” have two possible values (high or low). For the last two characteristics,
vi = 1 if characteristic i is low, and vi = 3 if characteristic i is high.









High High High Medium (1.75)
High High Low Medium (2.25)
High Low High High (2.5)
High Low Low High (3)
Medium High High Low (1.375)
Medium High Low Medium (1.875)
Medium Low High Medium (2.125)
Medium Low Low High (2.625)
Low High High Low (1)
Low High Low Low (1.5)
Low Low High Medium (1.75)
Low Low Low Medium (2.25)
As expected, the case where “Depth of Protection of the Asset” is high and the
attacker-related nodes are low leads to the highest level of security among the pos-
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sible cases. Similarly, the case where the “Depth of Protection of the Asset” is low
and the other two nodes are high leads to the lowest level of security: this case rep-
resents when assets are not well protected and when attackers are highly motivated
and have many resources available (e.g. knowledge, hardware, and software).
D.2.3 Example 3: Four Parent Nodes
This subsection details the propagation of evidence set in the example depicted
in Section 7.8.1. We assume a high value of “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”
and a medium value for “Security Awareness Communication” (Figure D.4).
Figure D.4: Example of Two Sets of Evidence - H, M, and L stand for High, Medium,
and Low
The high value of the “Security Team Expertise and Qualities” transfer to
“Security Policies” while “User’s Expertise in Using Computers or/and in Security”
takes the medium value of the “Security Awareness Communication”. On the other
hand, “User’s Risk Perception” is influenced by the medium values of “Security
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Awareness Communication” and “User’s Expertise in Using Computers or/and in
Security”. Therefore, “Depth of Protection of the Asset” has four parent nodes,
which values and strength of influence are depicted in Figure D.5 and summarized
in Table D.3. In this situation, the value vc of “Depth of Protection of the Asset”
is 2.44 and is therefore medium.
Figure D.5: Example of Four Parent Nodes - H, M, and L stand for High, Medium,
and Low
Table D.3: Value of “Depth of Protection of the Asset” based on Values of its Four
Parents
Characteristic Strength of the influence Value
Security policies Medium (2) High (3)
User’s risk perception Strong (3) Medium (2)
User’s expertise in using computers
or/and in security
Medium (2) Medium (2)
Security team expertise and quali-
ties
Medium (2) High (3)
Depth of protection of the asset - Medium (2.44)
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D.2.4 Example 4: Five Parent Nodes
This section explains the propagation of the example depicted in Section 7.8.4
where we have the following pieces of evidence (Figure D.6):
• Low value for the “Value of the Asset from the Organization’s Point of View”,
• High value for the “Security Team Expertise and Qualities”,
• Medium value for the “Security Awareness Communication”.
Figure D.6: Example of Three Sets of Evidence - H, M, and L stand for High,
Medium, and Low
On the one hand, “Security Policies” have a high value due to its only parent
“Security Team Expertise and Qualities”. On the other hand, the medium value of
“Security Awareness Communication” propagates to the “User’s Expertise in Using
Computers or/and in Security”. “User’s Risk Perception is impacted by a medium
value from “Security Awareness Communication and a medium value of “User’s
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Risk Perception”, hence it has a medium value. Therefore, “Depth of Protection
of the Asset” has five parent nodes with the set and propagated evidence shown in
Figure D.7. The evidence used to calculate the value vC of “Depth of Protection of
the Asset” is provided in Table D.4. Based on the three aforementioned pieces of
evidence, the value of the “Depth of Protection of the Asset” is medium.
Figure D.7: Example of Five Parent Nodes - H, M, and L stand for High, Medium,
and Low
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Table D.4: Value of “Depth of Protection of the Asset” based on Values of its Five
Parents
Characteristic Strength of the influence Value
Value of the asset from the organi-
zation’s point of view
Medium (2) Low (1)
Security policies Medium (2) High (3)
User’s risk perception Strong (3) Medium (2)
User’s expertise in using computers
or/and in security
Medium (2) Medium (2)
Security team expertise and quali-
ties
Medium (2) High (3)
Depth of protection of the asset - Medium (2.18)
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